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  Updated Jun, 1 2012 364.619 documents processed, 8.178.370 references and 3.213.942 citations

 

 
 

Games and Economic Behavior / Elsevier Science Economics Articles Archive

Raw citation data, Main indicators, Most cited papers , cites used to compute the impact factor (2010), Recent citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.

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Raw data:
IF AIF DOC CIT D2Y C2Y SC(%) CiY II AII
19900.330.092527221700.04
19910.150.0932267467010.030.05
19920.140.0837190578020.050.04
19930.10.0934485697030.090.05
19940.170.1617197112030.050.05
19950.160.126912929515080.120.06
19960.260.1697976130340100.10.08
19970.330.2163618166540190.30.08
19980.320.226144316051080.130.09
19990.220.2863498124270130.210.13
20000.480.3767564124590250.370.16
20010.420.3875476130550210.280.16
20020.520.4168502142741.4300.440.2
20030.480.4388603143690280.320.2
20040.710.49887461561100470.530.22
20050.950.52805061761670520.650.24
20061.010.5837081681700.6700.840.23
20071.070.42814131631740.6550.680.19
20081.030.431313321641690390.30.21
20090.670.431542842121420520.340.19
20100.420.361271512851210380.30.15
 
 
IF: Impact Factor: C2Y / D2Y
AIF: Average Impact Factor for series in RePEc in year y
DOC: Number of documents published in year y
CIT: Number of citations to the series in year y
D2Y: Number of articles published in y-1 plus y-2
C2Y: Cites in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2
SC(%): Percentage of selft citations in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2
CiY: Cites in year y to documents published in year y
IdI: Immediacy Index: CiY / Documents.
AII: Average Immediacy Index for series in RePEc in year y

 

Main indicators

Most cited documents in this series:
YearTitleCited
1995Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:10:y:1995:i:1:p:122-142 [Citation Analysis]
461
2006A theory of reciprocity
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:54:y:2006:i:2:p:293-315 [Citation Analysis]
254
2004A theory of sequential reciprocity
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:47:y:2004:i:2:p:268-298 [Citation Analysis]
236
1994Fairness in Simple Bargaining Experiments
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:6:y:1994:i:3:p:347-369 [Citation Analysis]
199
1994Preferences, Property Rights, and Anonymity in Bargaining Games
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:7:y:1994:i:3:p:346-380 [Citation Analysis]
193
1996Potential Games
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:14:y:1996:i:1:p:124-143 [Citation Analysis]
144
1995Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:8:y:1995:i:1:p:164-212 [Citation Analysis]
139
1990Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or cournot equilibria
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:2:y:1990:i:1:p:29-46 [Citation Analysis]
131
1989Psychological games and sequential rationality
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:1:y:1989:i:1:p:60-79 [Citation Analysis]
124
1989Renegotiation in repeated games
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:1:y:1989:i:4:p:327-360 [Citation Analysis]
120
1993The Statistical Mechanics of Strategic Interaction
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:5:y:1993:i:3:p:387-424 [Citation Analysis]
119
2004How to identify trust and reciprocity
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:46:y:2004:i:2:p:260-281 [Citation Analysis]
105
1995Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:10:y:1995:i:1:p:6-38 [Citation Analysis]
103
1995Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:8:y:1995:i:1:p:56-90 [Citation Analysis]
99
1996Altruism in Anonymous Dictator Games
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:16:y:1996:i:2:p:181-191 [Citation Analysis]
91
2007A tractable model of reciprocity and fairness
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:59:y:2007:i:1:p:17-45 [Citation Analysis]
90
2000Measuring Beliefs in an Experimental Lost Wallet Game
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:30:y:2000:i:2:p:163-182 [Citation Analysis]
84
1989Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:1:y:1989:i:2:p:170-190 [Citation Analysis]
83
2002The Stability of Hedonic Coalition Structures
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:38:y:2002:i:2:p:201-230 [Citation Analysis]
81
1996Sequential Formation of Coalitions in Games with Externalities and Fixed Payoff Division
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:14:y:1996:i:1:p:90-123 [Citation Analysis]
81
1999A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structures
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:26:y:1999:i:2:p:286-336 [Citation Analysis]
80
1995On Players Models of Other Players: Theory and Experimental Evidence
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:10:y:1995:i:1:p:218-254 [Citation Analysis]
75
1997Stable Coalition Structures with Externalities
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:20:y:1997:i:2:p:201-237 [Citation Analysis]
73

