Review of Economic Design

Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Recent citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.

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Raw data:
IF AIF DOC CIT D2Y C2Y SC(%) CiY II AII 1996 0.09 0.18 19 39 22 2 50 2 0.11 0.08 1997 0.21 6 25 19 0 0.08 1998 0.12 0.22 16 49 25 3 0 0.1 1999 0.23 0.28 22 87 22 5 0 2 0.09 0.13 2000 0.21 0.37 18 11 38 8 0 0.16 2001 0.2 0.37 13 2 40 8 0 0.16 2002 0.41 24 38 31 0 1 0.04 0.19 2003 0.03 0.42 20 43 37 1 0 8 0.4 0.2 2004 0.25 0.47 11 22 44 11 0 3 0.27 0.21 2005 0.39 0.5 16 17 31 12 0 1 0.06 0.23 2006 0.07 0.51 15 19 27 2 0 2 0.13 0.22 2007 0.26 0.4 18 30 31 8 0 3 0.17 0.18 2008 0.06 0.42 21 8 33 2 0 2 0.1 0.21 2009 0.21 0.43 23 1 39 8 0 0.19
IF: Impact Factor: C2Y / D2Y AIF: Average Impact Factor for series in RePEc in year y DOC: Number of documents published in year y CIT: Number of citations to the series in year y D2Y: Number of articles published in y-1 plus y-2 C2Y: Cites in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 SC(%): Percentage of selft citations in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 CiY: Cites in year y to documents published in year y IdI: Immediacy Index: CiY / Documents.   AII: Average Immediacy Index for series in RePEc in year y
Impact Factor:	Immediacy Index:
Documents published:	Citations received:

Most cited documents in this series:

(1) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:1:y:1994:i:1:p:173-203 Nash implementation through elementary mechanisms in economic environments (1994).
Cited: 30 times.

(2) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:1:p:35-55 Responsibility, talent, and compensation: A second-best analysis (1999).
Cited: 21 times.

(3) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:8:y:2003:i:2:p:143-164 Optimal two-object auctions with synergies (2003).
Cited: 20 times.

(4) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:1:y:1994:i:1:p:1-14 Economic design, adjustment processes, mechanisms, and institutions (1994).
Cited: 19 times.

(5) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:2:y:1996:i:1:p:193-209 On incentive compatibility and budget balancedness in public decision making (1996).
Cited: 14 times.

(6) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:1:p:13-33 Monotonic extensions on economic domains (1999).
Cited: 13 times.

(7) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1998:i:4:p:371-387 Efficient venture capital financing combining debt and equity (1998).
Cited: 11 times.

(8) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1997:i:1:p:29-43 Stackelberg leadership and transfers in private provision of public goods (1997).
Cited: 10 times.

(9) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:1:p:57-72 Feasible implementation of taxation methods (1999).
Cited: 9 times.

(10) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:8:y:2004:i:4:p:359-372 Link bidding in laboratory networks (2004).
Cited: 9 times.

(11) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1998:i:2:p:137-147 Implementation of stable solutions in a restricted matching market (1998).
Cited: 9 times.

(12) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:8:y:2004:i:4:p:383-411 Organizations and overlapping generations games: Memory, communication, and altruism (2004).
Cited: 9 times.

(13) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:11:y:2007:i:2:p:101-124 Tullock and Hirshleifer: a meeting of the minds (2007).
Cited: 8 times.

(14) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1997:i:1:p:45-55 Redistribution and individual characteristics (1997).
Cited: 8 times.

(15) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:7:y:2002:i:1:p:27-43 Integrating the Nash program into mechanism theory (2002).
Cited: 7 times.

(16) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:7:y:2002:i:1:p:75-91 Achieving the first best in sequencing problems (2002).
Cited: 7 times.

(17) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:1:y:1994:i:1:p:275-287 Exchange-proofness or divorce-proofness? Stability in one-sided matching markets (1994).
Cited: 7 times.

(18) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:10:y:2006:i:3:p:183-203 Equilibria in the spatial stochastic model of voting with party activists (2006).
Cited: 7 times.

(19) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:4:p:295-305 Organizational restructuring in response to changes in information-processing technology (1999).
Cited: 6 times.

(20) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:8:y:2003:i:2:p:205-215 Manipulation via merging and splitting in claims problems (2003).
Cited: 6 times.

(21) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:6:y:2001:i:3:p:461-480 First-price auctions when the ranking of valuations is common knowledge (2002).
Cited: 6 times.

(22) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:3:p:255-272 Coalitional manipulations in a bankruptcy problem (1999).
Cited: 6 times.

(23) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1998:i:2:p:93-127 The scheduling and organization of periodic associative computation: Efficient networks (1998).
Cited: 6 times.

(24) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:7:y:2002:i:1:p:45-56 How to get firms to invest: A simple solution to the hold-up problem in regulation (2002).
Cited: 6 times.

