International Game Theory Review (IGTR)

Raw citation data, Impact Factor, Immediacy Index, Published documents, Citations received, , Most cited papers , Recent citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.

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Raw data:
IF AIF DOC CIT D2Y C2Y SC(%) CiY II AII 1996 0.18 0 0 0 0.08 1997 0.21 0 0 0 0.08 1998 0.22 0 0 0 0.1 1999 0.28 0 0 0 0.13 2000 0.37 0 0 0 0.16 2001 0.37 0 0 0 0.16 2002 0.41 0 0 0 0.19 2003 0.42 0 0 0 0.2 2004 0.47 0 0 0 0.21 2005 0.5 33 15 0 0 0.23 2006 0.51 46 11 33 0 1 0.02 0.22 2007 0.03 0.4 47 30 79 2 0 3 0.06 0.18 2008 0.08 0.42 35 13 93 7 0 0.21 2009 0.11 0.43 35 3 82 9 0 0.19
IF: Impact Factor: C2Y / D2Y AIF: Average Impact Factor for series in RePEc in year y DOC: Number of documents published in year y CIT: Number of citations to the series in year y D2Y: Number of articles published in y-1 plus y-2 C2Y: Cites in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 SC(%): Percentage of selft citations in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2 CiY: Cites in year y to documents published in year y IdI: Immediacy Index: CiY / Documents.   AII: Average Immediacy Index for series in RePEc in year y
Impact Factor:	Immediacy Index:
Documents published:	Citations received:

Most cited documents in this series:

(1) RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:09:y:2007:i:02:p:353-360 THE SHAPLEY VALUE FOR PARTITION FUNCTION FORM GAMES (2007).
Cited: 8 times.

(2) RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:07:y:2005:i:01:p:63-72 AN AXIOM SYSTEM FOR A VALUE FOR GAMES IN PARTITION FUNCTION FORM (2005).
Cited: 7 times.

(3) RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:10:y:2008:i:01:p:1-16 DETERMINISTIC DIFFERENTIAL GAMES UNDER PROBABILITY KNOWLEDGE OF INITIAL CONDITION (2008).
Cited: 4 times.

(4) RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:09:y:2007:i:01:p:105-118 BANKRUPTCY RULES AND COALITIONAL MANIPULATION (2007).
Cited: 4 times.

(5) RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:08:y:2006:i:01:p:127-139 PROPORTIONALITY AND NON-MANIPULABILITY IN BANKRUPTCY PROBLEMS (2006).
Cited: 3 times.

(6) RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:07:y:2005:i:02:p:211-228 HELPING AND SABOTAGING IN TOURNAMENTS (2005).
Cited: 3 times.

(7) RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:09:y:2007:i:01:p:87-104 TRANSFORMING GAMES FROM CHARACTERISTIC INTO NORMAL FORM (2007).
Cited: 3 times.

(8) RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:09:y:2007:i:02:p:307-322 MEASURING THE POWER OF PARTIES WITHIN GOVERNMENT COALITIONS (2007).
Cited: 3 times.

(9) RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:10:y:2008:i:01:p:53-72 FRIENDLINESS AND RECIPROCITY IN EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION (2008).
Cited: 3 times.

(10) RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:10:y:2008:i:03:p:257-278 COMPUTING ALTERNATING OFFERS AND WATER PRICES IN BILATERAL RIVER BASIN MANAGEMENT (2008).
Cited: 3 times.

(11) RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:09:y:2007:i:04:p:667-688 ANTI-COORDINATION GAMES AND DYNAMIC STABILITY (2007).
Cited: 3 times.

(12) RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:12:y:2010:i:01:p:37-59 ENVIRONMENTAL INNOVATION, WAR OF ATTRITION AND INVESTMENT GRANTS (2010).
Cited: 3 times.

(13) RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:09:y:2007:i:02:p:151-167 EFFECTIVENESS OF COOP ADVERTISING PROGRAMS IN COMPETITIVE DISTRIBUTION CHANNELS (2007).
Cited: 2 times.

(14) RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:09:y:2007:i:04:p:599-635 NETWORK FORMATION UNDER HETEROGENEOUS COSTS: THE MULTIPLE GROUP MODEL (2007).
Cited: 2 times.

(15) RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:11:y:2009:i:02:p:207-214 A TWO-STEP SHAPLEY VALUE FOR COOPERATIVE GAMES WITH COALITION STRUCTURES (2009).
Cited: 2 times.

(16) RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:08:y:2006:i:01:p:1-20 GLOBAL BIFURCATIONS IN DUOPOLY WHEN THE COURNOT POINT IS DESTABILIZED VIA A SUBCRITICAL NEIMARK BIFURCATION (2006).
Cited: 2 times.

(17) RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:07:y:2005:i:01:p:43-61 CORE CONCEPTS FOR DYNAMIC TU GAMES (2005).
Cited: 2 times.

