Economics and Politics

Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Recent citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.

Create citation feed for this series

Raw data:
IF AIF DOC CIT D2Y C2Y SC(%) CiY II AII 1996 0.13 0.18 15 22 32 4 0 0.08 1997 0.48 0.21 16 15 31 15 0 1 0.06 0.08 1998 0.26 0.22 14 63 31 8 0 0.1 1999 0.07 0.28 15 106 30 2 0 1 0.07 0.13 2000 0.1 0.37 15 270 29 3 0 4 0.27 0.16 2001 0.47 0.37 15 123 30 14 0 4 0.27 0.16 2002 0.77 0.41 15 57 30 23 0 1 0.07 0.19 2003 0.7 0.42 14 35 30 21 0 3 0.21 0.2 2004 0.48 0.47 15 92 29 14 0 11 0.73 0.21 2005 0.76 0.5 15 101 29 22 0 16 1.07 0.23 2006 0.83 0.51 16 59 30 25 0 4 0.25 0.22 2007 0.74 0.4 18 49 31 23 0 3 0.17 0.18 2008 0.68 0.42 16 39 34 23 4.3 9 0.56 0.21 2009 0.47 0.43 16 26 34 16 0 11 0.69 0.19
IF: Impact Factor: C2Y / D2Y AIF: Average Impact Factor for series in RePEc in year y DOC: Number of documents published in year y CIT: Number of citations to the series in year y D2Y: Number of articles published in y-1 plus y-2 C2Y: Cites in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 SC(%): Percentage of selft citations in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 CiY: Cites in year y to documents published in year y IdI: Immediacy Index: CiY / Documents.   AII: Average Immediacy Index for series in RePEc in year y
Impact Factor:	Immediacy Index:
Documents published:	Citations received:

Most cited documents in this series:

(1) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:7:y:1995:i:3:p:207-227 INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: CROSS-COUNTRY TESTS USING ALTERNATIVE INSTITUTIONAL MEASURES (1995).
Cited: 363 times.

(2) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:12:y:2000:i:1:p:1-31 The Institutional Environment for Economic Growth (2000).
Cited: 145 times.

(3) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:1:y:1989:i:1:p:17-39 POLITICALLY CONTESTABLE RENTS AND TRANSFERS (1989).
Cited: 66 times.

(4) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:12:y:2000:i:1:p:69-81 Causality and Feedback Between Institutional Measures and Economic Growth (2000).
Cited: 63 times.

(5) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:13:y:2001:i:2:p:201-220 The Political Economy of the IRS (2001).
Cited: 39 times.

(6) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:17:y:2005:i::p:37-75 PROPOSAL FOR A NEW MEASURE OF CORRUPTION, ILLUSTRATED WITH ITALIAN DATA (2005).
Cited: 32 times.

(7) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:2:y:1990:i:1:p:1-23 THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS IN THE REVIVAL OF TRADE: THE LAW MERCHANT, PRIVATE JUDGES, AND THE CHAMPAGNE FAIRS (1990).
Cited: 32 times.

(8) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:3:y:1991:i:3:p:177-200 THE PARADOX OF POWER (1991).
Cited: 31 times.

(9) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:11:y:1999:i:3:p:275-297 Aid, Growth and Democracy (1999).
Cited: 28 times.

(10) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:16:y:2004:i:1:p:1-27 Political Institutions and Policy Volatility (2004).
Cited: 27 times.

(11) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:12:y:2000:i:2:p:155-182 Corruption, Income Distribution, and Growth (2000).
Cited: 25 times.

(12) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:4:y:1992:i:1:p:79-108 ELECTIONS AND THE THEORY OF CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS: A SURVEY AND CRITICAL ANALYSIS (1992).
Cited: 25 times.

(13) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:12:y:2000:i:3:p:225-245 Ethnicity, Politics and Economic Performance (2000).
Cited: 22 times.

(14) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:10:y:1998:i:1:p:63-83 Political Control of Administrative Spending: The Case of Local Governments in Norway (1998).
Cited: 21 times.

(15) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:17:y:2005:i::p:177-213 WHICH VARIABLES EXPLAIN DECISIONS ON IMF CREDIT? AN EXTREME BOUNDS ANALYSIS (2005).
Cited: 21 times.

(16) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:11:y:1999:i:2:p:171-199 Does Distributional Skewness Lead to Redistribution? Evidence from the United States (1999).
Cited: 20 times.

(17) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:11:y:1999:i:3:p:225-253 Aid, Taxation and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa (1999).
Cited: 20 times.

(18) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:4:y:1992:i:2:p:117-136 PROMISE KEEPING IN THE GREAT SOCIETY: A MODEL OF CREDIT INFORMATION SHARING (1992).
Cited: 20 times.

