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  Updated February, 7 2012 333.516 documents processed, 7.301.907 references and 2.961.463 citations

 

 
 

Theoretical Economics

Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Recent citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.

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Raw data:
IF AIF DOC CIT D2Y C2Y SC(%) CiY II AII
19960.180000.09
19970.180000.09
19980.20000.12
19990.260000.16
20000.360000.17
20010.350000.17
20020.40000.19
20030.40000.2
20040.440000.22
20050.460000.27
20060.481812800150.830.24
20071.280.4167718230110.690.2
20081.180.417333440050.290.2
20091.120.36893337010.130.21
 
 
IF: Impact Factor: C2Y / D2Y
AIF: Average Impact Factor for series in RePEc in year y
DOC: Number of documents published in year y
CIT: Number of citations to the series in year y
D2Y: Number of articles published in y-1 plus y-2
C2Y: Cites in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2
SC(%): Percentage of selft citations in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2
CiY: Cites in year y to documents published in year y
IdI: Immediacy Index: CiY / Documents.
 
AII: Average Immediacy Index for series in RePEc in year y
Impact Factor:
Immediacy Index:
Documents published:
Citations received:

 

Most cited documents in this series:

(1) RePEc:the:publsh:144 Competition over agents with boundedly rational expectations (2006).
Cited: 23 times.

(2) RePEc:the:publsh:163 Hierarchies of belief and interim rationalizability (2006).
Cited: 18 times.

(3) RePEc:the:publsh:140 Interim correlated rationalizability (2007).
Cited: 13 times.

(4) RePEc:the:publsh:309 Can intergenerational equity be operationalized? (2007).
Cited: 12 times.

(5) RePEc:the:publsh:266 Group formation and voter participation (2006).
Cited: 11 times.

(6) RePEc:the:publsh:263 Noisy talk (2007).
Cited: 11 times.

(7) RePEc:the:publsh:164 A model of choice from lists (2006).
Cited: 10 times.

(8) RePEc:the:publsh:229 Secure implementation (2007).
Cited: 10 times.

(9) RePEc:the:publsh:139 A theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets (2006).
Cited: 9 times.

(10) RePEc:the:publsh:199 Regret testing: learning to play Nash equilibrium without knowing you have an opponent (2006).
Cited: 9 times.

(11) RePEc:the:publsh:141 Topologies on types (2006).
Cited: 8 times.

(12) RePEc:the:publsh:165 Financial equilibrium with career concerns (2006).
Cited: 7 times.

(13) RePEc:the:publsh:203 Optimal auctions with ambiguity (2006).
Cited: 7 times.

(14) RePEc:the:publsh:215 Updating preferences with multiple priors (2007).
Cited: 7 times.

(15) RePEc:the:publsh:159 Sufficient conditions for stable equilibria (2006).
Cited: 7 times.

(16) RePEc:the:publsh:194 Monotone methods for equilibrium selection under perfect foresight dynamics (2008).
Cited: 7 times.

(17) RePEc:the:publsh:166 Information, evolution and utility (2006).
Cited: 7 times.

(18) RePEc:the:publsh:223 Coarse contingencies and ambiguity (2007).
Cited: 6 times.

(19) RePEc:the:publsh:211 A study in the pragmatics of persuasion: a game theoretical approach (2006).
Cited: 6 times.

(20) RePEc:the:publsh:399 Strategy-proofness and single-crossing (2009).
Cited: 5 times.

(21) RePEc:the:publsh:398 Many inspections are manipulable (2008).
Cited: 5 times.

(22) RePEc:the:publsh:334 Multi-sender cheap talk with restricted state spaces (2008).
Cited: 5 times.

(23) RePEc:the:publsh:168 Competitive markets with externalities (2006).
Cited: 5 times.

(24) RePEc:the:publsh:326 Consumer optimism and price discrimination (2008).
Cited: 4 times.

(25) RePEc:the:publsh:294 Complementarities in information acquisition with short-term trades (2007).
Cited: 4 times.

(26) RePEc:the:publsh:277 A non-differentiable approach to revenue equivalence (2007).
Cited: 4 times.

(27) RePEc:the:publsh:176 Party platforms in electoral competition with heterogeneous constituencies (2007).
Cited: 3 times.

(28) RePEc:the:publsh:375 Caller Number Five and related timing games (2008).
Cited: 3 times.

(29) RePEc:the:publsh:317 Cold feet (2007).
Cited: 3 times.

(30) RePEc:the:publsh:567 Contributing or free-riding? Voluntary participation in a public good economy (2011).
Cited: 2 times.

(31) RePEc:the:publsh:771 Survival of dominated strategies under evolutionary dynamics (2011).
Cited: 2 times.

(32) RePEc:the:publsh:153 Contracts and uncertainty (2007).
Cited: 2 times.

(33) RePEc:the:publsh:336 Nonlinear pricing, market coverage, and competition (2008).
Cited: 2 times.

(34) RePEc:the:publsh:507 Common agency and public good provision under asymmetric information (2010).
Cited: 2 times.

(35) RePEc:the:publsh:362 Price dispersion and loss leaders (2008).
Cited: 2 times.

(36) RePEc:the:publsh:182 Ex post implementation in environments with private goods (2006).
Cited: 2 times.

(37) RePEc:the:publsh:204 Endogenous incomplete markets, enforcement constraints, and intermediation (2006).
Cited: 1 times.

(38) RePEc:the:publsh:442 Asymptotic ordinal inefficiency of random serial dictatorship (2009).
Cited: 1 times.

