International Journal of Game Theory

Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Recent citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.

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Raw data:
IF AIF DOC CIT D2Y C2Y SC(%) CiY II AII 1996 0.04 0.18 30 190 45 2 0 2 0.07 0.08 1997 0.22 0.21 0 55 12 0 0.08 1998 0.17 0.22 81 452 30 5 0 10 0.12 0.1 1999 0.15 0.28 35 193 81 12 0 2 0.06 0.13 2000 0.43 0.37 31 93 116 50 0 7 0.23 0.16 2001 0.36 0.37 29 109 66 24 0 5 0.17 0.16 2002 0.22 0.41 30 47 60 13 0 2 0.07 0.19 2003 0.17 0.42 28 58 59 10 0 5 0.18 0.2 2004 0.16 0.47 28 61 58 9 0 3 0.11 0.21 2005 0.25 0.5 28 65 56 14 0 8 0.29 0.23 2006 0.32 0.51 42 113 56 18 11.1 10 0.24 0.22 2007 0.3 0.4 41 53 70 21 9.5 4 0.1 0.18 2008 0.39 0.42 36 49 83 32 0 9 0.25 0.21 2009 0.32 0.43 36 12 77 25 4 1 0.03 0.19
IF: Impact Factor: C2Y / D2Y AIF: Average Impact Factor for series in RePEc in year y DOC: Number of documents published in year y CIT: Number of citations to the series in year y D2Y: Number of articles published in y-1 plus y-2 C2Y: Cites in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 SC(%): Percentage of selft citations in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 CiY: Cites in year y to documents published in year y IdI: Immediacy Index: CiY / Documents.   AII: Average Immediacy Index for series in RePEc in year y
Impact Factor:	Immediacy Index:
Documents published:	Citations received:

Most cited documents in this series:

(1) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:26:y:1997:i:3:p:379-401 The Core of an Economy with Multilateral Environmental Externalities (1998).
Cited: 81 times.

(2) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:27:y:1998:i:2:p:269-299 Dictator game giving: Rules of fairness versus acts of kindness (1998).
Cited: 76 times.

(3) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:19:y:1990:i:1:p:59-89 Evolutionary Selection Dynamics in Games: Convergence and Limit Properties. (1990).
Cited: 55 times.

(4) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:15:y:1986:i:3:p:187-200 On the Reduced Game Property and Its Converse. (1986).
Cited: 45 times.

(5) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:25:y:1996:i:3:p:289-301 On Expectations and the Monetary Stakes in Ultimatum Games. (1996).
Cited: 42 times.

(6) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:24:y:1995:i:4:p:323-44 An Evolutionary Approach to Explaining Cooperative Behavior by Reciprocal Incentives. (1995).
Cited: 41 times.

(7) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:22:y:1993:i:2:p:171-98 Experimental Results on Ultimatum Games with Incomplete Information. (1993).
Cited: 40 times.

(8) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:27:y:1998:i:2:p:245-256 Link formation in cooperative situations (1998).
Cited: 37 times.

(9) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:20:y:1992:i:3:p:277-93 Games with Permission Structures: The Conjunctive Approach. (1992).
Cited: 35 times.

(10) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:34:y:2006:i:3:p:319-349 Unequal connections (2006).
Cited: 30 times.

(11) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:18:y:1989:i:3:p:273-91 A Bounded-Rationality Approach to the Study of Noncooperative Games. (1989).
Cited: 29 times.

(12) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:27:y:1998:i:3:p:375-392 Population uncertainty and Poisson games (1998).
Cited: 29 times.

(13) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:28:y:1999:i:3:p:263-300 Interactive epistemology I: Knowledge (1999).
Cited: 27 times.

(14) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:29:y:2000:i:2:p:269-287 Loss aversion equilibrium (2000).
Cited: 23 times.

(15) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:26:y:1997:i:3:p:335-351 Ternary Voting Games (1998).
Cited: 22 times.

(16) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:20:y:1992:i:4:p:419-27 Strongly Balanced Cooperative Games. (1992).
Cited: 21 times.

(17) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:17:y:1988:i:2:p:89-99 An Axiomatization of the Banzhaf Value. (1988).
Cited: 21 times.