repec:eee:gamebe:v:44:y:2003:i:2:p:217-226 [Citation Analysis]
72
1995Anonymity versus Punishment in Ultimatum Bargaining
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:10:y:1995:i:1:p:95-121 [Citation Analysis]
72
1997Individual Learning in Normal Form Games: Some Laboratory Results
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:19:y:1997:i:1:p:46-76 [Citation Analysis]
61
2008Testing theories of fairness--Intentions matter
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:62:y:2008:i:1:p:287-303 [Citation Analysis]
57
1989Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:1:y:1989:i:4:p:295-326 [Citation Analysis]
57
2001The Relevance of Equal Splits in Ultimatum Games
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:37:y:2001:i:1:p:161-169 [Citation Analysis]
55
1996Cournot Oligopoly and the Theory of Supermodular Games
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:15:y:1996:i:2:p:132-148 [Citation Analysis]
54
1991Adaptive and sophisticated learning in normal form games
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:3:y:1991:i:1:p:82-100 [Citation Analysis]
53
1993Meaning and Credibility in Cheap-Talk Games
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:5:y:1993:i:4:p:514-531 [Citation Analysis]
52
1993Learning Mixed Equilibria
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:5:y:1993:i:3:p:320-367 [Citation Analysis]
51
1995Commitment and observability in games
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:8:y:1995:i:2:p:271-280 [Citation Analysis]
50
1995Social Norms and Random Matching Games
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:9:y:1995:i:1:p:79-109 [Citation Analysis]
48
1994A Laboratory Investigation of Multiperson Rationality and Presentation Effects
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:6:y:1994:i:3:p:445-468 [Citation Analysis]
48
2001A Dynamic Model of Network Formation
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:34:y:2001:i:2:p:331-341 [Citation Analysis]
47
1994Learning Behavior in an Experimental Matching Pennies Game
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:7:y:1994:i:1:p:62-91 [Citation Analysis]
47
1999The Indirect Evolutionary Approach to Explaining Fair Allocations
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:28:y:1999:i:1:p:13-24 [Citation Analysis]
47
1996Fairness in Ultimatum Games with Asymmetric Information and Asymmetric Payoffs
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:13:y:1996:i:1:p:100-110 [Citation Analysis]
46
2006Do non-strategic sanctions obey the law of demand? The demand for punishment in the voluntary contribution mechanism
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:54:y:2006:i:1:p:1-24 [Citation Analysis]
45
1990Population monotonic allocation schemes for cooperative games with transferable utility
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:2:y:1990:i:4:p:378-394 [Citation Analysis]
44
1997Calibrated Learning and Correlated Equilibrium
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:21:y:1997:i:1-2:p:40-55 [Citation Analysis]
41
2002On the formation of interaction networks in social coordination games
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:41:y:2002:i:2:p:265-291 [Citation Analysis]
40
1996Asymmetric All-Pay Auctions with Incomplete Information: The Two-Player Case
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:14:y:1996:i:1:p:1-18 [Citation Analysis]
40
1998More Is Better, But Fair Is Fair: Tipping in Dictator and Ultimatum Games
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:23:y:1998:i:2:p:247-265 [Citation Analysis]
40
1993An Evolutionary Analysis of Backward and Forward Induction
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:5:y:1993:i:3:p:425-454 [Citation Analysis]
40
2003Networks of collaboration in oligopoly
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:43:y:2003:i:1:p:57-85 [Citation Analysis]
39
1997On the Interpretation of Decision Problems with Imperfect Recall
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:20:y:1997:i:1:p:3-24 [Citation Analysis]
38
1995Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:8:y:1995:i:1:p:6-19 [Citation Analysis]
38

