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  Updated Jun, 1 2012 364.619 documents processed, 8.178.370 references and 3.213.942 citations

 

  
 

Economics and Politics / Blackwell Publishers

Raw citation data, Main indicators, Most cited papers , cites used to compute the impact factor (2010), Recent citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.

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Raw data:
IF AIF DOC CIT D2Y C2Y SC(%) CiY II AII
19900.110.091610818200.04
19910.060.091698342010.060.05
19920.090.08159632300.04
19930.060.09185231200.05
19940.150.11637335010.060.05
19950.060.1216409342020.130.06
19960.130.16152432400.08
19970.480.2116163115010.060.08
19980.260.22146931800.09
19990.070.2815110302010.070.13
20000.10.3715284293040.270.16
20010.470.38151343014040.270.16
20020.80.4115623024010.070.2
20030.70.4314383021030.210.2
20040.520.491511029150120.80.22
20050.90.521511229260161.070.24
20060.80.516653024040.250.23
20070.740.4218553123030.170.19
20080.680.43164534234.390.560.21
20090.50.43162734170110.690.19
20100.410.3619113213010.050.15
 
 
IF: Impact Factor: C2Y / D2Y
AIF: Average Impact Factor for series in RePEc in year y
DOC: Number of documents published in year y
CIT: Number of citations to the series in year y
D2Y: Number of articles published in y-1 plus y-2
C2Y: Cites in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2
SC(%): Percentage of selft citations in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2
CiY: Cites in year y to documents published in year y
IdI: Immediacy Index: CiY / Documents.
AII: Average Immediacy Index for series in RePEc in year y

 

