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2006 | Donor influence in multilateral development banks: The case of the Asian Development Bank RePEc:spr:revint:v:1:y:2006:i:2:p:173-195 [Citation Analysis] | 28 |
2006 | Optimal transfers and participation decisions in international environmental agreements RePEc:spr:revint:v:1:y:2006:i:4:p:379-396 [Citation Analysis] | 26 |
2006 | IMF program compliance: Aggregate index versus policy specific research strategies RePEc:spr:revint:v:1:y:2006:i:4:p:359-378 [Citation Analysis] | 24 |
2006 | Principal-agent problems in international organizations RePEc:spr:revint:v:1:y:2006:i:2:p:125-138 [Citation Analysis] | 17 |
2008 | The International Monetary Fund: A review of the recent evidence RePEc:spr:revint:v:3:y:2008:i:2:p:123-149 [Citation Analysis] | 17 |
2009 | Does government ideology influence political alignment with the U.S.? An empirical analysis of voting in the UN General Assembly RePEc:spr:revint:v:4:y:2009:i:3:p:245-268 [Citation Analysis] | 15 |
2008 | IMF conditionality: An approach based on the theory of special interest politics RePEc:spr:revint:v:3:y:2008:i:2:p:105-121 [Citation Analysis] | 12 |
2006 | Optimal central bank design: Benchmarks for the ECB RePEc:spr:revint:v:1:y:2006:i:3:p:207-235 [Citation Analysis] | 11 |
2006 | Regional public goods and international organizations RePEc:spr:revint:v:1:y:2006:i:1:p:5-25 [Citation Analysis] | 9 |
2006 | Evaluating the impact of IMF programs: A comparison of matching and instrumental-variable estimators RePEc:spr:revint:v:1:y:2006:i:2:p:99-124 [Citation Analysis] | 8 |
2008 | Congressional voting on funding the international financial institutions RePEc:spr:revint:v:3:y:2008:i:4:p:351-374 [Citation Analysis] | 7 |
2011 | Explaining IMF lending decisions after the Cold War RePEc:spr:revint:v:6:y:2011:i:3:p:307-340 [Citation Analysis] | 6 |
2006 | Reviving the Bank and Fund RePEc:spr:revint:v:1:y:2006:i:1:p:49-59 [Citation Analysis] | 5 |
2008 | Trust in international organizations: An empirical investigation focusing on the United Nations RePEc:spr:revint:v:3:y:2008:i:1:p:65-93 [Citation Analysis] | 5 |
2011 | Informal influence in the Asian Development Bank RePEc:spr:revint:v:6:y:2011:i:3:p:223-257 [Citation Analysis] | 5 |
2008 | The political economy of labor market regulation by the European Union RePEc:spr:revint:v:3:y:2008:i:4:p:435-465 [Citation Analysis] | 5 |
2010 | The effects of IMF programs on U.S. foreign direct investment in the developing world RePEc:spr:revint:v:5:y:2010:i:1:p:73-95 [Citation Analysis] | 5 |
2010 | The politics of IO performance: A framework RePEc:spr:revint:v:5:y:2010:i:3:p:227-248 [Citation Analysis] | 4 |
2007 | How the court made a federation of the EU RePEc:spr:revint:v:2:y:2007:i:1:p:59-75 [Citation Analysis] | 4 |
2010 | The politics of performance evaluation: Independent evaluation at the International Monetary Fund RePEc:spr:revint:v:5:y:2010:i:3:p:365-385 [Citation Analysis] | 4 |
2011 | Is two better than one? The effects of IMF and World Bank interaction on growth RePEc:spr:revint:v:6:y:2011:i:3:p:287-306 [Citation Analysis] | 4 |
2010 | International regulation without international government: Improving IO performance through orchestration RePEc:spr:revint:v:5:y:2010:i:3:p:315-344 [Citation Analysis] | 3 |
2010 | Jean Pisani-Ferry and Adam S. Posen. 2009. The Euro at Ten: The next global currency? (Washington D.C.: Peterson Institute for International Economics, Bruegel) RePEc:spr:revint:v:5:y:2010:i:1:p:101-105 [Citation Analysis] | 3 |