Citing documents used to compute impact factor 121:
YearTitleSee
2010Regret Matching with Finite Memory
RePEc:cla:levarc:661465000000000078
[Citation Analysis]
2010The Benefits of Costly Voting
RePEc:pra:mprapa:21372
[Citation Analysis]
2010An optimal Voting System when Voting is costly
RePEc:pra:mprapa:29123
[Citation Analysis]
2010Compulsory Voting and Public Finance
RePEc:szg:worpap:1004
[Citation Analysis]
2010Independent Random Matching
RePEc:pra:mprapa:27687
[Citation Analysis]
2010Two-Party Competition with Persistent Policies
RePEc:wat:wpaper:1011
[Citation Analysis]
2010Aggregate monotonic stable single-valued solutions for cooperative games
RePEc:bar:bedcje:2010237
[Citation Analysis]
2010Identity and Fragmentation in Networks
RePEc:pra:mprapa:21632
[Citation Analysis]
2010Consistent Beliefs in Extensive Form Games
RePEc:gam:jgames:v:1:y:2010:i:4:p:415-421:d:9917
[Citation Analysis]
2010Are smarter people really less risk averse?
RePEc:not:notcdx:2010-17
[Citation Analysis]
2010Endogenous effort in communication networks under strategic complementarity
RePEc:spr:jogath:v:39:y:2010:i:3:p:391-408
[Citation Analysis]
2010Social Interactions and Spillovers
RePEc:hhs:sunrpe:2010_0020
[Citation Analysis]
2010Efficiency and stability in a model of wireless communication networks
RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:34:y:2010:i:3:p:441-454
[Citation Analysis]
2010Applying Quadratic Scoring Rule transparently in multiple choice settings: A note
RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2010-021
[Citation Analysis]
2010Information and Beliefs in a Repeated Normal-form Game
RePEc:wzb:wzebiv:spii2010_02
[Citation Analysis]
2010Beliefs and Actions in the Trust Game: Creating Instrumental Variables to Estimate the Causal Effect
RePEc:iza:izadps:dp4709
[Citation Analysis]
2010So you want to run an experiment, now what? Some Simple Rules of Thumb for Optimal Experimental Design
RePEc:nbr:nberwo:15701
[Citation Analysis]
2010Information and Beliefs in a Repeated Normal-form Game
RePEc:wzb:wzebiv:fsiv2010-02
[Citation Analysis]
2010Testing the TASP: An Experimental Investigation of Learning in Games with Unstable Equilibria
RePEc:pur:prukra:1233
[Citation Analysis]
2010Looking smart versus playing dumb in common-value auctions
RePEc:spr:joecth:v:44:y:2010:i:3:p:469-490
[Citation Analysis]
2010Rational indecisive choice
RePEc:pra:mprapa:25481
[Citation Analysis]
2010May increased partisanship lead to convergence of parties’ policy platforms?
RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:145:y:2010:i:3:p:547-569
[Citation Analysis]
2010Three-Candidate Spatial Competition When Candidates Have Valence: Asymmetric Voter Density and Plurality Maximization
RePEc:suf:wpaper:2010-1
[Citation Analysis]
2010Anti-Limit Pricing
RePEc:hit:hitjec:v:51:y:2010:i:2:p:1-22
[Citation Analysis]
2010Dynamic Limit Pricing
RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8104
[Citation Analysis]
2010Strategic Sophistication of Adolescents: Evidence from Experimental Normal-Form Games
RePEc:iza:izadps:dp5049
[Citation Analysis]
2010Strategic sophistication of adolescents ? Evidence from experimental normal-form games
RePEc:inn:wpaper:2010-15
[Citation Analysis]
2010Strategic Sophistication of Individuals and Teams in Experimental Normal-Form Games
RePEc:iza:izadps:dp4732
[Citation Analysis]
2010Belief elicitation in experiments: is there a hedging problem?
RePEc:kap:expeco:v:13:y:2010:i:4:p:412-438
[Citation Analysis]
2010Testable implications for the Bresnahan-Lau model of market competition.
RePEc:ner:leuven:urn:hdl:123456789/266900
[Citation Analysis]
2010The provision of relative performance feedback information: An experimental analysis of performance and happiness
RePEc:upf:upfgen:1216
[Citation Analysis]
2010Quaternary dichotomous voting rules
RePEc:ehu:ikerla:201041
[Citation Analysis]
2010Majorities with a quorum
RePEc:ehu:ikerla:201042
[Citation Analysis]
2010Coalition Formation among Farsighted Agents
RePEc:dgr:umamet:2010025
[Citation Analysis]
2010Costly and discrete communication: An experimental investigation
RePEc:pra:mprapa:24148
[Citation Analysis]
2010Behavioral arbitrage with collateral and uncertain deliveries
RePEc:kap:annfin:v:6:y:2010:i:2:p:241-254
[Citation Analysis]
2010Infinitely-lived agents via two-sided altruism
RePEc:pra:mprapa:31379
[Citation Analysis]
2010A Blotto Game with Multi-Dimensional Incomplete Information
RePEc:pur:prukra:1262
[Citation Analysis]
2010Information alliances in contests with budget limits
RePEc:zbw:wzbfff:spii201021
[Citation Analysis]
2010Implementing Efficient Graphs in Connection Networks
RePEc:hai:wpaper:201022
[Citation Analysis]
2010On the impossibility of fair risk allocation
RePEc:pra:mprapa:26515
[Citation Analysis]
2010Dynamic Multi-Activity Contests
