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  Updated February, 7 2012 333.516 documents processed, 7.301.907 references and 2.961.463 citations

 

 
 

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Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Recent citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.

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Raw data:
IF AIF DOC CIT D2Y C2Y SC(%) CiY II AII
19960.250.18105205400.09
19970.230.183118230742.990.290.09
19980.340.215964114040.270.12
19990.430.261436462050.16
20000.720.3615192921020.130.17
20010.170.35029500.17
20020.401500.19
20030.40000.2
20040.440000.22
20050.460000.27
20060.480000.24
20070.40000.2
20080.40000.2
20090.360000.21
 
 
IF: Impact Factor: C2Y / D2Y
AIF: Average Impact Factor for series in RePEc in year y
DOC: Number of documents published in year y
CIT: Number of citations to the series in year y
D2Y: Number of articles published in y-1 plus y-2
C2Y: Cites in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2
SC(%): Percentage of selft citations in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2
CiY: Cites in year y to documents published in year y
IdI: Immediacy Index: CiY / Documents.
 
AII: Average Immediacy Index for series in RePEc in year y
Impact Factor:
Immediacy Index:
Documents published:
Citations received:

 

Most cited documents in this series:

(1) RePEc:wop:pennca:97-20 Optimal Prediction Under Asymmetric Loss (1997).
Cited: 58 times.

(2) RePEc:wop:pennca:98-12 Who Wants a Good Reputation? (1998).
Cited: 31 times.

(3) RePEc:wop:pennca:97-05 Democratic Choice of an Education System: Implications for Growth and Income Distribution (1997).
Cited: 22 times.

(4) RePEc:wop:pennca:99-09 Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring (1999).
Cited: 17 times.

(5) RePEc:wop:pennca:95-14 Incorporating Concern for Relative Wealth into Economic Models (1995).
Cited: 17 times.

(6) RePEc:wop:pennca:95-02 An Economic Model of Representative Democracy (1995).
Cited: 15 times.

(7) RePEc:wop:pennca:97-8 Approximate Common Knowledge and Co-ordination: Recent Lessons from Game Theory (1997).
Cited: 14 times.

(8) RePEc:wop:pennca:97-22 How Strongly is Child Schooling Associated with Household Income? (1997).
Cited: 14 times.

(9) RePEc:wop:pennca:98-01 Do People Play Nash Equilibrium? Lessons From Evolutionary Game Theory (1998).
Cited: 14 times.

(10) RePEc:wop:pennca:97-23 Child Health and Schooling Achievement: Association, Causality and Household Allocations (1997).
Cited: 13 times.

(11) RePEc:wop:pennca:98-14 Earnings and Wealth Inequality and Income Taxation: Quantifying the Trade-Offs of Switching to a Proportional Income Tax in the U.S. (1998).
Cited: 11 times.

(12) RePEc:wop:pennca:95-18 The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information* (1995).
Cited: 10 times.

(13) RePEc:wop:pennca:98-13 Efficient Non-Contractible Investments (1998).
Cited: 9 times.

(14) RePEc:wop:pennca:95-15 An Anti-Folk Theorem for a Class of Asynchronously Repeated Games (1995).
Cited: 9 times.

(15) RePEc:wop:pennca:99-06 Racial Bias in Motor Vehicle Searches: Theory and Evidence (1999).
Cited: 9 times.

(16) RePEc:wop:pennca:97-4 Indeterminacy, Home Production, and the Business Cycle: a Calibrated Analysis (1997).
Cited: 9 times.

(17) RePEc:wop:pennca:98-08 The Provision of Public Goods Under Alternative Electoral Incentives (1998).
Cited: 9 times.

(18) RePEc:wop:pennca:97-2 Policy Persistence (1997).
Cited: 8 times.

(19) RePEc:wop:pennca:98-06 Endogenous Inequality in Integrated Labor Markets with Two-sided Search (1998).
Cited: 8 times.

(20) RePEc:wop:pennca:97-6 Correlated Equilibria and Local Interactions (1997).
Cited: 8 times.

(21) RePEc:wop:pennca:98-11 Your Reputation Is Who Youre Not, Not Who Youd Like To Be (1998).
Cited: 7 times.

