Most cited documents in this series:

Year	Title	Cited
1986	The judgment proof problem RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:6:y:1986:i:1:p:45-58 [Citation Analysis]	47
1997	Casual police corruption and the economics of crime RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:17:y:1997:i:1:p:75-87 [Citation Analysis]	29
2000	Socioeconomic and demographic factors of crime in Germany: Evidence from panel data of the German states RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:20:y:2000:i:1:p:75-106 [Citation Analysis]	27
2000	On the joint use of liability and safety regulation RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:20:y:2000:i:3:p:371-382 [Citation Analysis]	22
1997	Judicial detection skill and contractual compliance RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:17:y:1997:i:4:p:509-520 [Citation Analysis]	20
1995	The effects of criminality and conviction on the labor market status of young British offenders RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:15:y:1995:i:1:p:109-126 [Citation Analysis]	20
1996	FOCJ: Competitive governments for Europe RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:16:y:1996:i:3:p:315-327 [Citation Analysis]	19
1982	Evaluating choice RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:2:y:1982:i:1:p:47-65 [Citation Analysis]	18
2000	Casual police corruption and the economics of crime:: Further results RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:20:y:2000:i:1:p:35-51 [Citation Analysis]	17
2002	Rent-seeking through litigation: adversarial and inquisitorial systems compared RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:22:y:2002:i:2:p:193-216 [Citation Analysis]	16
1988	The deterrent effects of settlements and trials RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:8:y:1988:i:1:p:109-116 [Citation Analysis]	15
1986	Optimal subsidies and damages in the presence of judicial error RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:6:y:1986:i:1:p:101-105 [Citation Analysis]	15
1991	Optimal criminal procedure: Fairness and deterrence RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:11:y:1991:i:1:p:3-10 [Citation Analysis]	15
1992	A note on marginal deterrence RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:12:y:1992:i:3:p:345-355 [Citation Analysis]	14
1999	Using decoupling and deep pockets to mitigate judgment-proof problems1 RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:19:y:1999:i:2:p:275-293 [Citation Analysis]	14
2003	Voting control in German corporations RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:23:y:2003:i:1:p:1-29 [Citation Analysis]	14
2000	Expertise, contingent fees, and insufficient attorney effort RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:20:y:2000:i:1:p:21-33 [Citation Analysis]	14
1990	The social value of crime? RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:10:y:1990:i:3:p:271-284 [Citation Analysis]	13
1993	Optimal sanctions and differences in individuals likelihood of avoiding detection RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:13:y:1993:i:2:p:217-224 [Citation Analysis]	13
1998	On offense history and the theory of deterrence RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:18:y:1998:i:3:p:305-324 [Citation Analysis]	13
1988	Judicial decisionmaking and litigation expenditure RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:8:y:1988:i:2:p:127-143 [Citation Analysis]	12
1998	Dissolving the relationship between divorce laws and divorce rates RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:18:y:1998:i:3:p:341-359 [Citation Analysis]	12
1994	Pretrial negotiations with asymmetric information on risk preferences RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:14:y:1994:i:3:p:273-281 [Citation Analysis]	12
2000	Generic take-up in the pharmaceutical market following patent expiry: A multi-country study RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:20:y:2000:i:2:p:205-221 [Citation Analysis]	12
1992	A positive theory of statutory interpretation RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:12:y:1992:i:2:p:263-279 [Citation Analysis]	12
1982	The optimum enforcement of laws and the concept of justice: A positive analysis RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:2:y:1982:i:1:p:3-27 [Citation Analysis]	12
1997	Incentive compatibility constraints as an explanation for the use of prison sentences instead of fines RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:17:y:1997:i:2:p:179-192 [Citation Analysis]	11
1993	Should employees be subject to fines and imprisonment given the existence of corporate liability? RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:13:y:1993:i:3:p:239-257 [Citation Analysis]	11
1994	Efficient standards of due care: Should courts find more parties negligent under comparative negligence? RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:14:y:1994:i:1:p:21-34 [Citation Analysis]	11
1994	A positive theory of legal change RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:14:y:1994:i:4:p:467-477 [Citation Analysis]	10
1994	Does conviction have a persistent effect on income and employment? RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:14:y:1994:i:1:p:103-119 [Citation Analysis]	10
2001	Collective wage setting when wages are generally binding An antitrust perspective RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:21:y:2001:i:3:p:287-307 [Citation Analysis]	10
2003	A note on the optimal punishment for repeat offenders RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:23:y:2003:i:3:p:253-259 [Citation Analysis]	10
1994	The capture of wealth by monopolists and the protection of property rights RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:14:y:1994:i:4:p:393-409 [Citation Analysis]	10
1997	The burden of proof in civil litigation: A simple model of mechanism design RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:17:y:1997:i:3:p:431-447 [Citation Analysis]	10
1990	Re-examining liability rules when injurers as well as victims suffer losses RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:10:y:1990:i:3:p:233-239 [Citation Analysis]	10
1997	Mandatory rotation of company auditors: A critical examination RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:17:y:1997:i:1:p:31-61 [Citation Analysis]	9
2005	Alcohol, Drugs and Violent Crime RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:25:y:2005:i:1:p:20-44 [Citation Analysis]	9
1999	Combining regulation and legal liability for the control of external costs RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:19:y:1999:i:2:p:227-244 [Citation Analysis]	9
2004	Corruption and the optimal use of nonmonetary sanctions RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:24:y:2004:i:2:p:219-225 [Citation Analysis]	9
1992	The optimal probability and magnitude of fines for acts that definitely are undesirable RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:12:y:1992:i:1:p:3-11 [Citation Analysis]	9
2002	Secured debt and the likelihood of reorganization RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:21:y:2002:i:4:p:359-372 [Citation Analysis]	9
1999	Contingent fees and litigation settlement1 RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:19:y:1999:i:3:p:295-317 [Citation Analysis]	9
1985	A model in which suits are brought for their nuisance value RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:5:y:1985:i:1:p:3-13 [Citation Analysis]	9
2008	Customary versus technological advancement tests RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:28:y:2008:i:2:p:106-112 [Citation Analysis]	9
1996	Limited liability and the requirement to purchase insurance RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:16:y:1996:i:2:p:259-276 [Citation Analysis]	8
1999	Do punitive damages promote deterrence?1 RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:19:y:1999:i:1:p:47-68 [Citation Analysis]	8
2009	Two-tiered entrepreneurship and economic development RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:29:y:2009:i:3:p:252-259 [Citation Analysis]	8
2001	Collective coherence? RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:21:y:2001:i:2:p:197-211 [Citation Analysis]	8
1990	Strict liability in a principal-agent model RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:10:y:1990:i:3:p:219-231 [Citation Analysis]	8

