Discussion Papers

Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Recent citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.

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Raw data:
IF AIF DOC CIT D2Y C2Y SC(%) CiY II AII 1996 0.09 0.18 28 120 66 6 33.3 2 0.07 0.09 1997 0.22 0.18 34 63 63 14 14.3 1 0.03 0.09 1998 0.13 0.2 38 113 62 8 12.5 5 0.13 0.12 1999 0.14 0.26 33 65 72 10 60 4 0.12 0.16 2000 0.34 0.36 30 64 71 24 20.8 5 0.17 0.17 2001 0.25 0.35 25 51 63 16 18.8 4 0.16 0.17 2002 0.35 0.4 24 80 55 19 0 12 0.5 0.19 2003 0.29 0.4 22 27 49 14 14.3 5 0.23 0.2 2004 0.2 0.44 15 63 46 9 0 4 0.27 0.22 2005 0.32 0.46 17 28 37 12 0 12 0.71 0.27 2006 0.63 0.48 24 29 32 20 10 2 0.08 0.24 2007 0.29 0.4 22 28 41 12 0 3 0.14 0.2 2008 0.35 0.4 18 9 46 16 12.5 0.2 2009 0.38 0.36 15 17 40 15 0 5 0.33 0.21
IF: Impact Factor: C2Y / D2Y AIF: Average Impact Factor for series in RePEc in year y DOC: Number of documents published in year y CIT: Number of citations to the series in year y D2Y: Number of articles published in y-1 plus y-2 C2Y: Cites in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 SC(%): Percentage of selft citations in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 CiY: Cites in year y to documents published in year y IdI: Immediacy Index: CiY / Documents.   AII: Average Immediacy Index for series in RePEc in year y
Impact Factor:	Immediacy Index:
Documents published:	Citations received:

Most cited documents in this series:

(1) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:451 Post-War U.S. Business Cycles: An Empirical Investigation (1981).
Cited: 216 times.

(2) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:362 Optimal Auction Design (1978).
Cited: 142 times.

(3) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:594 Job Search and Labor Market Analysis (1984).
Cited: 90 times.

(4) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:572 Redistributive Taxation in a Simple Perfect Foresight Model (1982).
Cited: 80 times.

(5) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1170 Convicting the Innocent: The Inferiority of Unanimous Jury Verdicts (1996).
Cited: 64 times.

(6) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:618 Banking Panics (1984).
Cited: 60 times.

(7) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:225 A Dynamic Theory of Racial Income Differences (1976).
Cited: 59 times.

(8) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:428r Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information (1981).
Cited: 58 times.

(9) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1014 Commitment and Observability in Games (1992).
Cited: 56 times.

(10) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:570 Bid, Ask and Transaction Prices in a Specialist Market with Heterogeneously Informed Traders (1983).
Cited: 54 times.

(11) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:144 Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the Free Rider Problem (1976).
Cited: 52 times.

(12) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:179 Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons (1977).
Cited: 50 times.

(13) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:878 Increasing Returns, Industrialization and Indeterminacy of Equilibrium (1990).
Cited: 48 times.

(14) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:246 Graphs and Cooperation in Games (1976).
Cited: 40 times.

(15) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:602 On Weighted Shapley Values (1983).
Cited: 34 times.

(16) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1058 Intermediation in Search Markets (1993).
Cited: 34 times.

(17) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1494 Transparency of Information and Coordination in Economies with Investment Complementarities (2004).
Cited: 34 times.

(18) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:911 Occupational Choice and the Process of Development (1990).
Cited: 33 times.

(19) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:934 Agricultural Productivity, Comparative Advantage, and Economic Growth (1990).
Cited: 32 times.

(20) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:860 Equilibrium Wage Differentials and Employer Size (1989).
Cited: 31 times.

(21) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:782 A Theory of Voting Equilibria (1988).
Cited: 31 times.

(22) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:496 Multiple-Object Auctions (1981).
Cited: 30 times.

(23) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1141 Games (1995).
Cited: 29 times.