(22) RePEc:wop:pennca:endo-one Endogenous Interactions (1997).
Cited: 7 times.

(23) RePEc:wop:pennca:95-05 Co-operation and Timing (1995).
Cited: 6 times.

(24) RePEc:wop:pennca:97-18 Evaluating Density Forecasts (1997).
Cited: 6 times.

(25) RePEc:wop:pennca:rep-is-sep Your Reputation Is Who Youre Not, Not Who Youd Like To Be (1998).
Cited: 6 times.

(26) RePEc:wop:pennca:00-04 Does Competition Solve the Hold-up Problem'DONE' (2000).
Cited: 6 times.

(27) RePEc:wop:pennca:98-07 Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective (1998).
Cited: 5 times.

(28) RePEc:wop:pennca:imp-mon Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective (1998).
Cited: 5 times.

(29) RePEc:wop:pennca:95-04 Justifying Rational Expectations (1995).
Cited: 4 times.

(30) RePEc:wop:pennca:97-17 Technological Innovations: Slumps and Booms (1997).
Cited: 4 times.

(31) RePEc:wop:pennca:98-05 Learning Correlated Equilibria in Potential Games (1998).
Cited: 4 times.

(32) RePEc:wop:pennca:97-9 A Dynamic Equilibrium Model of Search, Bargaining, and Money (1997).
Cited: 3 times.

(33) RePEc:wop:pennca:97-01 Contagion (1997).
Cited: 3 times.

(34) RePEc:wop:pennca:99-14 Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility (1999).
Cited: 3 times.

(35) RePEc:wop:pennca:invest Investment and Concern for Relative Position (2000).
Cited: 3 times.

(36) RePEc:wop:pennca:97-7 A Model of Commodity Money, With Application to Greshams Law and the Debasement Puzzle (1997).
Cited: 3 times.

(37) RePEc:wop:pennca:00-03 Endogenous Lobbying (2000).
Cited: 3 times.

(38) RePEc:wop:pennca:97-21 Child Nutrition, Child Health, and School Enrollment: A Longitudinal Analysis (1997).
Cited: 3 times.

(39) RePEc:wop:pennca:95-17 A Rudimentary Model of Search with Divisible Money and Prices (1995).
Cited: 3 times.

(40) RePEc:wop:pennca:eff-inv-large Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Large Economies (2000).
Cited: 2 times.

(41) RePEc:wop:pennca:00-05 Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Large Economies (2000).
Cited: 2 times.

(42) RePEc:wop:pennca:97-1 On Money as a Medium of Exchange When Goods Vary by Supply and Demand (1997).
Cited: 2 times.

(43) RePEc:wop:pennca:97-09 Cooperation, Corporate Culture and Incentive Intensity (1997).
Cited: 2 times.

(44) RePEc:wop:pennca:99-13 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma with Private Monitoring: a N-player case (1999).
Cited: 2 times.

(45) RePEc:wop:pennca:00-08 Reducing Overlapping Generations Economies to Finite Economies (2000).
Cited: 2 times.

(46) RePEc:wop:pennca:99-12 A Theory of Negotiation and Formation of Coalition (1999).
Cited: 2 times.

(47) RePEc:wop:pennca:00-02 The Drawbacks of Electoral Competition (2000).
Cited: 2 times.

(48) RePEc:wop:pennca:95-12 Generic Existence of Sunspot Equilibria: The Case of real Assets (1995).
Cited: 2 times.

(49) RePEc:wop:pennca:96-04 Class Systems and the Enforcement of Social Norms (1996).
Cited: 2 times.

(50) RePEc:wop:pennca:00-06 Investment and Concern for Relative Position (2000).
Cited: 2 times.

Recent citations received in: | 2009 | 2008 | 2007 | 2006

Recent citations received in: 2009

Recent citations received in: 2008

Recent citations received in: 2007

Recent citations received in: 2006

Warning!! This is still an experimental service. The results of this service should be interpreted with care, especially in research assessment exercises. The processing of documents is automatic. There still are errors and omissions in the identification of references. We are working to improve the software to increase the accuracy of the results.

Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.

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