Citing documents used to compute impact factor 17:

Year	Title	See
2010	Institutions, Capital, and Growth RePEc:wvu:wpaper:10-15	[Citation Analysis]
2010	Conflict and Entrepreneurial Activity in Afghanistan: Findings from the National Risk Vulnerability Assessment Data RePEc:unu:wpaper:wp2010-08	[Citation Analysis]
2010	Safety and the Allocation of Costs in Large Accidents RePEc:pra:mprapa:25710	[Citation Analysis]
2010	Organizational Differences between U.S. Major Leagues and European Leagues: Implications for Salary Caps RePEc:iso:wpaper:0122	[Citation Analysis]
2010	Prosecutorial Retention: Signaling by Trial RePEc:bir:birmec:10-11	[Citation Analysis]
2010	Social Comparison and Performance: Experimental Evidence on the Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis RePEc:iza:izadps:dp4687	[Citation Analysis]
2010	Are Patent Laws Harmful to Developing Countries? Evidence from China RePEc:osu:osuewp:09-07	[Citation Analysis]
2010	Interjurisdictional Linkages and the Scope for Interventionist Legal Harmonization RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3085	[Citation Analysis]
2010	Controlling shareholders and payout policy: do founding families have a special taste for dividends? RePEc:zbw:cefswp:201001	[Citation Analysis]
2010	DAXplus family: Ein Aktienindex zur Darstellung der Performance von Familienunternehmen RePEc:zbw:cefswp:201005	[Citation Analysis]
2010	Personal Well-being in Urban China RePEc:spr:soinre:v:95:y:2010:i:2:p:231-251	[Citation Analysis]
2010	Optimal Liability Sharing and Court Errors: An Exploratory Analysis RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3073	[Citation Analysis]
2010	Optimal liability sharing and court errors: an exploratory analysis RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00463913	[Citation Analysis]
2010	Optimal Liability Sharing and Court Errors : An Exploratory Analysis RePEc:mtl:montec:05-2010	[Citation Analysis]
2010	Re-election Concerns and the Failure of Plea Bargaining RePEc:bir:birmec:10-28	[Citation Analysis]
2010	Differential enforcement across police jurisdictions and client demand in paid sex markets RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:29:y:2010:i:1:p:43-55	[Citation Analysis]
2010	Equité du plaider coupable : une analyse économétrique dans trois tribunaux de grande instance français. RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2010-09	[Citation Analysis]

Cites in year: CiY