Main indicators

Most cited documents in this series:
YearTitleCited
1995INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: CROSS-COUNTRY TESTS USING ALTERNATIVE INSTITUTIONAL MEASURES
RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:7:y:1995:i:3:p:207-227 [Citation Analysis]		383
2000The Institutional Environment for Economic Growth
RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:12:y:2000:i:1:p:1-31 [Citation Analysis]		150
1989POLITICALLY CONTESTABLE RENTS AND TRANSFERS
RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:1:y:1989:i:1:p:17-39 [Citation Analysis]		81
2000Causality and Feedback Between Institutional Measures and Economic Growth
RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:12:y:2000:i:1:p:69-81 [Citation Analysis]		64
2001The Political Economy of the IRS
RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:13:y:2001:i:2:p:201-220 [Citation Analysis]		40
2005PROPOSAL FOR A NEW MEASURE OF CORRUPTION, ILLUSTRATED WITH ITALIAN DATA
RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:17:y:2005:i::p:37-75 [Citation Analysis]		35
1990THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS IN THE REVIVAL OF TRADE: THE LAW MERCHANT, PRIVATE JUDGES, AND THE CHAMPAGNE FAIRS
RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:2:y:1990:i:1:p:1-23 [Citation Analysis]		34
1991THE PARADOX OF POWER
RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:3:y:1991:i:3:p:177-200 [Citation Analysis]		33
2000Corruption, Income Distribution, and Growth
RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:12:y:2000:i:2:p:155-182 [Citation Analysis]		29
1999Aid, Growth and Democracy
RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:11:y:1999:i:3:p:275-297 [Citation Analysis]		28
2004Political Institutions and Policy Volatility
RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:16:y:2004:i:1:p:1-27 [Citation Analysis]		27
1992ELECTIONS AND THE THEORY OF CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS: A SURVEY AND CRITICAL ANALYSIS
RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:4:y:1992:i:1:p:79-108 [Citation Analysis]		26
2000Ethnicity, Politics and Economic Performance
RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:12:y:2000:i:3:p:225-245 [Citation Analysis]		25
2005WHICH VARIABLES EXPLAIN DECISIONS ON IMF CREDIT? AN EXTREME BOUNDS ANALYSIS
RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:17:y:2005:i::p:177-213 [Citation Analysis]		25
1999Does Distributional Skewness Lead to Redistribution? Evidence from the United States
RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:11:y:1999:i:2:p:171-199 [Citation Analysis]		22
1998Political Control of Administrative Spending: The Case of Local Governments in Norway
RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:10:y:1998:i:1:p:63-83 [Citation Analysis]		21
1991ON BUYING LEGISLATURES
RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:3:y:1991:i:2:p:93-109 [Citation Analysis]		21
2004INEQUALITY, REDISTRIBUTION, AND RENT-SEEKING
RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:16:y:2004:i::p:287-320 [Citation Analysis]		21
1999Aid, Taxation and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa
RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:11:y:1999:i:3:p:225-253 [Citation Analysis]		21
1992MACROECONOMIC POLICY AND ELECTIONS IN OECD DEMOCRACIES
RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:4:y:1992:i:1:p:1-30 [Citation Analysis]		21
1990PUBLIC GOODS, RENT DISSIPATION, AND CANDIDATE COMPETITION
RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:2:y:1990:i:2:p:115-132 [Citation Analysis]		20
2007THE QUALITY OF INSTITUTIONS AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:19:y:2007:i:3:p:317-344 [Citation Analysis]		20
1992PROMISE KEEPING IN THE GREAT SOCIETY: A MODEL OF CREDIT INFORMATION SHARING
RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:4:y:1992:i:2:p:117-136 [Citation Analysis]		20
2001Do Crises Induce Reform? Simple Empirical Tests of Conventional Wisdom
RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:13:y:2001:i:2:p:129-157 [Citation Analysis]		20
2006PROMISES MADE, PROMISES BROKEN: A MODEL OF IMF PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION
RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:18:y:2006:i:3:p:339-365 [Citation Analysis]		20
1991INTERNATIONAL TRADE BARGAINING AND THE MOST-FAVORED-NATION CLAUSE
RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:3:y:1991:i:1:p:1-20 [Citation Analysis]		19
1999Do Gatt Rules Help Governments Make Domestic Commitments?
RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:11:y:1999:i:2:p:109-144 [Citation Analysis]		19
1990ARE EFFICIENCY IMPROVEMENTS IN GOVERNMENT TRANSFER POLICIES SELF-DEFEATING IN POLITICAL EQUILIBRIUM?
RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:2:y:1990:i:3:p:241-258 [Citation Analysis]		19
2009INSTABILITY AND THE INCENTIVES FOR CORRUPTION
RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:21:y:2009:i:1:p:42-92 [Citation Analysis]		18
1990A THEORY OF KLEPTOCRACY WITH PROBABILISTIC SURVIVAL AND REPUTATION
RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:2:y:1990:i:2:p:157-171 [Citation Analysis]		18
2005ACCOUNTABILITY AND CORRUPTION: POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS MATTER
RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:17:y:2005:i::p:1-35 [Citation Analysis]		17
2006SOCIAL COHESION, INSTITUTIONS, AND GROWTH
RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:18:y:2006:i:2:p:103-120 [Citation Analysis]		17
2002Democracy and the Variability of Economic Performance
RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:14:y:2002:i:3:p:225-257 [Citation Analysis]		16
1998Rationalizing the Political Business Cycle: A Workhorse Model
RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:10:y:1998:i:1:p:1-17 [Citation Analysis]		16
2005ELECTIONS AND EXCHANGE RATE POLICY CYCLES
RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:17:y:2005:i::p:151-176 [Citation Analysis]		16
2004VOTING TRANSPARENCY, CONFLICTING INTERESTS, AND THE APPOINTMENT OF CENTRAL BANKERS
RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:16:y:2004:i::p:321-345 [Citation Analysis]		15
1998Foreign Aid and International Support as a Gift Exchange
RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:10:y:1998:i:2:p:127-142 [Citation Analysis]		15
2004The Influence of IMF Programs on the Re-election of Debtor Governments
RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:16:y:2004:i:1:p:53-76 [Citation Analysis]		14
2001Political Determinants of Intergovernmental Grants: Evidence From Argentina
RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:13:y:2001:i:3:p:237-256 [Citation Analysis]		14
2001Electoral Rules, Political Systems, and Institutional Quality
RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:13:y:2001:i:3:p:311-342 [Citation Analysis]		13
2001Political Competition in Weak States
RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:13:y:2001:i:2:p:159-184 [Citation Analysis]		13
2003Restraining the Genuine Homo Economicus: Why the Economy Cannot Be Divorced from Its Governance
RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:15:y:2003:i:2:p:135-162 [Citation Analysis]		13
1991DANGO: JAPANS PRICE-FIXING CONSPIRACIES
RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:3:y:1991:i:3:p:201-218 [Citation Analysis]		12
2000Delays of Inflation Stabilizations
RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:12:y:2000:i:3:p:275-295 [Citation Analysis]		12
2002The Economics of Trade Disputes, the GATTs Article XXIII, and the WTOs Dispute Settlement Understanding
RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:14:y:2002:i:3:p:283-323 [Citation Analysis]		12
1990THE NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY: ITS EXPLANATORY POWER FOR LDCs
RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:2:y:1990:i:2:p:193-221 [Citation Analysis]		12
1989THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRADE POLICY
RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:1:y:1989:i:3:p:301-314 [Citation Analysis]		12
1992THE REVELATION OF INFORMATION THROUGH THE ELECTORAL PROCESS: AN EXPLORATORY ANALYSIS
RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:4:y:1992:i:3:p:255-276 [Citation Analysis]		12
2000Repeated Elections with Asymmetric Information
RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:12:y:2000:i:2:p:109-135 [Citation Analysis]		12
1993THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF EUROPEAN MONETARY UNIFICATION: AN ANALYTICAL INTRODUCTION
RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:5:y:1993:i:2:p:85-104 [Citation Analysis]		11