RePEc:emo:wp2003:1005
[Citation Analysis]
2010Collusion in homogeneous and heterogeneous tournaments
RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:100:y:2010:i:3:p:265-280
[Citation Analysis]
2010Ambiguous Information and Market Entry: An Experimental Study
RePEc:pra:mprapa:25276
[Citation Analysis]
2010The Dynamics of Cooperation in Group Lending - A Microfinance Experiment
RePEc:kls:series:0049
[Citation Analysis]
2010Perfect-Substitutes, Best-Shot, and Weakest-Link Contests between Groups
RePEc:chu:wpaper:10-25
[Citation Analysis]
2010Wage Transparency and Performance: A Real-Effort Experiment
RePEc:kls:series:0048
[Citation Analysis]
2010Egalitarian Equivalence under Asymmetric Information
RePEc:aub:autbar:813.10
[Citation Analysis]
2010Copmment on Egalitarianism under Incomplete Information
RePEc:bro:econwp:2010-4
[Citation Analysis]
2010Egalitarian Equivalence under Asymmetric Information
RePEc:bro:econwp:2010-5
[Citation Analysis]
2010Efficient allocation of heterogenous commodities with balanced transfers
RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:35:y:2010:i:1:p:29-48
[Citation Analysis]
2010Egalitarian Equivalence under Asymmetric Information
RePEc:bge:wpaper:431
[Citation Analysis]
2010Optimal Procurement Contracts with Pre–Project Planning
RePEc:trf:wpaper:303
[Citation Analysis]
2010Impatience and uncertainty: Experimental decisions predict adolescents? field behavior
RePEc:inn:wpaper:2010-29
[Citation Analysis]
2010Impatience and Uncertainty: Experimental Decisions Predict Adolecents Field Behavior
RePEc:lmu:muenec:12114
[Citation Analysis]
2010Impatience and Uncertainty: Experimental Decisions Predict Adolescents Field Behavior
RePEc:iza:izadps:dp5404
[Citation Analysis]
2010Inside-money theory after Diamond and Dybvig
RePEc:fip:fedreq:y:2010:i:1q:p:59-82:n:v.96no.1
[Citation Analysis]
2010Buy-It-Now prices in eBay Auctions - The Field in the Lab
RePEc:trf:wpaper:294
[Citation Analysis]
2010Auction Design with Loss Averse Bidders: The Optimality of All Pay Mechanisms
RePEc:pra:mprapa:23357
[Citation Analysis]
2010Comment on Auctions with a buy price: The case of reference-dependent preferences
RePEc:cte:werepe:we1019
[Citation Analysis]
2010A Noncooperative Approach to Bankruptcy Problems with an Endogenous Estate
RePEc:dgr:umamet:2010027
[Citation Analysis]
2010Behavioral Effects in Individual Decisions of Network Formation: Complexity Reduces Payoff Orientation and Social Preferences
RePEc:ris:fcnwpa:2010_005
[Citation Analysis]
2010(Anti-) Coordination in Networks
RePEc:fem:femwpa:2010.49
[Citation Analysis]
2010A reasoning approach to introspection and unawareness
RePEc:dgr:umamet:2010006
[Citation Analysis]
2010Revealed Unawareness
RePEc:pra:mprapa:21491
[Citation Analysis]
2010Revealed Unawareness
RePEc:cda:wpaper:10-5
[Citation Analysis]
2010Reverse Bayesianism: A Choice-Based Theory of Growing Awareness
RePEc:qed:wpaper:1258
[Citation Analysis]
2010Competition in the Pharmaceutical Industry: How do Quality Differences Shape Advertising Strategies?
RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8076
[Citation Analysis]
2010Merger profitability in industries with brand portfolios and loyal customers
RePEc:zbw:wzbfff:spii201008
[Citation Analysis]
2010Feature-based Choice and Similarity in Normal-form Games: An Experimental Study.
RePEc:trt:disawp:1007
[Citation Analysis]
2010Robustness to strategic uncertainty in price competition
RePEc:hhs:hastef:0726
[Citation Analysis]
2010Ambiguous Information and Market Entry: An Experimental Study
RePEc:pra:mprapa:25276
[Citation Analysis]
2010Procuring Commodities: First Price Sealed Bid or English Auction?
RePEc:pra:mprapa:13418
[Citation Analysis]
2010Rationalizable Implementation
RePEc:cla:levarc:661465000000000022
[Citation Analysis]
2010Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms
RePEc:cla:levarc:661465000000000017
[Citation Analysis]
2010Rationalizable Implementation
RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1697r
[Citation Analysis]
2010Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms
RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1666r
[Citation Analysis]
2010A new monotonicity condition for tournament solutions
RePEc:kap:theord:v:69:y:2010:i:3:p:439-452
[Citation Analysis]
2010Identity, reputation and social interaction with an application to sequential voting
RePEc:vnm:wpaper:204
[Citation Analysis]
2010Influential Opinion Leaders
RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1485
[Citation Analysis]
2010Influential Opinion Leaders
RePEc:tor:tecipa:tecipa-403
[Citation Analysis]
2010Wars of Attrition with Stochastic Competition
RePEc:kls:series:0047
[Citation Analysis]
2010Aggregation of incomplete ordinal preferences with approximate interpersonal comparisons