2011 | When BITs have some bite: The political-economic environment for bilateral investment treaties RePEc:spr:revint:v:6:y:2011:i:1:p:1-32 [Citation Analysis] | 3 |
2006 | Reply to Gordon Tullock RePEc:spr:revint:v:1:y:2006:i:1:p:47-48 [Citation Analysis] | 3 |
2009 | Public support for the international economic organizations: Evidence from developing countries RePEc:spr:revint:v:4:y:2009:i:2:p:185-209 [Citation Analysis] | 3 |
2010 | Performance under ambiguity: International organization performance in UN peacekeeping RePEc:spr:revint:v:5:y:2010:i:3:p:249-284 [Citation Analysis] | 3 |
2006 | Strengthening the citizens role in international organizations RePEc:spr:revint:v:1:y:2006:i:1:p:27-43 [Citation Analysis] | 3 |
2007 | Daniel W. Drezner: All politics is global: Explaining international regulatory regimes RePEc:spr:revint:v:2:y:2007:i:3:p:301-303 [Citation Analysis] | 3 |
2010 | The World Trade Organization at work: Performance in a member-driven milieu RePEc:spr:revint:v:5:y:2010:i:3:p:345-363 [Citation Analysis] | 3 |
2006 | IMF quotas: Constructing an international organization using inferior building blocks RePEc:spr:revint:v:1:y:2006:i:2:p:153-171 [Citation Analysis] | 3 |
2006 | Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, Making war and building peace: United Nations peace operations RePEc:spr:revint:v:1:y:2006:i:4:p:401-403 [Citation Analysis] | 3 |
2011 | The cost of complying with human rights treaties: The convention on the rights of the child and basic immunization RePEc:spr:revint:v:6:y:2011:i:1:p:33-56 [Citation Analysis] | 3 |
2008 | Outside and inside competition for international organizationsfrom analysis to innovations RePEc:spr:revint:v:3:y:2008:i:4:p:335-350 [Citation Analysis] | 2 |
2006 | BRICSAM and the nonWTO RePEc:spr:revint:v:1:y:2006:i:3:p:237-261 [Citation Analysis] | 2 |
2009 | Financing the peace: Evaluating World Bank post-conflict assistance programs RePEc:spr:revint:v:4:y:2009:i:1:p:1-27 [Citation Analysis] | 2 |
2007 | Domestic structures and constitution-building in an international organization: Introduction RePEc:spr:revint:v:2:y:2007:i:2:p:105-113 [Citation Analysis] | 2 |
2008 | The implementation of IMF programs: A conceptual framework RePEc:spr:revint:v:3:y:2008:i:1:p:41-64 [Citation Analysis] | 2 |
2010 | Reputation concerns in aid conditionality RePEc:spr:revint:v:5:y:2010:i:4:p:433-459 [Citation Analysis] | 2 |
2008 | IMF retrospective and prospective: A public goods viewpoint RePEc:spr:revint:v:3:y:2008:i:3:p:221-238 [Citation Analysis] | 2 |
2006 | A response to Allan Meltzer RePEc:spr:revint:v:1:y:2006:i:1:p:61-64 [Citation Analysis] | 2 |
2008 | The effect of ECB communication on interest rates: An assessment RePEc:spr:revint:v:3:y:2008:i:4:p:375-398 [Citation Analysis] | 2 |
2006 | Do donors cooperatively fund foreign aid? RePEc:spr:revint:v:1:y:2006:i:4:p:337-357 [Citation Analysis] | 2 |
2007 | Referendums in the EUs constitution building process RePEc:spr:revint:v:2:y:2007:i:2:p:177-218 [Citation Analysis] | 2 |
2009 | Renewing IMF surveillance: Transparency, accountability, and independence RePEc:spr:revint:v:4:y:2009:i:1:p:29-46 [Citation Analysis] | 2 |
2007 | Should it be curtains for some of the IMFs lending windows? RePEc:spr:revint:v:2:y:2007:i:3:p:281-299 [Citation Analysis] | 2 |
2007 | Explaining the European Parliaments gains in the EU Constitution RePEc:spr:revint:v:2:y:2007:i:2:p:115-129 [Citation Analysis] | 1 |
2011 | Climate business for poverty reduction? The role of the World Bank RePEc:spr:revint:v:6:y:2011:i:3:p:259-286 [Citation Analysis] | 1 |
