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| 1994 | Nash implementation through elementary mechanisms in economic environments
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:1:y:1994:i:1:p:173-203 [Citation Analysis] | 36 |
| 1999 | Responsibility, talent, and compensation: A second-best analysis
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:1:p:35-55 [Citation Analysis] | 21 |
| 2003 | Optimal two-object auctions with synergies
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:8:y:2003:i:2:p:143-164 [Citation Analysis] | 20 |
| 1994 | Economic design, adjustment processes, mechanisms, and institutions
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:1:y:1994:i:1:p:1-14 [Citation Analysis] | 19 |
| 1996 | On incentive compatibility and budget balancedness in public decision making
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:2:y:1996:i:1:p:193-209 [Citation Analysis] | 16 |
| 1999 | Monotonic extensions on economic domains
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:1:p:13-33 [Citation Analysis] | 14 |
| 1998 | Efficient venture capital financing combining debt and equity
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1998:i:4:p:371-387 [Citation Analysis] | 13 |
| 2002 | Achieving the first best in sequencing problems
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:7:y:2002:i:1:p:75-91 [Citation Analysis] | 10 |
| 1997 | Stackelberg leadership and transfers in private provision of public goods
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1997:i:1:p:29-43 [Citation Analysis] | 10 |
| 1999 | Feasible implementation of taxation methods
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:1:p:57-72 [Citation Analysis] | 10 |
| 2004 | Link bidding in laboratory networks
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:8:y:2004:i:4:p:359-372 [Citation Analysis] | 9 |
| 1998 | Implementation of stable solutions in a restricted matching market
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1998:i:2:p:137-147 [Citation Analysis] | 9 |
| 2004 | Organizations and overlapping generations games: Memory, communication, and altruism
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:8:y:2004:i:4:p:383-411 [Citation Analysis] | 9 |
| 2007 | Tullock and Hirshleifer: a meeting of the minds
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:11:y:2007:i:2:p:101-124 [Citation Analysis] | 8 |
| 1997 | Redistribution and individual characteristics
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1997:i:1:p:45-55 [Citation Analysis] | 8 |
| 1999 | Coalitional manipulations in a bankruptcy problem
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:3:p:255-272 [Citation Analysis] | 8 |
| 2006 | Equilibria in the spatial stochastic model of voting with party activists
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:10:y:2006:i:3:p:183-203 [Citation Analysis] | 7 |
| 1998 | A mechanism design approach to an optimal contract under ex ante and ex post private information
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1998:i:3:p:237-255 [Citation Analysis] | 7 |
| 1994 | Exchange-proofness or divorce-proofness? Stability in one-sided matching markets
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:1:y:1994:i:1:p:275-287 [Citation Analysis] | 7 |
| 2002 | Integrating the Nash program into mechanism theory
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:7:y:2002:i:1:p:27-43 [Citation Analysis] | 7 |
| 1998 | The scheduling and organization of periodic associative computation: Efficient networks
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1998:i:2:p:93-127 [Citation Analysis] | 6 |
| 1999 | A profit-center game with incomplete information
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:4:p:307-343 [Citation Analysis] | 6 |
| 2000 | original papers : Spatial social networks
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:5:y:2000:i:3:p:273-299 [Citation Analysis] | 6 |
| 2002 | First-price auctions when the ranking of valuations is common knowledge
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:6:y:2001:i:3:p:461-480 [Citation Analysis] | 6 |
| 2007 | The theory of contests: a survey
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:11:y:2007:i:2:p:69-100 [Citation Analysis] | 6 |
| 2002 | How to get firms to invest: A simple solution to the hold-up problem in regulation
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:7:y:2002:i:1:p:45-56 [Citation Analysis] | 6 |
| 1999 | Organizational restructuring in response to changes in information-processing technology
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:4:p:295-305 [Citation Analysis] | 6 |
| 2003 | Manipulation via merging and splitting in claims problems
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:8:y:2003:i:2:p:205-215 [Citation Analysis] | 6 |
| 2007 | The generalized Stackelberg equilibrium of the all-pay auction with complete information
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:11:y:2007:i:2:p:165-174 [Citation Analysis] | 6 |
| 1998 | Correlated equilibrium as a stable standard of behavior
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1998:i:3:p:257-269 [Citation Analysis] | 5 |
| 2002 | Trust and social efficiencies
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:6:y:2001:i:3:p:413-428 [Citation Analysis] | 5 |
| 1998 | Managerial costs for one-shot decentralized information processing
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1998:i:4:p:329-345 [Citation Analysis] | 5 |
| 2006 | New characterizations of a classical bankruptcy rule
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:10:y:2006:i:2:p:73-84 [Citation Analysis] | 5 |
| 1999 | Taxation in an economy with private provision of public goods
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:4:p:357-379 [Citation Analysis] | 5 |
| 2003 | Optimal design of trade institutions
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:8:y:2003:i:3:p:269-292 [Citation Analysis] | 5 |
| 1997 | Equilibrium in a market with intermediation is Walrasian
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1997:i:1:p:75-89 [Citation Analysis] | 5 |
| 2005 | The Pazner-Schmeidler social ordering: A defense
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:9:y:2005:i:2:p:145-166 [Citation Analysis] | 4 |
| 1999 | Decision-making under risk: Editing procedures based on correlated similarities, and preference overdetermination
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:1:p:1-12 [Citation Analysis] | 4 |
| 1999 | A non-cooperative interpretation of bargaining sets
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:3:p:219-230 [Citation Analysis] | 4 |
| 1996 | Replicating Walrasian equilibria using markets for membership in labor-managed firms
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:2:y:1996:i:1:p:147-162 [Citation Analysis] | 4 |
| 1996 | Nonlinear pricing in spatial oligopoly
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:2:y:1996:i:1:p:379-397 [Citation Analysis] | 4 |
| 1999 | Single-peakedness and coalition-proofness
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:4:y:1999:i:4:p:381-387 [Citation Analysis] | 4 |
| 1998 | On durable goods monopolies and the Coase-Conjecture
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1998:i:3:p:215-236 [Citation Analysis] | 4 |
| 2002 | Public spending and optimal taxes without commitment
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:6:y:2001:i:3:p:371-396 [Citation Analysis] | 4 |
| 2005 | Strategic delegation in oligopolistic tournaments
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:9:y:2005:i:4:p:377-396 [Citation Analysis] | 4 |
| 1996 | A continuous double implementation of the constrained Walras equilibrium
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:2:y:1996:i:1:p:89-97 [Citation Analysis] | 4 |
| 2005 | The condominium problem; auctions for substitutes
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:9:y:2005:i:2:p:73-90 [Citation Analysis] | 4 |
| 2007 | The effect of spillovers on the provision of local public goods
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:11:y:2007:i:3:p:199-216 [Citation Analysis] | 4 |
| 1998 | On optimality of illegal collusion in contracts
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:3:y:1998:i:4:p:303-328 [Citation Analysis] | 3 |
| 2006 | Incomplete regulation, market competition and collusion
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:10:y:2006:i:2:p:113-142 [Citation Analysis] | 3 |
