Economic theory and game theory
Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Recent citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers. Create citation feed for this series
Raw data: |
|
IF |
AIF |
DOC |
CIT |
D2Y |
C2Y |
SC(%) |
CiY |
II |
AII |
1996 | | 0.18 | | 0 | 0 | | 0 | | | 0.09 |
1997 | | 0.18 | 2 | 10 | 0 | | 0 | | | 0.09 |
1998 | | 0.2 | 1 | 0 | 2 | | 0 | | | 0.12 |
1999 | | 0.26 | 7 | 13 | 3 | | 0 | 1 | 0.14 | 0.16 |
2000 | 0.25 | 0.36 | 1 | 2 | 8 | 2 | 0 | | | 0.17 |
2001 | 0.63 | 0.35 | 2 | 1 | 8 | 5 | 0 | | | 0.17 |
2002 | | 0.4 | 2 | 10 | 3 | | 0 | | | 0.19 |
2003 | 0.25 | 0.4 | | 0 | 4 | 1 | 0 | | | 0.2 |
2004 | | 0.44 | | 0 | 2 | | 0 | | | 0.22 |
2005 | | 0.46 | 2 | 2 | 0 | | 0 | | | 0.27 |
2006 | | 0.48 | | 0 | 2 | | 0 | | | 0.24 |
2007 | | 0.4 | | 0 | 2 | | 0 | | | 0.2 |
2008 | | 0.4 | | 0 | 0 | | 0 | | | 0.2 |
2009 | | 0.36 | | 0 | 0 | | 0 | | | 0.21 |
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Impact Factor:
| Immediacy Index:
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Documents published:
| Citations received:
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  Most cited documents in this series: (1) RePEc:nid:ovolij:015 The Measurement of Intellectual Influence (2002). Cited: 9 times. (2) RePEc:nid:ovolij:005 The Core of Economies with Asymmetric Information: An Axiomatic Approach (1997). Cited: 7 times. (3) RePEc:nid:ovolij:006 Communication, Credible Improvements and the Core of an Economy with Asymmetric Information (1999). Cited: 6 times. (4) RePEc:nid:ovolij:020 Field Centipedes (0000). Cited: 6 times. (5) RePEc:nid:ovolij:019 EXPERIENTIA DOCET: PROFESSIONALS PLAY MINIMAX IN LABORATORY EXPERIMENTS (0000). Cited: 5 times. (6) RePEc:nid:ovolij:010 On Risk Aversion and Bargaining Outcomes (1999). Cited: 4 times. (7) RePEc:nid:ovolij:004 Will You Marry Me? A Perspective on the Gender Gap (1997). Cited: 3 times. (8) RePEc:nid:ovolij:012 The Evolution of Exchange (2000). Cited: 2 times. (9) RePEc:nid:ovolij:017 Measuring Segregation (2005). Cited: 2 times. (10) RePEc:nid:ovolij:001 Comment on McLennan and Sonnenschein Sequential Bargaining as a Non-Cooperative Foundation for Walrasian Equilibrium (0000). Cited: 1 times. (11) RePEc:nid:ovolij:014 The Time-Preference Nash Solution (2001). Cited: 1 times. (12) RePEc:nid:ovolij:011 On the Failure of Core Convergence in Economies with Asymmetric Information (1999). Cited: 1 times. (13) RePEc:nid:ovolij:016 A Remark on Bargaining and Non-Expected Utility (2002). Cited: 1 times. (14) RePEc:nid:ovolij:002 Formation of Nations in a Welfare State Minded World (1999). Cited: 1 times. (15) RePEc:nid:ovolij:009 Utility Equivalence in Sealed Bid Auctions and the Dual Theory of Choice Under Risk (1999). Cited: 1 times. Recent citations received in: | 2009 | 2008 | 2007 | 2006 Recent citations received in: 2009 Recent citations received in: 2008 Recent citations received in: 2007 Recent citations received in: 2006 Warning!! This is still an experimental service. The results of this service should be interpreted with care, especially in research assessment exercises. The processing of documents is automatic. There still are errors and omissions in the identification of references. We are working to improve the software to increase the accuracy of the results. Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.
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