Citing documents used to compute impact factor 13:
YearTitleSee
2010Electoral rules, political competition and fiscal spending: regression discontinuity evidence from brazilian municipalities
RePEc:fgv:eesptd:208		[Citation Analysis]
2010Building Political Collusion: Evidence from Procurement Auctions
RePEc:iza:izadps:dp4939		[Citation Analysis]
2010Democracy and politics: Romanian mechanisms, realities and electoral developments
RePEc:pra:mprapa:22440		[Citation Analysis]
2010Anti-corruption strategies in some South-Eastern European states.An empirical study on the impact of the government performance
RePEc:pra:mprapa:24741		[Citation Analysis]
2010FDI waves, waves of neglect of political risk
RePEc:sol:wpaper:10-004		[Citation Analysis]
2010Fiscal Federalism and Electoral Accountability
RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3022		[Citation Analysis]
2010Enforcement and Public Corruption: Evidence from US States
RePEc:kud:epruwp:10-08		[Citation Analysis]
2010Globalization, Economic Freedom and Human Rights
RePEc:got:cegedp:115		[Citation Analysis]
2010Taking stock of antidumping, safeguards, and countervailingduties, 1990-2009
RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:5436		[Citation Analysis]
2010Trade Disputes, Quality Choice, and Economic Integration
RePEc:rye:wpaper:wp022		[Citation Analysis]
2010Corruption and Productivity Firm-level Evidence from the BEEPS Survey
RePEc:kie:kieliw:1632		[Citation Analysis]
2010Corruption and productivity : firm-level evidence from the BEEPS survey
RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:5348		[Citation Analysis]
2010Corruption as a Barrier to Entry: Theory and Evidence
RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8061		[Citation Analysis]

Cites in year: CiY

Recent citations received in: 2010

YearTitleSee
2010Forecast uncertainty and the Bank of England interest rate decisions
RePEc:zbw:bubdp1:201027		[Citation Analysis]

Recent citations received in: 2009

YearTitleSee
2009A Centered Index of Spatial Concentration : Axiomatic Approach with an Application to Population and Capital Cities
RePEc:eab:develo:22059		[Citation Analysis]
2009Keeping Dictators Honest : the Role of Population Concentration
RePEc:eab:govern:22076		[Citation Analysis]
2009THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INEQUALITY
RePEc:erg:wpaper:493		[Citation Analysis]
2009The growth effects of institutional instability
RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2009_008		[Citation Analysis]
2009The Growth Effects of Institutional Instability
RePEc:hhs:ratioi:0135		[Citation Analysis]
2009Electoral Rules, Political Competition and Fiscal Expenditures: Regression Discontinuity Evidence from Brazilian Municipalities
RePEc:iza:izadps:dp4658		[Citation Analysis]
2009Electoral Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from the Audits of Local Governments
RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14937		[Citation Analysis]
2009The Economic Cost of Harboring Terrorism
RePEc:nbr:nberwo:15465		[Citation Analysis]
2009Corruption, Transparency and Quality.Comparative Approaches and Judiciary Support
RePEc:pra:mprapa:19954		[Citation Analysis]
2009Keeping Dictators Honest: the Role of Population Concentration
RePEc:siu:wpaper:01-2009		[Citation Analysis]
2009A Centered Index of Spatial Concentration: Axiomatic Approach with an Application to Population and Capital Cities
RePEc:siu:wpaper:02-2009		[Citation Analysis]

Recent citations received in: 2008

YearTitleSee
2008The Choices Governors Make: The Roles of Checks and Balances and Political Competition
RePEc:anp:en2008:200807181549410		[Citation Analysis]
2008A Theory of the Corrupt Keynesian
RePEc:cam:camdae:0861		[Citation Analysis]
2008Do Interest Groups Affect US Immigration Policy?
RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6898		[Citation Analysis]
2008Trade Liberalization and Antidumping: Is There a Substitution Effect?
RePEc:eca:wpaper:2008_024		[Citation Analysis]
2008Does Antidumping Use Contribute to Trade Liberalization in Developing Countries
RePEc:gwi:wpaper:2008-01		[Citation Analysis]
2008Trade Liberalization and Antidumping: Is There a Substitution Effect?
RePEc:gwi:wpaper:2008-09		[Citation Analysis]
2008Do Interest Groups Affect U.S. Immigration Policy?
RePEc:imf:imfwpa:08/244		[Citation Analysis]
2008A Politico-Economic Analysis of the European Union’s R&D Policy
RePEc:pra:mprapa:10329		[Citation Analysis]
2008The not so dark side of trust: does trust increase the size of the shadow economy?
RePEc:sol:wpaper:08-030		[Citation Analysis]

Recent citations received in: 2007

YearTitleSee
2007Do Interest Groups Affect Immigration?
RePEc:iza:izadps:dp3183		[Citation Analysis]
2007Location decisions of foreign banks and competitive advantage
RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:4113		[Citation Analysis]
2007Trade facilitation, regulatory quality and export performance
RePEc:wly:jintdv:v:19:y:2007:i:6:p:735-753		[Citation Analysis]

Warning!! This is still an experimental service. The results of this service should be interpreted with care, especially in research assessment exercises. The processing of documents is automatic. There still are errors and omissions in the identification of references. We are working to improve the software to increase the accuracy of the results.

Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.
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