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2010 | A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice RePEc:cpi:cpijrn:6.1.2010:i=5496 [Citation Analysis] | 77 |
2006 | Welfare Standards and Merger Analysis: Why Not the Best? RePEc:cpi:cpijrn:2.2.2006:i=4893 [Citation Analysis] | 14 |
2008 | Interactions between Competition and Consumer Policy RePEc:cpi:cpijrn:4.1.2008:i=5057 [Citation Analysis] | 14 |
2007 | The Industrial Organization of Markets with Two-Sided Platforms RePEc:cpi:cpijrn:3.1.2007:i=4907 [Citation Analysis] | 7 |
2006 | The Economics of Welfare Standards in Antitrust RePEc:cpi:cpijrn:2.2.2006:i=4894 [Citation Analysis] | 5 |
2007 | Consumer Surplus as the Appropriate Standard for Antitrust Enforcement RePEc:cpi:cpijrn:3.2.2007:i=4927 [Citation Analysis] | 5 |
2005 | The Analysis of Tying Cases: A Primer RePEc:cpi:cpijrn:1.1.2005:i=4863 [Citation Analysis] | 4 |
2007 | Market Definition: Use and Abuse RePEc:cpi:cpijrn:3.1.2007:i=4904 [Citation Analysis] | 4 |
2010 | Consumer Protection in Markets with Advice RePEc:cpi:cpijrn:6.1.2010:i=5483 [Citation Analysis] | 3 |
2007 | Comments on Evans & Schmalenseeâââ‰â¢s âââ¬Ã
âThe Industrial Organization of Markets with Two-Sided Platformsââ∠RePEc:cpi:cpijrn:3.1.2007:i=4908 [Citation Analysis] | 3 |
2010 | Behavioral Economics as Applied to Firms: A Primer RePEc:cpi:cpijrn:6.1.2010:i=5482 [Citation Analysis] | 3 |
2006 | An Economic Approach to Article 82 RePEc:cpi:cpijrn:2.1.2006:i=4852 [Citation Analysis] | 3 |
2010 | What Does Behavioral Economics Mean for Competition Policy? RePEc:cpi:cpijrn:6.1.2010:i=5488 [Citation Analysis] | 3 |
2009 | Why We Need to Measure the Effect of Merger Policy and How to Do It RePEc:cpi:cpijrn:5.1.2009:i=5241 [Citation Analysis] | 2 |
2009 | Competition Policy, Bailouts, and the Economic Crisis RePEc:cpi:cpijrn:5.2.2009:i=5333 [Citation Analysis] | 2 |
2009 | Assessing the Quality of Competition Policy: The Case of Horizontal Merger Enforcement RePEc:cpi:cpijrn:5.1.2009:i=5243 [Citation Analysis] | 2 |
2005 | Mario Montis Legacy in EC Merger Control RePEc:cpi:cpijrn:1.1.2005:i=4867 [Citation Analysis] | 1 |
2007 | The Empirics of Antitrust in Two-Sided Markets RePEc:cpi:cpijrn:3.1.2007:i=4910 [Citation Analysis] | 1 |
2005 | How Economics Can Improve Antitrust Doctrine towards Tie-In Sales: Comment on Jean Tiroles The Analysis of Tying Cases RePEc:cpi:cpijrn:1.1.2005:i=4864 [Citation Analysis] | 1 |
2008 | Dynamic Competition Does Not Excuse Monopolization RePEc:cpi:cpijrn:4.2.2008:i=5156 [Citation Analysis] | 1 |
2010 | Comment on Antitrust Sanctions RePEc:cpi:cpijrn:6.2.2010:i=5731 [Citation Analysis] | 1 |
2007 | Economic Analysis of Competition Practices in the EU and the U.S.: A View from Chief Economists RePEc:cpi:cpijrn:3.2.2007:i=4926 [Citation Analysis] | 1 |
2008 | The Lawful Acquisition and Exercise of Monopoly Power and Its Implications for the Objectives of Antitrust RePEc:cpi:cpijrn:4.2.2008:i=5155 [Citation Analysis] | 1 |
2007 | The Impala Judgment: Does EC Merger Control Need to Be Fixed or Fine-Tuned? RePEc:cpi:cpijrn:3.1.2007:i=4919 [Citation Analysis] | 1 |
2005 | Determinants of Private Antitrust Enforcement in the United States RePEc:cpi:cpijrn:1.2.2005:i=4876 [Citation Analysis] | 1 |
2007 | Mobile Virtual Network Operators: Beyond the Hyperbolae RePEc:cpi:cpijrn:3.1.2007:i=4917 [Citation Analysis] | 1 |
2006 | Walter Eucken and Ordoliberalism: An Introduction from a Consumer Welfare Perspective RePEc:cpi:cpijrn:2.2.2006:i=4898 [Citation Analysis] | 1 |
2007 | The Antimonopoly Law in China: Where Do We Stand? RePEc:cpi:cpijrn:3.2.2007:i=4931 [Citation Analysis] | 1 |
2010 | The Future of Behavioral Economics in Antitrust Jurisprudence RePEc:cpi:cpijrn:6.1.2010:i=5486 [Citation Analysis] | 1 |
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Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.