RePEc:pra:mprapa:25271
[Citation Analysis]
2010Approximate interpersonal comparisons of well-being
RePEc:pra:mprapa:25224
[Citation Analysis]
2010Risky social choice with approximate interpersonal comparisons of well-being
RePEc:pra:mprapa:25222
[Citation Analysis]
2010The High/Low Divide: Self-Selection by Values in Auction Choice
RePEc:trf:wpaper:295
[Citation Analysis]
2010A New Approach to Solving Production-Appropriation Games with Many Heterogeneous Players
RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3060
[Citation Analysis]
2010Preference Intensities and Risk Aversion in School Choice: A Laboratory Experiment
RePEc:bge:wpaper:447
[Citation Analysis]
2010‘Expressive’ Obligations in Public Good Games: Crowding-in and Crowding-out Effects.
RePEc:ven:wpaper:2010_04
[Citation Analysis]
2010Finding all Nash equilibria of a finite game using polynomial algebra
RePEc:spr:joecth:v:42:y:2010:i:1:p:55-96
[Citation Analysis]
2010Production and financial linkages in inter-firm networks: structural variety, risk-sharing and resilience
RePEc:trn:utwpol:1018
[Citation Analysis]
2010Speculative Trade under Unawareness: The Infinite Case
RePEc:pra:mprapa:20632
[Citation Analysis]
2010Speculative Trade under Unawareness: The Infinite Case
RePEc:cda:wpaper:10-2
[Citation Analysis]
2010Auctioning Process Innovations when Losers’ Bids Determine Royalty Rates
RePEc:trf:wpaper:291
[Citation Analysis]
2010Licensing a common value innovation when signaling strength may backfire
RePEc:trf:wpaper:292
[Citation Analysis]
2010SIGNALING IN AUCTIONS AMONG COMPETITORS
RePEc:trf:wpaper:293
[Citation Analysis]
2010A model of influence with an ordered set of possible actions
RePEc:kap:theord:v:69:y:2010:i:4:p:635-656
[Citation Analysis]
2010On the equilibrium of voting games with abstention and several levels of approval
RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:34:y:2010:i:3:p:379-396
[Citation Analysis]
2010Signaling and Tacit Collusion in an Infinitely Repeated Prisoners Dilemma
RePEc:jhu:papers:559
[Citation Analysis]
2010Inconsistency of fairness evaluation in simulated labot market.
RePEc:pra:mprapa:21527
[Citation Analysis]
2010Inequality Aversion and Reciprocity in Moonlighting Games
RePEc:gam:jgames:v:1:y:2010:i:4:p:459-477:d:9946
[Citation Analysis]
2010Assignment markets with the same core
RePEc:bar:bedcje:2010239
[Citation Analysis]
2010Hidden Costs of Control: Three Repetitions and an Extension
RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2010-007
[Citation Analysis]
2010Committing to Incentives: Should the Decision to Sanction be Revealed or Hidden?
RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2010-013
[Citation Analysis]
2010Gender at work: Productivity and incentives
RePEc:uca:ucapdv:142
[Citation Analysis]
2010Formulation and analysis of horizontal mergers among oligopolistic firms with insights into the merger paradox: a supply chain network perspective
RePEc:spr:comgts:v:7:y:2010:i:4:p:377-406
[Citation Analysis]
2010One-dimensional bargaining: a revision
RePEc:dgr:umamet:2010031
[Citation Analysis]
2010On the Asymptotic Uniqueness of Bargaining Equilibria
RePEc:dgr:umamet:2010010
[Citation Analysis]
2010Guilt and shame: an axiomatic analysis
RePEc:kap:theord:v:69:y:2010:i:4:p:569-586
[Citation Analysis]
2010Individual powers and social consent: an axiomatic approach
RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:34:y:2010:i:4:p:571-596
[Citation Analysis]
2010Simple Collective Identity Functions
RePEc:kap:theord:v:68:y:2010:i:4:p:417-443
[Citation Analysis]
2010A contraction principle for finite global games
RePEc:spr:joecth:v:42:y:2010:i:3:p:539-563
[Citation Analysis]
2010Right-to-Choose Auctions: A Field Study of Water Markets in the Limari Valley of Chile
RePEc:ala:wpaper:2010-04
[Citation Analysis]
2010On the existence of Nash equilibria in large games
RePEc:spr:jogath:v:39:y:2010:i:3:p:351-357
[Citation Analysis]
2010A note on the law of large numbers in economics
RePEc:pav:wpaper:254
[Citation Analysis]
2010A note on the law of large numbers in economics
RePEc:pav:wpaper:131
[Citation Analysis]
2010Wealth and status: Analyzing the perceived attractiveness of 2010 FIFA world cup players
RePEc:pra:mprapa:23881
[Citation Analysis]
2010Values for rooted-tree and sink-tree digraph games and sharing a river
RePEc:kap:theord:v:69:y:2010:i:4:p:657-669
[Citation Analysis]
2010Compensations in the Shapley value and the compensation solutions for graph games
RePEc:pra:mprapa:20955
[Citation Analysis]
2010A characterization of the average tree solution for tree games
RePEc:spr:jogath:v:39:y:2010:i:1:p:105-111
[Citation Analysis]
2010Group Membership, Competition, and Altruistic versus Antisocial Punishment: Evidence from Randomly Assigned Army Groups
RePEc:inn:wpaper:2010-24
[Citation Analysis]

