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  Updated February, 7 2012 333.516 documents processed, 7.301.907 references and 2.961.463 citations

 

 
 

Boston University - Industry Studies Programme

Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Recent citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.

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Raw data:
IF AIF DOC CIT D2Y C2Y SC(%) CiY II AII
19960.150.18245120300.09
19970.250.18131532800.09
19980.160.2161937600.12
19990.10.2628293010.50.16
20000.110.36534182010.20.17
20010.140.3507100.17
20020.40.405200.19
20030.40000.2
20040.440000.22
20050.460000.27
20060.480000.24
20070.40000.2
20080.40000.2
20090.360000.21
 
 
IF: Impact Factor: C2Y / D2Y
AIF: Average Impact Factor for series in RePEc in year y
DOC: Number of documents published in year y
CIT: Number of citations to the series in year y
D2Y: Number of articles published in y-1 plus y-2
C2Y: Cites in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2
SC(%): Percentage of selft citations in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2
CiY: Cites in year y to documents published in year y
IdI: Immediacy Index: CiY / Documents.
 
AII: Average Immediacy Index for series in RePEc in year y
Impact Factor:
Immediacy Index:
Documents published:
Citations received:

 

Most cited documents in this series:

(1) RePEc:fth:bostin:0047 Health Care Payment Systems: Cost and Quality Incentives (1994).
Cited: 61 times.

(2) RePEc:fth:bostin:0062 Machine Replacement and the Business Cycle: Lumps and Bumps (1995).
Cited: 30 times.

(3) RePEc:fth:bostin:0015 Physician Response to Fee Changes with Multiple Payers (1991).
Cited: 27 times.

(4) RePEc:fth:bostin:0100 Competition Policy as Strategic Trade (2000).
Cited: 18 times.

(5) RePEc:fth:bostin:68 A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structure. (1996).
Cited: 18 times.

(6) RePEc:fth:bostin:0099 Using Diagnoses to Describe Populations and Predict Costs (2000).
Cited: 13 times.

(7) RePEc:fth:bostin:0093 The Relevance of Private Information in Mechanism Design (1998).
Cited: 12 times.

(8) RePEc:fth:bostin:0026 Competition and Bank Performance: A Theoretical Perspective (1992).
Cited: 12 times.

(9) RePEc:fth:bostin:0065 Experimentation, Imitation, and Stochastic Stability (1996).
Cited: 11 times.

(10) RePEc:fth:bostin:36 Cooperation without Reputation: Experimental Evidence from Prisoners Dilemma Games. (1992).
Cited: 9 times.

(11) RePEc:fth:bostin:0070 Contract Complexity, Incentives and the Value of Delegation (1996).
Cited: 8 times.

(12) RePEc:fth:bostin:0096 Endogenous Matching and the Empirical Determinants of Contract Form (1999).
Cited: 8 times.

(13) RePEc:fth:bostin:44 Generalized Solutions of Stochastic Differential Games in One Dimension. (1993).
Cited: 6 times.

(14) RePEc:fth:bostin:71 Budgeting and Hierarchical Control. (1996).
Cited: 6 times.

(15) RePEc:fth:bostin:0084 Cost and Quality Incentives in Health Care: Altruistic Providers (1997).
Cited: 5 times.

(16) RePEc:fth:bostin:0011 A Cross Country Comparison of Seasonal Cycles and Business Cycles (1991).
Cited: 5 times.

(17) RePEc:fth:bostin:0091 Environmental Regulation and Productivity: Evidence from Oil Refineries (1998).
Cited: 5 times.

(18) RePEc:fth:bostin:0058 Ex Post Regret and the Decentralized Sharing of Information (1995).
Cited: 4 times.

(19) RePEc:fth:bostin:0001 Macroeconomic Implications of Production Bunching: Factor Demand Linkages (1990).
Cited: 3 times.

(20) RePEc:fth:bostin:0064 Anticompetitive Vertical Integration by a Dominant Firm (1996).
Cited: 3 times.

(21) RePEc:fth:bostin:0080 Health Insurance, Moral Hazard, and Managed Care (1997).
Cited: 3 times.

(22) RePEc:fth:bostin:82 Environmental Regulation and Labor demand: Evidence from the South Coast Air Basin. (1997).
Cited: 3 times.