(18) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:26:y:1997:i:1:p:27-43 An Axiomatization of the Disjunctive Permission Value for Games with a Permission Structure (1998).
Cited: 21 times.

(19) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:23:y:1994:i:1:p:75-83 Strategy-Proofness and the Strict Core in a Market with Indivisibilities. (1994).
Cited: 21 times.

(20) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:21:y:1992:i:3:p:249-66 The Shapley Value for Cooperative Games under Precedence Constraints. (1992).
Cited: 21 times.

(21) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:18:y:1989:i:4:p:389-407 The Consistent Shapley Value for Hyperplane Games. (1989).
Cited: 21 times.

(22) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:25:y:1996:i:2:p:245-58 The Nonemptiness of the f-Core of a Game without Side Payments. (1996).
Cited: 20 times.

(23) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:25:y:1996:i:3:p:303-27 Expectations and Fairness in a Simple Bargaining Experiment. (1996).
Cited: 20 times.

(24) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:25:y:1996:i:3:p:385-406 Voter Turnout as a Participation Game: An Experimental Investigation. (1996).
Cited: 20 times.

(25) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:28:y:1999:i:1:p:131-152 Does observation of others affect learning in strategic environments? An experimental study (1999).
Cited: 19 times.

(26) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:18:y:1989:i:1:p:37-44 A Set of Axioms for a Value for Partition Function Games. (1989).
Cited: 18 times.

(27) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:26:y:1997:i:2:p:223-227 Correlated Equilibrium and Potential Games (1998).
Cited: 18 times.

(28) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:33:y:2005:i:4:p:505-514 A characterization of the position value* (2005).
Cited: 18 times.

(29) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:28:y:1999:i:1:p:53-68 Refinements of rationalizability for normal-form games (1999).
Cited: 18 times.

(30) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:28:y:1999:i:4:p:511-520 Equivalence of axioms for bankruptcy problems (1999).
Cited: 16 times.

(31) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:20:y:1992:i:4:p:393-418 Characterization and Computation of Nash-Equilibria for Auctions with Incomplete Information. (1992).
Cited: 16 times.

(32) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:18:y:1989:i:1:p:57-89 Lower Equilibrium Payoffs in Two-Player Repeated Games with Non-observable Actions. (1989).
Cited: 16 times.

(33) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:29:y:2001:i:4:p:487-494 Stability in coalition formation games (2001).
Cited: 15 times.

(34) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:18:y:1989:i:2:p:227-40 A Value for Cooperative Games with Levels Structure of Cooperation. (1989).
Cited: 15 times.

(35) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:25:y:1996:i:2:p:177-88 Mediated Talk. (1996).
Cited: 15 times.

(36) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:27:y:1998:i:3:p:427-441 Home-grown values and incentive compatible auction design (1998).
Cited: 15 times.

(37) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:29:y:2001:i:4:p:495-515 When are Nash equilibria self-enforcing? An experimental analysis (2001).
Cited: 15 times.

(38) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:27:y:1998:i:2:p:161-189 On implementation via demand commitment games (1998).
Cited: 15 times.

(39) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:26:y:1997:i:1:p:61-73 The Nucleolus and Kernel of Veto-Rich Transferable Utility Games (1998).
Cited: 14 times.

(40) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:23:y:1994:i:3:p:261-81 Collusion Properties of Values. (1994).
Cited: 14 times.

(41) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:18:y:1989:i:3:p:293-310 On Equilibria in Repeated Games with Absorbing States. (1989).
Cited: 13 times.

(42) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:29:y:2000:i:1:p:23-38 The selectope for cooperative games (2000).
Cited: 13 times.

(43) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:20:y:1992:i:3:p:211-26 On the Equilibrium Payoffs Set of Two Player Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring. (1992).
Cited: 13 times.

(44) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:28:y:1999:i:2:p:241-252 Strategic behavior of experienced subjects in a common pool resource game (1999).
Cited: 13 times.

(45) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:21:y:1992:i:3:p:301-12 Monotonicity and Dummy Free Property for Multi-choice Cooperative Games. (1992).
Cited: 12 times.