(18) RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:07:y:2005:i:01:p:107-115 A NOTE ON REPEATED GAMES WITH VANISHING ACTIONS (2005).
Cited: 1 times.

(19) RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:10:y:2008:i:03:p:229-243 COMPETING FOR ENDOGENOUS INFORMATION IN AN IRREVERSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCE PROBLEM: A GAME-THEORETIC ANALYSIS (2008).
Cited: 1 times.

(20) RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:11:y:2009:i:04:p:391-406 A LOCATION GAME ON DISJOINT CIRCLES (2009).
Cited: 1 times.

(21) RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:08:y:2006:i:04:p:595-612 BIDDER WELFARE IN AN AUCTION WITH A BUYOUT OPTION (2006).
Cited: 1 times.

(22) RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:09:y:2007:i:02:p:347-351 COMPETITIVE TAX EVASION AND TRANSFER PRICES (2007).
Cited: 1 times.

(23) RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:10:y:2008:i:02:p:145-164 MULTISTAGE COMMUNICATION WITH AND WITHOUT VERIFIABLE TYPES (2008).
Cited: 1 times.

(24) RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:08:y:2006:i:01:p:111-126 COALITION FORMATION IN GAMES WITHOUT SYNERGIES (2006).
Cited: 1 times.

(25) RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:09:y:2007:i:04:p:565-581 THE IMPACT OF ADVERTISING IN A DUOPOLY GAME (2007).
Cited: 1 times.

(26) RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:08:y:2006:i:03:p:499-514 THE DISCRETIZATION OF CONTINUUM STRATEGY SPACES (2006).
Cited: 1 times.

(27) RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:09:y:2007:i:01:p:47-57 EGALITARIAN DISTRIBUTIONS IN COALITIONAL MODELS (2007).
Cited: 1 times.

(28) RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:09:y:2007:i:03:p:453-460 A NOTE ON LUENBERGERS ZERO-MAXIMUM PRINCIPLE FOR CORE ALLOCATIONS (2007).
Cited: 1 times.

(29) RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:08:y:2006:i:02:p:185-218 GUARANTEED INERTIA FUNCTIONS IN DYNAMICAL GAMES (2006).
Cited: 1 times.

(30) RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:09:y:2007:i:02:p:199-213 ON BARGAINING SETS IN SYMMETRIC GAMES (2007).
Cited: 1 times.

(31) RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:07:y:2005:i:04:p:473-489 LINK MONOTONIC ALLOCATION SCHEMES (2005).
Cited: 1 times.

(32) RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:09:y:2007:i:03:p:437-452 THE CONSENSUS VALUE FOR GAMES IN PARTITION FUNCTION FORM (2007).
Cited: 1 times.

(33) RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:07:y:2005:i:01:p:25-42 CONVEXITY IN STOCHASTIC COOPERATIVE SITUATIONS (2005).
Cited: 1 times.

(34) RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:10:y:2008:i:03:p:245-256 CONFLICT AND COOPERATION IN SYMMETRIC POTENTIAL GAMES (2008).
Cited: 1 times.

(35) RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:08:y:2006:i:01:p:21-31 HERDING WITH COSTLY INFORMATION (2006).
Cited: 1 times.

(36) RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:09:y:2007:i:02:p:169-181 A REFINEMENT CONCEPT FOR EQUILIBRIA IN MULTICRITERIA GAMES VIA STABLE SCALARIZATIONS (2007).
Cited: 1 times.

(37) RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:07:y:2005:i:04:p:395-406 SUSTAINABILITY OF COOPERATION OVERTIME IN LINEAR-QUADRATIC DIFFERENTIAL GAMES (2005).
Cited: 1 times.

(38) RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:08:y:2006:i:04:p:655-668 A ONE-SHOT PRISONERS DILEMMA WITH PROCEDURAL UTILITY (2006).
Cited: 1 times.

Recent citations received in: | 2009 | 2008 | 2007 | 2006

Recent citations received in: 2009

Recent citations received in: 2008

Recent citations received in: 2007

(1) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200753 The Minority Game: An Economics Perspective (2007). Discussion Paper

(2) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200761 Congestion, Equilibrium and Learning: The Minority Game (2007). Discussion Paper

(3) RePEc:imd:wpaper:wp2007-04 Marginal contributions and externalities in the value (2007). Working Papers

Recent citations received in: 2006

(1) RePEc:trf:wpaper:181 How eBay Sellers set “Buy-it-now” prices - Bringing The Field Into the Lab (2006). Discussion Papers

Warning!! This is still an experimental service. The results of this service should be interpreted with care, especially in research assessment exercises. The processing of documents is automatic. There still are errors and omissions in the identification of references. We are working to improve the software to increase the accuracy of the results.

Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.