(24) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:406 Rational Expectations (1978).
Cited: 29 times.

(25) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:515 Persistent Equilibria in Strategic Games (1982).
Cited: 28 times.

(26) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1210 Decentralization and Collusion (1998).
Cited: 27 times.

(27) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:532 Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy in an Economy Without Capital (1982).
Cited: 25 times.

(28) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:802 The Limits of Monopolization Through Acquisition (1988).
Cited: 25 times.

(29) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:817 Collusion in Auctions (1989).
Cited: 23 times.

(30) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:297 Labor Supply Under Uncertainty (1977).
Cited: 22 times.

(31) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:848 Cheap Talk and Cooperation in the Society (1989).
Cited: 22 times.

(32) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:384 The Matching Process as a Non-Cooperative/Bargaining Game (1979).
Cited: 21 times.

(33) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:394 The Dynamics of Supply: Retrospect and Prospect (1979).
Cited: 20 times.

(34) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1096 A Technical Primer on Auction Theory I: Independent Private Values (1995).
Cited: 19 times.

(35) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:970 An Approach to Equilibrium Selection (1990).
Cited: 19 times.

(36) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1064 The Swing Voters Curse (1995).
Cited: 19 times.

(37) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1098r A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks (1995).
Cited: 19 times.

(38) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:363 Conference Structures and Fair Allocation Rules (1978).
Cited: 19 times.

(39) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:991r Efficient and Nearly Efficient Partnerships (1992).
Cited: 18 times.

(40) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:964 A Characterization of Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions for Economies with Pure Public Goods (1991).
Cited: 18 times.

(41) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1244 Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations (1998).
Cited: 17 times.

(42) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:295 Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium Concept (1977).
Cited: 17 times.

(43) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1195 Abstention in Elections with Asymmetric Information and Diverse Preferences (1996).
Cited: 17 times.

(44) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1048 Multilateral Tariff Cooperation During the Formation of Free Trade Areas (1993).
Cited: 17 times.

(45) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:811 Equilibrium Wage Distrihutions: A Synthesis (1988).
Cited: 16 times.

(46) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1150 Reciprocal Trade Liberalization (1996).
Cited: 16 times.

(47) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1227 Quitting Games (1998).
Cited: 16 times.

(48) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:29 Incentives and Public Inputs (1974).
Cited: 15 times.

(49) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1202 A Unique Subjective State Space for Unforeseen Contingencies (1997).
Cited: 15 times.

(50) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1117 Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections with Private Information (1994).
Cited: 15 times.

Recent citations received in: | 2009 | 2008 | 2007 | 2006

Recent citations received in: 2009

(1) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:7147 A Theory of Slow-Moving Capital and Contagion (2009). CEPR Discussion Papers

(2) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:15324 Dynamic Incentive Accounts (2009). NBER Working Papers

(3) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1483 Market and Non-Market Mechanisms for the Optimal Allocation of Scarce Resources (2009). Discussion Papers

(4) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1491 Dynamic Managerial Compensation: a Mechanism Design Approach (2009). Discussion Papers

(5) RePEc:roc:wallis:wp60 A Newton Collocation Method for Solving Dynamic Bargaining Games (2009). Wallis Working Papers

Recent citations received in: 2008

Recent citations received in: 2007

(1) RePEc:cdx:dpaper:2007-09 Noncooperative Foundations of Stable Sets in Voting Games (2007). Discussion Papers

(2) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6487 Currency Crisis Triggers: Sunspots or Thresholds? (2007). CEPR Discussion Papers

(3) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1451 The Dynamics of Distributive Politics (2007). Discussion Papers

Recent citations received in: 2006

(1) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5975 Redistributive Politics with Distortionary Taxation (2006). CEPR Discussion Papers

(2) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1434 Vote Bying I: General Elections (2006). Discussion Papers

Warning!! This is still an experimental service. The results of this service should be interpreted with care, especially in research assessment exercises. The processing of documents is automatic. There still are errors and omissions in the identification of references. We are working to improve the software to increase the accuracy of the results.

Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.