Cites in year: CiY

Recent citations received in: 2010

YearTitleSee
2010Strategic Spending in Voting Competitions with Social Networks
RePEc:bdm:wpaper:2010-16
[Citation Analysis]
2010Directed Generosity and Network Formation: Network Dimension Matters
RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3287
[Citation Analysis]
2010Perfect-Substitutes, Best-Shot, and Weakest-Link Contests between Groups
RePEc:chu:wpaper:10-25
[Citation Analysis]
2010Dynamic Auctions: A Survey
RePEc:cla:levarc:661465000000000035
[Citation Analysis]
2010Competitive Equilibrium in Markets for Votes
RePEc:cla:levarc:661465000000000143
[Citation Analysis]
2010Competitive Equilibrium in Markets for Votes
RePEc:clu:wpaper:0910-21
[Citation Analysis]
2010Dynamic Auctions: A Survey
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[Citation Analysis]
2010Dynamic Auctions: A Survey
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2010Performance Pay and Multi-dimensional Sorting - Productivity, Preferences and Gender
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[Citation Analysis]
2010Scheduling with package auctions
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[Citation Analysis]
2010Bounding Preference Parameters under Different Assumptions about Beliefs: a Partial Identification Approach
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2010Competitive Equilibrium in Markets for Votes
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[Citation Analysis]
2010Estimating Time Preferences from Convex Budgets
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[Citation Analysis]
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[Citation Analysis]
2010The Framing of Games and the Psychology of Play
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[Citation Analysis]
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[Citation Analysis]
2010Auctions with Dynamic Populations: Efficiency and Revenue Maximization
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[Citation Analysis]
2010Auction Design with Loss Averse Bidders: The Optimality of All Pay Mechanisms
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[Citation Analysis]
2010Endogenous Timing in General Rent-Seeking and Conflict Models
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[Citation Analysis]
2010On the evolution of prize perceptions in contests
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[Citation Analysis]
2010On the number of blocks required to access the core
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[Citation Analysis]
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2010Computing equilibria: a computational complexity perspective
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[Citation Analysis]
2010Implementation of solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
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[Citation Analysis]
2010A Folk Theorem for Competing Mechanisms
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[Citation Analysis]
2010On the Revelation Principle and Reciprocal Mechanisms in Competing Mechanism Games
RePEc:ubc:pmicro:michael_peters-2010-18
[Citation Analysis]
2010Long-run equilibria, dominated strategies, and local interactions
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[Citation Analysis]
2010Information and Beliefs in a Repeated Normal-form Game
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[Citation Analysis]

