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  Updated February, 7 2012 333.516 documents processed, 7.301.907 references and 2.961.463 citations

 

 
 

Discussion Paper Series

Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Recent citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.

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Raw data:
IF AIF DOC CIT D2Y C2Y SC(%) CiY II AII
19960.180000.09
19970.180000.09
19980.20000.12
19990.260000.16
20000.3621000.17
20010.50.35211421010.050.17
20020.040.4329523110040.130.19
20030.190.4323753104020.060.2
20040.360.44333264234.390.270.22
20050.220.463319651428.620.060.27
20060.180.4828346612080.290.24
20070.180.43413611136.40.2
20080.180.4233621136.40.2
20090.050.3627357366.710.040.21
 
 
IF: Impact Factor: C2Y / D2Y
AIF: Average Impact Factor for series in RePEc in year y
DOC: Number of documents published in year y
CIT: Number of citations to the series in year y
D2Y: Number of articles published in y-1 plus y-2
C2Y: Cites in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2
SC(%): Percentage of selft citations in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2
CiY: Cites in year y to documents published in year y
IdI: Immediacy Index: CiY / Documents.
 
AII: Average Immediacy Index for series in RePEc in year y
Impact Factor:
Immediacy Index:
Documents published:
Citations received:

 

Most cited documents in this series:

(1) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp298 Individual and Group Decisions in the Centipede Game: Are Groups More “Rational” Players? (2002).
Cited: 27 times.

(2) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp297 Intergroup conflict: Individual, group and collective interests. (2002).
Cited: 21 times.

(3) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp421 Shapley Value (2006).
Cited: 17 times.

(4) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp292 On the Existence of Pure Strategy Monotone Equilibria in Asymmetric First-Price Auctions (2002).
Cited: 16 times.

(5) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp321 Limit Order Book as a Market for Liquidity (2003).
Cited: 9 times.

(6) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp359 Strategic Merger Waves: A Theory of Musical Chairs (2004).
Cited: 8 times.

(7) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp284 Long Cheap Talk (2002).
Cited: 8 times.

(8) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp295 Stochastic games: Existence of the MinMax (2002).
Cited: 7 times.

(9) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp303 Repeated Price Competition Between Individuals and Between Teams (2002).
Cited: 7 times.

(10) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp330 Bounded Rationality and Socially Optimal Limits on Choice in a Self-Selection Model (2002).
Cited: 6 times.

(11) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp266 Scapegoats and Optimal Allocation of Responsibility (2001).
Cited: 5 times.

(12) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp336 Online Concealed Correlation by Boundedly Rational Players (2003).
Cited: 5 times.

(13) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp343 Type Indeterminacy: A Model of the KT(Kahneman-Tversky)-man (2003).
Cited: 5 times.

(14) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp532 How Common Are Common Priors? (2010).
Cited: 4 times.

(15) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp377 Optimal Use of Communication Resources (2004).
Cited: 4 times.

(16) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp428 War and Peace (2005).
Cited: 4 times.

(17) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp411 Growth of Strategy Sets, Entropy, and Nonstationary Bounded Recall (2005).
Cited: 4 times.

(18) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp434 Discrete Colonel Blotto and General Lotto Games (2006).
Cited: 3 times.

(19) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp285 On the Misperception of Variability (2002).
Cited: 3 times.

(20) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp337 An Axiomatization of the Consistent Non-Transferable Utility Value (2003).
Cited: 3 times.

(21) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp309 Regret-Based Continuous-Time Dynamics (2003).
Cited: 3 times.

(22) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp438 Honesty of Signaling and Pollinator Attraction: The Case of Flag-Like Bracts (2006).
Cited: 3 times.

(23) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp385 Declining Valuations in Sequential Auctions (2004).
Cited: 3 times.

(24) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp316 Online Matching Pennies (2003).
Cited: 3 times.

(25) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp353 Corruption and Openness (2004).
Cited: 2 times.