(25) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:11:y:2007:i:2:p:69-100 The theory of contests: a survey (2007).
Cited: 6 times.

(26) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:4:p:307-343 A profit-center game with incomplete information (1999).
Cited: 6 times.

(27) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1998:i:3:p:237-255 A mechanism design approach to an optimal contract under ex ante and ex post private information (1998).
Cited: 5 times.

(28) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:11:y:2007:i:2:p:165-174 The generalized Stackelberg equilibrium of the all-pay auction with complete information (2007).
Cited: 5 times.

(29) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:5:y:2000:i:3:p:273-299 original papers : Spatial social networks (2000).
Cited: 5 times.

(30) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1998:i:4:p:329-345 Managerial costs for one-shot decentralized information processing (1998).
Cited: 5 times.

(31) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:4:p:357-379 Taxation in an economy with private provision of public goods (1999).
Cited: 5 times.

(32) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:8:y:2003:i:3:p:269-292 Optimal design of trade institutions (2003).
Cited: 5 times.

(33) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:9:y:2005:i:2:p:145-166 The Pazner-Schmeidler social ordering: A defense (2005).
Cited: 4 times.

(34) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:2:y:1996:i:1:p:379-397 Nonlinear pricing in spatial oligopoly (1996).
Cited: 4 times.

(35) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1998:i:3:p:215-236 On durable goods monopolies and the Coase-Conjecture (1998).
Cited: 4 times.

(36) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:10:y:2006:i:2:p:73-84 New characterizations of a classical bankruptcy rule (2006).
Cited: 4 times.

(37) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:2:y:1996:i:1:p:89-97 A continuous double implementation of the constrained Walras equilibrium (1996).
Cited: 4 times.

(38) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1997:i:1:p:75-89 Equilibrium in a market with intermediation is Walrasian (1997).
Cited: 4 times.

(39) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:1:p:1-12 Decision-making under risk: Editing procedures based on correlated similarities, and preference overdetermination (1999).
Cited: 4 times.

(40) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:3:p:219-230 A non-cooperative interpretation of bargaining sets (1999).
Cited: 4 times.

(41) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:9:y:2005:i:2:p:73-90 The condominium problem; auctions for substitutes (2005).
Cited: 4 times.

(42) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1998:i:3:p:257-269 Correlated equilibrium as a stable standard of behavior (1998).
Cited: 4 times.

(43) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:6:y:2001:i:3:p:371-396 Public spending and optimal taxes without commitment (2002).
Cited: 4 times.

(44) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:2:y:1996:i:1:p:147-162 Replicating Walrasian equilibria using markets for membership in labor-managed firms (1996).
Cited: 4 times.

(45) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:9:y:2005:i:4:p:377-396 Strategic delegation in oligopolistic tournaments (2005).
Cited: 4 times.

(46) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:2:y:1996:i:1:p:311-324 Double implementation of the Lindahl equilibrium by a continuous mechanism (1996).
Cited: 3 times.

(47) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1997:i:1:p:15-27 The scheduling and organization of periodic associative computation: Essential networks (1997).
Cited: 3 times.

(48) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:4:p:381-387 Single-peakedness and coalition-proofness (1999).
Cited: 3 times.

(49) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:11:y:2007:i:2:p:139-163 Endogenous coalition formation in contests (2007).
Cited: 3 times.

(50) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:3:p:273-292 Competition among mechanism designers in a common value environment (1999).
Cited: 3 times.

Recent citations received in: | 2009 | 2008 | 2007 | 2006

Recent citations received in: 2009

Recent citations received in: 2008

(1) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1472 Fee Setting Intermediaries: On Real Estate Agents, Stock Brokers, and Auction Houses (2008). Discussion Papers

(2) RePEc:wrk:warwec:858 Regulating a Monopolist with unknown costs and unknown quality capacity (2008). The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS)

Recent citations received in: 2007

(1) RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2007-27 ALL-PAY AUCTION EQUILIBRIA IN CONTESTS (2007). Working Papers. Serie AD

(2) RePEc:spr:jogath:v:36:y:2007:i:2:p:177-207 Fair and efficient student placement with couples (2007). International Journal of Game Theory

(3) RePEc:spr:reecde:v:11:y:2007:i:2:p:69-100 The theory of contests: a survey (2007). Review of Economic Design

Recent citations received in: 2006

(1) RePEc:ivi:wpasad:2006-26 Fixed priced plus rationing: An experiment (2006). Working Papers. Serie AD

(2) RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:27:y:2006:i:2:p:231-249 The TAL-Family of Rules for Bankruptcy Problems (2006). Social Choice and Welfare

Warning!! This is still an experimental service. The results of this service should be interpreted with care, especially in research assessment exercises. The processing of documents is automatic. There still are errors and omissions in the identification of references. We are working to improve the software to increase the accuracy of the results.

Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.