Recent citations received in: 2009

YearTitleSee
2009Departure Times in Y-Shaped Traffic Networks with Multiple Bottlenecks
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[Citation Analysis]
2009Contracts, cost sharing and consistency
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[Citation Analysis]
2009Game Mining: How to Make Money from those about to Play a Game
RePEc:amu:wpaper:2009-10
[Citation Analysis]
2009Von Neumann–Morgenstern stable-set solutions in the assignment market
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[Citation Analysis]
2009Voronoi languages: Equilibria in cheap-talk games with high-dimensional types and few signals
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[Citation Analysis]
2009The Relation Between Competition and Investment – Towards a Synthesis
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[Citation Analysis]
2009The Relation Between Competition and Investment – Towards a Synthesis
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[Citation Analysis]
2009Decision Making in Uncertain and Changing Environments
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[Citation Analysis]
2009Altruism, Turnout and Strategic Voting Behavior
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[Citation Analysis]
2009Communication, Renegotiation, and the Scope for Collusion
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[Citation Analysis]
2009Endogenous Default Penalties in Nominal Incomplete Markets
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[Citation Analysis]
2009Revisiting Strategic versus Non-strategic Cooperation
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[Citation Analysis]
2009Never change a winning team: The effect of substitutions on success in football tournaments
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[Citation Analysis]
2009Eliciting Discount Functions when Baseline Consumption changes over Time
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[Citation Analysis]
2009Cheap Talk with an Informed Receiver
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[Citation Analysis]
2009Confidence in preferences
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[Citation Analysis]
2009Revisiting Friendship Networks
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[Citation Analysis]
2009Testing the TASP: An Experimental Investigation of Learning in Games with Unstable Equilibria
RePEc:edn:esedps:188
[Citation Analysis]
2009Strategic Information Transmission in Networks
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[Citation Analysis]
2009Team Formation in a Network
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[Citation Analysis]
2009Fatigue in dynamic tournaments
RePEc:fsu:wpaper:wp2009_06_03
[Citation Analysis]
2009Dumbing down rational players: Learning and teaching in an experimental game
RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-00607223
[Citation Analysis]
2009Ascending auctions: some impossibility results and their resolutions with final price discounts
RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-00575076
[Citation Analysis]
2009Coordination in Evolving Networks with Endogenous Decay
RePEc:inn:wpaper:2009-19
[Citation Analysis]
2009Revisiting Strategic versus Non-Strategic Cooperation
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[Citation Analysis]
2009On the Relevance and Composition of Gifts within the Firm: Evidence from Field Experiments
RePEc:iza:izadps:dp4339
[Citation Analysis]
2009Preferences and Beliefs in a Sequential Social Dilemma: A Within-Subjects Analysis
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[Citation Analysis]
2009Choosers as extension axioms
RePEc:kap:theord:v:67:y:2009:i:4:p:375-384
[Citation Analysis]
2009Limit Behavior of No-regret Dynamics
RePEc:kse:dpaper:21
[Citation Analysis]
2009Revisiting Friendship Networks
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[Citation Analysis]
2009On the Relevance and Composition of Gifts within the Firm: Evidence from Field Experiments
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[Citation Analysis]
2009Evaluating the Degree of Manipulability of Certain Aggregation Procedures under Multiple Choices
RePEc:nea:journl:y:2009:i:1-2:p:37-61
[Citation Analysis]
2009Measuring Winners and Losers from the new I-35W Mississippi River Bridge
RePEc:nex:wpaper:i-35w-trb2010-measuringwinnerslosers
[Citation Analysis]
2009Stationary consistent equilibrium coalition structures constitute the recursive core
RePEc:pkk:wpaper:0905
[Citation Analysis]
2009The impossibility of effective enforcement mechanisms in collateralized credit markets
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[Citation Analysis]
2009The Role of Financial Intermediaries in Securities Issues: A Theoretical Analysis
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[Citation Analysis]
2009Auctioning with Aspirations: Keep Them Low (Enough)
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[Citation Analysis]
2009Self-Enforcing Climate Change Treaties: A Generalized Differential Game Approach with Applications
RePEc:pra:mprapa:17889
[Citation Analysis]
2009Political Influence in Multi-Choice Institutions: Cyclicity, Anonymity and Transitivity
RePEc:pra:mprapa:18240
[Citation Analysis]
2009Consumer theory with bounded rational preferences
RePEc:pra:mprapa:18673
[Citation Analysis]
2009Endogenous Relative Concerns: The Impact of Workers Characteristics on Status and Pro ts in the Firm
RePEc:pra:mprapa:18759
[Citation Analysis]
2009In Vino Veritas: The Economics of Drinking
RePEc:rwi:repape:0158
[Citation Analysis]
2009Robust rational turnout
RePEc:spr:joecth:v:41:y:2009:i:2:p:317-343
[Citation Analysis]
2009Strategic absentmindedness in finitely repeated games
RePEc:spr:topjnl:v:17:y:2009:i:1:p:85-95
[Citation Analysis]
2009On Inequity Aversion A Reply to Binmore and Shaked
RePEc:trf:wpaper:256
[Citation Analysis]
2009Renegotiation-Proof Relational Contracts with Side Payments
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[Citation Analysis]
2009Sabotage in dynamic tournaments
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[Citation Analysis]
2009Household behavior and individual autonomy.
RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2009-17
[Citation Analysis]
2009Elicited beliefs and social information in modified dictator games: What do dictators believe other dictators do?
RePEc:upf:upfgen:1137
[Citation Analysis]
2009Decision making in uncertain and changing environments
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[Citation Analysis]
2009Optimum Tariffs and Retaliation: How Country Numbers Matter
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[Citation Analysis]
2009Price Dispersion, Search Externalities, and the Digital Divide
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[Citation Analysis]