(23) RePEc:fth:bostin:64 Anticompetitive Vertical Integration by a Dominant Firm. (1996).
Cited: 3 times.

(24) RePEc:fth:bostin:0039 The Learning Curve, Market Dominance and Predatory Pricing (1992).
Cited: 3 times.

(25) RePEc:fth:bostin:0075 Competition and Incentives with Non-Exclusive Contracts (1996).
Cited: 3 times.

(26) RePEc:fth:bostin:0046 Equilibria and Pareto Optima of Markets with Adverse Selection (1994).
Cited: 3 times.

(27) RePEc:fth:bostin:0082 Environmental Regulation and Labor Demand: Evidence from the South Coast Air Basin (1997).
Cited: 3 times.

(28) RePEc:fth:bostin:0038 Informational Capacity and Financial Collapse (1992).
Cited: 3 times.

(29) RePEc:fth:bostin:0102 Price and Quality Competition under Adverse Selection: Market Organization and Efficiency (2000).
Cited: 3 times.

(30) RePEc:fth:bostin:0056 Simultaneous Auctions with Synergies (1995).
Cited: 2 times.

(31) RePEc:fth:bostin:0024 Quality Competition, Welfare, and Regulation (1992).
Cited: 2 times.

(32) RePEc:fth:bostin:0044 Generalized Solutions of Stochastic Differential Games in One Dimension (1993).
Cited: 2 times.

(33) RePEc:fth:bostin:0077 On Some Myths about Sequenced Common-value Auctions (1997).
Cited: 2 times.

(34) RePEc:fth:bostin:0055 Explaining the Choice Among Regulatory Plans in the U.S. Telecommunications Industry (1995).
Cited: 2 times.

(35) RePEc:fth:bostin:0068 A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structure (1996).
Cited: 2 times.

(36) RePEc:fth:bostin:0022 BANK RUNS: Liquidity and Incentives (1991).
Cited: 2 times.

(37) RePEc:fth:bostin:37 Dynamic Duopoly with Slowly Changing Customer Loyalties. (1992).
Cited: 2 times.

(38) RePEc:fth:bostin:0029 Hospital Cost Function Estimation When Firms May Not Try to Minimize Total Costs (1991).
Cited: 2 times.

(39) RePEc:fth:bostin:0007 Bargaining with Deadlines and Imperfect Player Control (1991).
Cited: 2 times.

(40) RePEc:fth:bostin:0066 Health Premium Payment Systems for State Employees (1996).
Cited: 2 times.

(41) RePEc:fth:bostin:0020 The Economics of Referrals (1991).
Cited: 2 times.

(42) RePEc:fth:bostin:0059 Optimal Health Insurance and Provider Payment (1995).
Cited: 2 times.

(43) RePEc:fth:bostin:73 Sharing Default Information as a Borrower Discipline Device. (1996).
Cited: 2 times.

(44) RePEc:fth:bostin:0073 Sharing Default Information as a Borrower Discipline Device (1996).
Cited: 2 times.

(45) RePEc:fth:bostin:42 Asking Prices as Commitment Devices. (1993).
Cited: 2 times.

(46) RePEc:fth:bostin:0017 Learning to Compete and Vice Versa (1991).
Cited: 1 times.

(47) RePEc:fth:bostin:0037 Dynamic Duopoly with Slowly Changing Customer Loyalties (1992).
Cited: 1 times.

(48) RePEc:fth:bostin:0009 Mental Health Provider Response to the Reimbursement System (1991).
Cited: 1 times.

(49) RePEc:fth:bostin:0090 Violence and the U.S. Prohibition of Drugs and Alcohol (1998).
Cited: 1 times.

(50) RePEc:fth:bostin:41 Regulation without Commitment: Price Regulation of UK Utilities (with Special Emphasis on Telecommunications). (1993).
Cited: 1 times.

Recent citations received in: | 2009 | 2008 | 2007 | 2006

Recent citations received in: 2009

Recent citations received in: 2008

Recent citations received in: 2007

Recent citations received in: 2006

Warning!! This is still an experimental service. The results of this service should be interpreted with care, especially in research assessment exercises. The processing of documents is automatic. There still are errors and omissions in the identification of references. We are working to improve the software to increase the accuracy of the results.

Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.

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