(19) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:4:y:1992:i:1:p:1-30 MACROECONOMIC POLICY AND ELECTIONS IN OECD DEMOCRACIES (1992).
Cited: 20 times.

(20) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:3:y:1991:i:1:p:1-20 INTERNATIONAL TRADE BARGAINING AND THE MOST-FAVORED-NATION CLAUSE (1991).
Cited: 19 times.

(21) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:13:y:2001:i:2:p:129-157 Do Crises Induce Reform? Simple Empirical Tests of Conventional Wisdom (2001).
Cited: 19 times.

(22) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:2:y:1990:i:3:p:241-258 ARE EFFICIENCY IMPROVEMENTS IN GOVERNMENT TRANSFER POLICIES SELF-DEFEATING IN POLITICAL EQUILIBRIUM? (1990).
Cited: 19 times.

(23) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:2:y:1990:i:2:p:157-171 A THEORY OF KLEPTOCRACY WITH PROBABILISTIC SURVIVAL AND REPUTATION (1990).
Cited: 18 times.

(24) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:11:y:1999:i:2:p:109-144 Do Gatt Rules Help Governments Make Domestic Commitments? (1999).
Cited: 18 times.

(25) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:2:y:1990:i:2:p:115-132 PUBLIC GOODS, RENT DISSIPATION, AND CANDIDATE COMPETITION (1990).
Cited: 18 times.

(26) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:18:y:2006:i:3:p:339-365 PROMISES MADE, PROMISES BROKEN: A MODEL OF IMF PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION (2006).
Cited: 18 times.

(27) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:19:y:2007:i:3:p:317-344 THE QUALITY OF INSTITUTIONS AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (2007).
Cited: 18 times.

(28) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:21:y:2009:i:1:p:42-92 INSTABILITY AND THE INCENTIVES FOR CORRUPTION (2009).
Cited: 17 times.

(29) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:14:y:2002:i:3:p:225-257 Democracy and the Variability of Economic Performance (2002).
Cited: 16 times.

(30) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:17:y:2005:i::p:1-35 ACCOUNTABILITY AND CORRUPTION: POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS MATTER (2005).
Cited: 16 times.

(31) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:18:y:2006:i:2:p:103-120 SOCIAL COHESION, INSTITUTIONS, AND GROWTH (2006).
Cited: 15 times.

(32) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:16:y:2004:i:1:p:53-76 The Influence of IMF Programs on the Re-election of Debtor Governments (2004).
Cited: 14 times.

(33) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:16:y:2004:i::p:321-345 VOTING TRANSPARENCY, CONFLICTING INTERESTS, AND THE APPOINTMENT OF CENTRAL BANKERS (2004).
Cited: 14 times.

(34) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:10:y:1998:i:2:p:127-142 Foreign Aid and International Support as a Gift Exchange (1998).
Cited: 14 times.

(35) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:17:y:2005:i::p:151-176 ELECTIONS AND EXCHANGE RATE POLICY CYCLES (2005).
Cited: 14 times.

(36) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:10:y:1998:i:1:p:1-17 Rationalizing the Political Business Cycle: A Workhorse Model (1998).
Cited: 13 times.

(37) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:3:y:1991:i:2:p:93-109 ON BUYING LEGISLATURES (1991).
Cited: 13 times.

(38) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:13:y:2001:i:3:p:237-256 Political Determinants of Intergovernmental Grants: Evidence From Argentina (2001).
Cited: 13 times.

(39) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:15:y:2003:i:2:p:135-162 Restraining the Genuine Homo Economicus: Why the Economy Cannot Be Divorced from Its Governance (2003).
Cited: 13 times.

(40) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:12:y:2000:i:3:p:275-295 Delays of Inflation Stabilizations (2000).
Cited: 12 times.

(41) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:1:y:1989:i:3:p:301-314 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRADE POLICY (1989).
Cited: 12 times.

(42) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:4:y:1992:i:3:p:255-276 THE REVELATION OF INFORMATION THROUGH THE ELECTORAL PROCESS: AN EXPLORATORY ANALYSIS (1992).
Cited: 12 times.

(43) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:13:y:2001:i:3:p:311-342 Electoral Rules, Political Systems, and Institutional Quality (2001).
Cited: 11 times.

(44) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:5:y:1993:i:2:p:85-104 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF EUROPEAN MONETARY UNIFICATION: AN ANALYTICAL INTRODUCTION (1993).
Cited: 11 times.

(45) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:12:y:2000:i:2:p:109-135 Repeated Elections with Asymmetric Information (2000).
Cited: 11 times.

(46) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:14:y:2002:i:3:p:283-323 The Economics of Trade Disputes, the GATTs Article XXIII, and the WTOs Dispute Settlement Understanding (2002).
Cited: 10 times.

(47) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:2:y:1990:i:2:p:193-221 THE NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY: ITS EXPLANATORY POWER FOR LDCs (1990).
Cited: 10 times.