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YearTitleSee
2008Nash Equilibrium and Mechanism Design
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[Citation Analysis]
2008Multiple Priors as Similarity Weighted Frequencies
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[Citation Analysis]
2008Optimal Auction Design and Irrelevance of Private Information
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[Citation Analysis]
2008Bubblesandcrashes:Gradientdynamicsinï¬nancial markets
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[Citation Analysis]
2008The Paradoxes of Revenge in Conflicts
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[Citation Analysis]
2008Inequality, Happiness and Relative Concerns: What Actually is their Relationship?
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[Citation Analysis]
2008Cooling-Off in Negotiations - Does It Work?
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[Citation Analysis]
2008The Average Tree Solution for Cooperative Games with Communication Structure
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[Citation Analysis]
2008Non-cooperative Support for the Asymmetric Nash Bargaining solution
RePEc:dgr:umamet:2008018
[Citation Analysis]
2008Behavorial Effects in Individual Decisions of Network Formation
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[Citation Analysis]
2008The Average Tree Solution for Cooperative Games with Communication Structure
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[Citation Analysis]
2008Simultaneous Pooled Auctions with Multiple Bids and Preference Lists
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[Citation Analysis]
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[Citation Analysis]
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[Citation Analysis]
2008On two basic properties of equilibria of voting with exit
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2008Pricing with markups in industries with increasing marginal costs
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[Citation Analysis]
2008Generalized projection dynamics in evolutionary game theory
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[Citation Analysis]
2008The Right of Withdrawal in the Treaty of Lisbon: A game theoretic reflection on different decision processes in the EU
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[Citation Analysis]
2008Tracing Fairness Intentions: Chinese Whisper
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[Citation Analysis]
2008The Paradoxes of Revenge in Conflicts
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2008Feedback; Punishment and Cooperation in Public Good Experiments
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[Citation Analysis]
2008Average tree solution and subcore for acyclic graph games.
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[Citation Analysis]
2008Job-market signalling and screening: An experimental study.
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2008The Rate of Convergence to Perfect Competition of Matching and Bargaining Mechanisms
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2008Macroeconomics: A Survey of Laboratory Research
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[Citation Analysis]
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[Citation Analysis]
2008The Impact of Council Voting Rules on EU Decision-Making
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[Citation Analysis]
2008The Power of Words: Why Communication fosters Cooperation and Efficiency
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[Citation Analysis]
2008An Experimental Study of the Holdout Problem in a Multilateral Bargaining Game
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[Citation Analysis]
2008The Power of Reasoning: Experimental Evidence
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2008The Optimal Choice of Pre-launch Reviewer : How Best to Transmit Information using Tests and Conditional Pricing
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YearTitleSee
2007Group Reputations, Stereotypes, and Cooperation in a Repeated Labor Market
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[Citation Analysis]
2007Could Behavioral Economics Help Improve Diet Quality for Nutrition Assistance Program Participants?
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[Citation Analysis]
2007The minority game: An economics perspective
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[Citation Analysis]
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2007The Evolution of Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games: Experimental Evidence
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2007A Route Choice Experiment With an Efficient Toll
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2007The Relevance of Heterogeneity in a Congested Route Network with Tolls: An Analysis of Two Experiments Using Actual Waiting Times and Monetized Time Costs
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[Citation Analysis]
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[Citation Analysis]
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[Citation Analysis]
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[Citation Analysis]
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2007Many-to-One Matching when Colleagues Matter
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2007Social Memory and Evidence from the Past
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2007Stochastic Evolution of Rules for Playing Finite Normal Form Games
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2007Cooperation among strangers: an experiment with indefinite interaction
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2007Communicating Quality: A Unified Model of Disclosure and Signaling
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