(46) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:22:y:1993:i:3:p:279-302 Adjustment Patterns and Equilibrium Selection in Experimental Signaling Games. (1993).
Cited: 12 times.

(47) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:30:y:2001:i:2:p:209-220 Inferior players in simple games (2001).
Cited: 12 times.

(48) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:21:y:1992:i:1:p:27-39 Weighted Values and the Core. (1992).
Cited: 12 times.

(49) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:30:y:2001:i:2:p:177-185 Assignment games with stable core (2001).
Cited: 11 times.

(50) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:25:y:1996:i:3:p:269-87 An Experimental Study of Constant-Sum Centipede Games. (1996).
Cited: 11 times.

Recent citations received in: | 2009 | 2008 | 2007 | 2006

Recent citations received in: 2009

(1) RePEc:spr:joecth:v:39:y:2009:i:3:p:461-471 Strategy-proofness of the plurality rule over restricted domains (2009). Economic Theory

Recent citations received in: 2008

(1) RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2378 The Non-Constant-Sum Colonel Blotto Game (2008). CESifo Working Paper Series

(2) RePEc:cla:levarc:122247000000002312 The Relationship Between Classical and Quantum Correlation in Games (2008). Levine's Working Paper Archive

(3) RePEc:dgr:umamet:2008010 Stochastic Stability for Roommate Markets (2008). Research Memoranda

(4) RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00356304 Markovian assignment rules (2008). Working Papers

(5) RePEc:iza:izadps:dp3862 On the Sorting of Physicians across Medical Occupations (2008). IZA Discussion Papers

(6) RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14502 On the Sorting of Physicians across Medical Occupations (2008). NBER Working Papers

(7) RePEc:pcc:pccumd:08qcspr The Quadratic Core-Selecting Payment Rule for Combinatorial Auctions (2008). Papers of Peter Cramton

(8) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:36:y:2008:i:3:p:333-352 The dynamics of stable matchings and half-matchings for the stable marriage and roommates problems (2008). International Journal of Game Theory

(9) RePEc:uct:uconnp:2008-29 Preference Structure and Random Paths to Stability in Matching Markets (2008). Working papers

Recent citations received in: 2007

(1) RePEc:aub:autbar:681.07 The Key Party in the Catalan Government (2007). UFAE and IAE Working Papers

(2) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200789 A Vertex Oriented Approach to Minimum Cost Spanning Tree Problems (2007). Discussion Paper

(3) RePEc:pra:mprapa:4051 Conformism and Cooperation in a Local Interaction Model (2007). MPRA Paper

(4) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:35:y:2007:i:3:p:395-426 Dissection of solutions in cooperative game theory using representation techniques (2007). International Journal of Game Theory

Recent citations received in: 2006

(1) RePEc:aub:autbar:668.06 Weighted Approval Voting (2006). UFAE and IAE Working Papers

(2) RePEc:bbk:bbkefp:0614 Links and Architecture in Village Networks (2006). Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics and Finance

(3) RePEc:cor:louvco:2006092 Farsightedly stable networks (2006). CORE Discussion Papers

(4) RePEc:ctl:louvec:2006046 Farsightedly stable networks (2006). Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques)

(5) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200643 On the Core of Routing Games with Revenues (2006). Discussion Paper

(6) RePEc:dgr:umamet:2006038 Weighted Approval Voting (2006). Research Memoranda

(7) RePEc:dgr:umamet:2006045 A genetic algorithm for the partial binary constraint satisfaction problem: an application to a frequency assignment problem (2006). Research Memoranda

(8) RePEc:dgr:umamet:2006046 Homotopy Methods to Compute Equilibria in Game Theory (2006). Research Memoranda

(9) RePEc:ecl:stabus:1929 Federalism, Taxation, and Economic Growth (2006). Research Papers

(10) RePEc:roc:wallis:wp41 A Reputational Theory of Two Party Competition (2006). Wallis Working Papers

Warning!! This is still an experimental service. The results of this service should be interpreted with care, especially in research assessment exercises. The processing of documents is automatic. There still are errors and omissions in the identification of references. We are working to improve the software to increase the accuracy of the results.

Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.