(48) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:14:y:2002:p:41-63 Private Investment and Political Institutions (2002).
Cited: 10 times.

(49) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:6:y:1994:i:1:p:1-23 THE PARTISAN MODEL OF MACROECONOMIC CYCLES: MORE THEORY AND EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES (1994).
Cited: 9 times.

(50) RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:19:y:2007:i:1:p:1-33 PUBLIC FINANCE AND INDIVIDUAL PREFERENCES OVER GLOBALIZATION STRATEGIES (2007).
Cited: 9 times.

Recent citations received in: | 2009 | 2008 | 2007 | 2006

Recent citations received in: 2009

(1) RePEc:eab:develo:22059 A Centered Index of Spatial Concentration : Axiomatic Approach with an Application to Population and Capital Cities (2009). Development Economics Working Papers

(2) RePEc:eab:govern:22076 Keeping Dictators Honest : the Role of Population Concentration (2009). Governance Working Papers

(3) RePEc:erg:wpaper:493 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INEQUALITY (2009). Working Papers

(4) RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2009_008 The growth effects of institutional instability (2009). Working Papers

(5) RePEc:hhs:ratioi:0135 The Growth Effects of Institutional Instability (2009). Ratio Working Papers

(6) RePEc:iza:izadps:dp4658 Electoral Rules, Political Competition and Fiscal Expenditures: Regression Discontinuity Evidence from Brazilian Municipalities (2009). IZA Discussion Papers

(7) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14937 Electoral Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from the Audits of Local Governments (2009). NBER Working Papers

(8) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:15465 The Economic Cost of Harboring Terrorism (2009). NBER Working Papers

(9) RePEc:pra:mprapa:19954 Corruption, Transparency and Quality.Comparative Approaches and Judiciary Support (2009). MPRA Paper

(10) RePEc:siu:wpaper:01-2009 Keeping Dictators Honest: the Role of Population Concentration (2009). Working Papers

(11) RePEc:siu:wpaper:02-2009 A Centered Index of Spatial Concentration: Axiomatic Approach with an Application to Population and Capital Cities (2009). Working Papers

Recent citations received in: 2008

(1) RePEc:anp:en2008:200807181549410 The Choices Governors Make: The Roles of Checks and Balances and Political Competition (2008). Anais do XXXVI Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 36th Brazilian Economics Meeting]

(2) RePEc:cam:camdae:0861 A Theory of the Corrupt Keynesian (2008). Cambridge Working Papers in Economics

(3) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6898 Do Interest Groups Affect US Immigration Policy? (2008). CEPR Discussion Papers

(4) RePEc:eca:wpaper:2008_024 Trade Liberalization and Antidumping: Is There a Substitution Effect? (2008). Working Papers ECARES

(5) RePEc:gwi:wpaper:2008-01 Does Antidumping Use Contribute to Trade Liberalization in Developing Countries (2008). Working Papers

(6) RePEc:gwi:wpaper:2008-09 Trade Liberalization and Antidumping: Is There a Substitution Effect? (2008). Working Papers

(7) RePEc:imf:imfwpa:08/244 Do Interest Groups Affect U.S. Immigration Policy? (2008). IMF Working Papers

(8) RePEc:pra:mprapa:10329 A Politico-Economic Analysis of the European Union’s R&D Policy (2008). MPRA Paper

(9) RePEc:sol:wpaper:08-030 The not so dark side of trust: does trust increase the size of the shadow economy? (2008). Working Papers CEB

Recent citations received in: 2007

(1) RePEc:iza:izadps:dp3183 Do Interest Groups Affect Immigration? (2007). IZA Discussion Papers

(2) RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:4113 Location decisions of foreign banks and competitive advantage (2007). Policy Research Working Paper Series

(3) RePEc:wly:jintdv:v:19:y:2007:i:6:p:735-753 Trade facilitation, regulatory quality and export performance (2007). Journal of International Development

Recent citations received in: 2006

(1) RePEc:cgd:wpaper:85 The Economics of Young Democracies: Policies and Performance (2006). Working Papers

(2) RePEc:imf:imfwpa:06/210 Growth and Reforms in Latin America: A Survey of Facts and Arguments (2006). IMF Working Papers

(3) RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:128:y:2006:i:3:p:383-405 Everyone likes a winner: An empirical test of the effect of electoral closeness on turnout in a context of expressive voting (2006). Public Choice

(4) RePEc:pra:mprapa:553 The Economics of Young Democracies: Policies and Performance (2006). MPRA Paper

Warning!! This is still an experimental service. The results of this service should be interpreted with care, especially in research assessment exercises. The processing of documents is automatic. There still are errors and omissions in the identification of references. We are working to improve the software to increase the accuracy of the results.

Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.