(26) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp369 Unilateral face-to-face communication in ultimatum bargaining - A video experiment (2004).
Cited: 2 times.

(27) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp315 Bargaining with an Agenda (2002).
Cited: 2 times.

(28) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp393 Conditioning and the Sure-Thing Principle (2005).
Cited: 2 times.

(29) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp444 Bayesian Decision Theory and the Representation of Beliefs (2007).
Cited: 2 times.

(30) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp476 Learning Effectiveness and Memory Size (2008).
Cited: 2 times.

(31) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp433 Differentiated Annuities in a Pooling Equilibrium (2006).
Cited: 2 times.

(32) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp363 A Law of Large Numbers for Weighted Majority (2004).
Cited: 2 times.

(33) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp470 The Strategic Value of Recall (2007).
Cited: 2 times.

(34) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp319 Markets Versus Negotiations: An Experimental Investigation (2003).
Cited: 2 times.

(35) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp278 Rationalizing Choice Functions by Multiple Rationales (2001).
Cited: 2 times.

(36) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp454 An Operational Measure of Riskiness (2007).
Cited: 2 times.

(37) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp387 When All is Said and Done, How Should You Play and What Should You Expect? (2005).
Cited: 2 times.

(38) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp357 A Theory of Optimal Deadlines (2003).
Cited: 2 times.

(39) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp372 Adaptive Heuristics (2004).
Cited: 2 times.

(40) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp461 Rationalizable Expectations (2006).
Cited: 2 times.

(41) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp545 Non-Consequentialist Voting (2010).
Cited: 2 times.

(42) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp273 Predictably Incoherent Judgements (2001).
Cited: 2 times.

(43) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp361 Assessing Strategic Risk (2004).
Cited: 2 times.

(44) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp510 The Maximal Variation of Martingales of Probabilities and Repeated Games with Incomplete Information (2009).
Cited: 2 times.

(45) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp414 Tournaments with Midterm Reviews (2006).
Cited: 2 times.

(46) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp435 Complexity and Effective Prediction (2006).
Cited: 2 times.

(47) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp291 A Note on Revenue Effects of Asymmetry in Private-Value Auctions (2002).
Cited: 2 times.

(48) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp394 Tight Correlated Equilibrium (2005).
Cited: 2 times.

(49) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp272 Real Algebraic Tools in Stochastic Games (2001).
Cited: 2 times.

(50) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp446 An Economic Index of Riskiness (2007).
Cited: 2 times.

Recent citations received in: | 2009 | 2008 | 2007 | 2006

Recent citations received in: 2009

(1) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp512 The Value Of Two-Person Zero-Sum Repeated Games with Incomplete Information and Uncertain Duration (2009). Discussion Paper Series

Recent citations received in: 2008

Recent citations received in: 2007

Recent citations received in: 2006

(1) RePEc:bie:wpaper:384 Stable coalition structures in simple games with veto control (2006). Working Papers

(2) RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000374 Optimal Ties in Contests (2006). Levine's Bibliography

(3) RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000608 Vertical Orientation and Color Contrast and Choices by Bumblebees (Bombus terrestris L.) (2006). Levine's Bibliography

(4) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:2006113 Population Monotonic Path Schemes for Simple Games (2006). Discussion Paper

(5) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:2006114 Stable Coalition Structures in Simple Games with Veto Control (2006). Discussion Paper

(6) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp430 Optimal Ties in Contests (2006). Discussion Paper Series

(7) RePEc:huj:dispap:dp439 Vertical Orientation and Color Contrast and Choices by Bumblebees (Bombus terrestris L.) (2006). Discussion Paper Series

(8) RePEc:ner:leuven:urn:hdl:123456789/103684 A behavioural finance model of the exchange rate with many forecasting rules. (2006). Open Access publications from Katholieke Universiteit Leuven

Warning!! This is still an experimental service. The results of this service should be interpreted with care, especially in research assessment exercises. The processing of documents is automatic. There still are errors and omissions in the identification of references. We are working to improve the software to increase the accuracy of the results.

Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.

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