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2002 | Moral property rights in bargaining RePEc:bie:wpaper:330 [Citation Analysis] | 19 |
2002 | Power measurement as sensitivity analysis : a unified approach RePEc:bie:wpaper:345 [Citation Analysis] | 17 |
1974 | Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games RePEc:bie:wpaper:023 [Citation Analysis] | 14 |
1973 | A Simple Model of Imperfect Competition, where 4 are Few and 6 are Many RePEc:bie:wpaper:008 [Citation Analysis] | 13 |
1974 | The Chain Store Paradox RePEc:bie:wpaper:018 [Citation Analysis] | 7 |
2002 | Convex fuzzy games and participation monotonic allocation schemes RePEc:bie:wpaper:332 [Citation Analysis] | 6 |
2007 | Network formation with closeness incentives RePEc:bie:wpaper:395 [Citation Analysis] | 5 |
2007 | Do social preferences matter in competitive markets? RePEc:bie:wpaper:392 [Citation Analysis] | 5 |
1998 | The Positive Prekernel of a Cooperative Game RePEc:bie:wpaper:292 [Citation Analysis] | 4 |
1998 | Implementation of the Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution in Dominant Strategies RePEc:bie:wpaper:301 [Citation Analysis] | 4 |
2001 | The Pazner-Schmeidler Social Ordering: A Defense RePEc:bie:wpaper:328 [Citation Analysis] | 4 |
1999 | Unique Nash implementation for a class of bargaining solutions RePEc:bie:wpaper:308 [Citation Analysis] | 4 |
1999 | A universal meta bargaining realization of the Nash solution RePEc:bie:wpaper:310 [Citation Analysis] | 3 |
2009 | Voronoi languages: Equilibria in cheap-talk games with high-dimensional types and few signals RePEc:bie:wpaper:420 [Citation Analysis] | 3 |
2005 | Regrouping of endowments in exchange markets with indivisible goods RePEc:bie:wpaper:367 [Citation Analysis] | 3 |
2001 | Can and should the Nash program be looked at as a part of mechanism theory? RePEc:bie:wpaper:322 [Citation Analysis] | 3 |
2001 | Game theory RePEc:bie:wpaper:321 [Citation Analysis] | 2 |
2007 | On Maskin monotonicity of solution based social choice rules RePEc:bie:wpaper:393 [Citation Analysis] | 2 |
2009 | Indivisible commodities and an equivalence theorem on the strong core RePEc:bie:wpaper:417 [Citation Analysis] | 2 |
2002 | Social Choice and Just Institutions: New Perspectives RePEc:bie:wpaper:333 [Citation Analysis] | 2 |
2001 | A note on an axiomatization of the core of market games RePEc:bie:wpaper:323 [Citation Analysis] | 2 |
2005 | Government versus opposition: Who should be who in the 16th German Bundestag? RePEc:bie:wpaper:375 [Citation Analysis] | 2 |
2011 | Competitive Outcomes and the Inner Core of NTU Market Games RePEc:bie:wpaper:449 [Citation Analysis] | 2 |
2005 | On core membership testing for hedonic coalition formation games RePEc:bie:wpaper:374 [Citation Analysis] | 1 |
1998 | Should High-Tax Countries Pursue Revenue-Neutral Ecological Tax Reforms? RePEc:bie:wpaper:304 [Citation Analysis] | 1 |
2010 | Representation of TU games by coalition production economies RePEc:bie:wpaper:430 [Citation Analysis] | 1 |
2004 | A superadditive solution RePEc:bie:wpaper:361 [Citation Analysis] | 1 |
2006 | Convex games versus clan games RePEc:bie:wpaper:381 [Citation Analysis] | 1 |
2009 | Strong core equivalence theorem in an atomless economy with indivisible commodities RePEc:bie:wpaper:418 [Citation Analysis] | 1 |
2010 | Existence of Financial Equilibria in Continuous Time with Potentially Complete Markets RePEc:bie:wpaper:443 [Citation Analysis] | 1 |
2002 | How to cope with division problems under interval uncertainty of claims? RePEc:bie:wpaper:339 [Citation Analysis] | 1 |
2005 | A taxonomy of myopic stability concepts for hedonic games RePEc:bie:wpaper:373 [Citation Analysis] | 1 |
2010 | Optimal Stopping Under Ambiguity in Continuous Time RePEc:bie:wpaper:429 [Citation Analysis] | 1 |
2004 | Cephoids : Minkowski sums of prisms RePEc:bie:wpaper:360 [Citation Analysis] | 1 |
1997 | Environmental Taxation and the Double Dividend: A Drawback for a Revenue-Neutral Tax Reform RePEc:bie:wpaper:274 [Citation Analysis] | 1 |
2006 | Polluting technologies and sustainable economic development RePEc:bie:wpaper:379 [Citation Analysis] | 1 |
2010 | Financial markets with volatility uncertainty RePEc:bie:wpaper:441 [Citation Analysis] | 1 |
2005 | Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts RePEc:bie:wpaper:372 [Citation Analysis] | 1 |
1998 | Fair-Negotiation Procedures RePEc:bie:wpaper:300 [Citation Analysis] | 1 |
2010 | Impossibility results for infinite-electorate abstract aggregation rules RePEc:bie:wpaper:427 [Citation Analysis] | 1 |
2001 | The positive core of a cooperative game RePEc:bie:wpaper:326 [Citation Analysis] | 1 |
2003 | A General Strategy Proof Fair Allocation Mechanism RePEc:bie:wpaper:346 [Citation Analysis] | 1 |
1997 | The Selection of Mixed Strategies in 2x2 Bimatrix Games RePEc:bie:wpaper:268 [Citation Analysis] | 1 |
2005 | On top coalitions, common rankings, and semistrict core stability RePEc:bie:wpaper:377 [Citation Analysis] | 1 |
2009 | Irreversible investment in oligopoly RePEc:bie:wpaper:415 [Citation Analysis] | 1 |
2010 | Product and Quality Innovations: An Optimal Control Approach RePEc:bie:wpaper:439 [Citation Analysis] | 1 |
2005 | Sustainable economic development and the environment: Theory and evidence RePEc:bie:wpaper:369 [Citation Analysis] | 1 |
1998 | Supporting Cooperative Multi-Issue Negotiations RePEc:bie:wpaper:299 [Citation Analysis] | 1 |
2006 | An axiomatic approach to composite solutions RePEc:bie:wpaper:385 [Citation Analysis] | 1 |
2011 | Competitive Outcomes and the Core of TU Market Games RePEc:bie:wpaper:454 [Citation Analysis] | 1 |
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Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.