2007 | Are economic forecasts of the International Monetary Fund politically biased? A public choice analysis RePEc:spr:revint:v:2:y:2007:i:3:p:239-260 [Citation Analysis] | 1 |
2008 | The governance of the World Bank: Lessons from the corporate sector RePEc:spr:revint:v:3:y:2008:i:3:p:287-323 [Citation Analysis] | 1 |
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2010 | Reputation concerns in aid conditionality RePEc:spr:revint:v:5:y:2010:i:4:p:433-459 | [Citation Analysis] |
2010 | Financing Peace: International and National Resources for Postconflict Countries and Fragile States RePEc:uma:periwp:wp238 | [Citation Analysis] |
2010 | The politics of IO performance: A framework RePEc:spr:revint:v:5:y:2010:i:3:p:227-248 | [Citation Analysis] |
2010 | Measuring Delegation RePEc:spr:revint:v:5:y:2010:i:2:p:141-175 | [Citation Analysis] |
2010 | Assessing the implementation of the IMFs 2007 surveillance decision RePEc:spr:revint:v:5:y:2010:i:1:p:27-52 | [Citation Analysis] |
2010 | Expressive behavior in economics and politics RePEc:eee:poleco:v:26:y:2010:i:4:p:403-418 | [Citation Analysis] |
2010 | The growth of public health expenditures in OECD countries: do government ideology and electoral motives matter? RePEc:pra:mprapa:24083 | [Citation Analysis] |
2010 | The growth of public health expenditures in OECD countries: Do government ideology and electoral motives matter? RePEc:eee:jhecon:v:29:y:2010:i:6:p:797-810 | [Citation Analysis] |
2010 | Are Debt Repayment Incentives Undermined by Foreign Aid? RePEc:hhs:aareco:2010_020 | [Citation Analysis] |
2010 | Does government ideology influence deregulation of product markets? Empirical evidence from OECD countries RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:143:y:2010:i:1:p:135-155 | [Citation Analysis] |
2010 | Labor market deregulation and globalization: empirical evidence from OECD countries RePEc:spr:weltar:v:146:y:2010:i:3:p:545-571 | [Citation Analysis] |
2010 | Ideology and cultural policy RePEc:twi:respas:0049 | [Citation Analysis] |
2010 | Islam and Democracy RePEc:knz:dpteco:1010 | [Citation Analysis] |
2010 | Political cycles and economic performance in OECD countries: empirical evidence from 1951-2006 RePEc:pra:mprapa:23751 | [Citation Analysis] |
2010 | Labor market deregulation and globalization: empirical evidence from OECD countries RePEc:spr:weltar:v:146:y:2010:i:3:p:545-571 | [Citation Analysis] |
2010 | Does government ideology influence deregulation of product markets? Empirical evidence from OECD countries RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:143:y:2010:i:1:p:135-155 | [Citation Analysis] |
2010 | A positive theory of the earnings relationship of unemployment benefits RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:145:y:2010:i:1:p:137-163 | [Citation Analysis] |
2010 | The growth of public health expenditures in OECD countries: Do government ideology and electoral motives matter? RePEc:eee:jhecon:v:29:y:2010:i:6:p:797-810 | [Citation Analysis] |
2010 | An empirical assessment of informal influence in the World Bank RePEc:vil:papers:9 | [Citation Analysis] |
2010 | The effects of IMF programs on U.S. foreign direct investment in the developing world RePEc:spr:revint:v:5:y:2010:i:1:p:73-95 | [Citation Analysis] |
2010 | The politics of IO performance: A framework RePEc:spr:revint:v:5:y:2010:i:3:p:227-248 | [Citation Analysis] |
2010 | The politics of performance evaluation: Independent evaluation at the International Monetary Fund RePEc:spr:revint:v:5:y:2010:i:3:p:365-385 | [Citation Analysis] |
2010 | Reputation concerns in aid conditionality RePEc:spr:revint:v:5:y:2010:i:4:p:433-459 | [Citation Analysis] |