(39) repec:the:publsh:598 ().
Cited: 1 times.

(40) RePEc:the:publsh:302 Subjective expected utility in games (2008).
Cited: 1 times.

(41) RePEc:the:publsh:563 A resurrection of the Condorcet Jury Theorem (2009).
Cited: 1 times.

(42) RePEc:the:publsh:758 On the strategic use of attention grabbers (2011).
Cited: 1 times.

(43) RePEc:the:publsh:427 Topologies on types: Correction (2008).
Cited: 1 times.

(44) RePEc:the:publsh:596 Symmetry of evidence without evidence of symmetry (2010).
Cited: 1 times.

(45) RePEc:the:publsh:295 Incomplete markets with no Hart points (2007).
Cited: 1 times.

(46) RePEc:the:publsh:240 Repeated games with incomplete information on one side (2008).
Cited: 1 times.

(47) RePEc:the:publsh:723 Implementation with evidence (2011).
Cited: 1 times.

(48) RePEc:the:publsh:167 Coordination failure in repeated games with almost-public monitoring (2006).
Cited: 1 times.

(49) RePEc:the:publsh:425 Rationalizable voting (2010).
Cited: 1 times.

(50) RePEc:the:publsh:595 Strategic experimentation with Poisson bandits (2010).
Cited: 1 times.

Recent citations received in: | 2009 | 2008 | 2007 | 2006

Recent citations received in: 2009

(1) RePEc:bro:econwp:2009-11 Multiplicity of Mixed Equilibria in Mechanisms: a Unified Approach ot Exact and Approximate Implementation (2009). Working Papers

Recent citations received in: 2008

(1) RePEc:ads:wpaper:0085 Log-linear Dynamics and Local Potential (2008). Economics Working Papers

(2) RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2420 Speculative Attacks: A Laboratory Study in Continuous Time (2008). CESifo Working Paper Series

(3) RePEc:pen:papers:08-014 Manipulability of Future-Independent Tests (2008). PIER Working Paper Archive

(4) RePEc:pen:papers:08-015 Strategic Manipulation of Empirical Tests (2008). PIER Working Paper Archive

(5) RePEc:rut:rutres:200807 Log-linear Dynamics and Local Potential (2008). Departmental Working Papers

Recent citations received in: 2007

(1) RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1958 Majority-efficiency and Competition-efficiency in a Binary Policy Model (2007). CESifo Working Paper Series

(2) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000001638 Common Belief Foundations of Global Games (2007). Levine's Bibliography

(3) RePEc:cla:levrem:843644000000000210 Robust Equilibria under Non-Common Priors (2007). Levine's Bibliography

(4) RePEc:cte:werepe:we081207 The theory of implementation : what did we learn? (2007). Economics Working Papers

(5) RePEc:dgr:umamet:2007017 Characterization of Revenue Equivalence (2007). Research Memoranda

(6) RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0699 Secure Implementation in Economies with Indivisible Objects and Money (2007). ISER Discussion Paper

(7) RePEc:gue:guelph:2007-8 American Idol: Should it be a Singing Contest or a Popularity Contest? (2007). Working Papers

(8) RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2993 Choice Over Time (2007). IZA Discussion Papers

(9) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1448 Characterization of Revenue Equivalence (2007). Discussion Papers

(10) RePEc:pra:mprapa:6288 Paretian evaluation of infinite utility streams: an egalitarian criterion (2007). MPRA Paper

(11) RePEc:pra:mprapa:6300 American Idol: Should it be a Singing Contest or a Popularity Contest? (2007). MPRA Paper

Recent citations received in: 2006

(1) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000001188 Interim Correlated Rationalizability (2006). Levine's Bibliography

(2) RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000001211 Metastable Equilibria (2006). Levine's Bibliography

(3) RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000272 Two Comments on the Principle of Revealed Preference (2006). Levine's Bibliography

(4) RePEc:cor:louvco:2006041 Correlated equilibrium in games with incomplete information revisited (2006). CORE Discussion Papers

(5) RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:5538 On the Evolution of Market Institutions: The Platform Design Paradox (2006). CEPR Discussion Papers

(6) RePEc:dgr:umamet:2006003 Maximal Domains for Strategy-Proof or Maskin Monotonic Choice Rules (2006). Research Memoranda

(7) RePEc:dgr:umamet:2006041 Farsightedly Stable Networks (2006). Research Memoranda

(8) RePEc:fip:fedmsr:383 Private monitoring with infinite histories (2006). Staff Report

(9) RePEc:kap:theord:v:61:y:2006:i:4:p:329-344 Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information Revisited (2006). Theory and Decision

(10) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1417 Topologies on Type (2006). Discussion Papers

(11) RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1438 Voting in small networks with cross-pressure (2006). Discussion Papers

(12) RePEc:pen:papers:07-007 Mediocracy (2006). PIER Working Paper Archive

(13) RePEc:pra:mprapa:131 Markets with Search and Switching Costs (2006). MPRA Paper

(14) RePEc:roc:wallis:wp43 Robust Rational Turnout (2006). Wallis Working Papers

(15) RePEc:roc:wallis:wp44 Robust Rational Turnout (2006). Wallis Working Papers

Warning!! This is still an experimental service. The results of this service should be interpreted with care, especially in research assessment exercises. The processing of documents is automatic. There still are errors and omissions in the identification of references. We are working to improve the software to increase the accuracy of the results.

Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.

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