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Updated Jun, 1 2012 364.619 documents processed, 8.178.370
references and 3.213.942 citations
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Working Papers / Department of Economics, Suffolk University
Raw citation data, Main indicators, Most cited papers , cites used to compute the impact factor (2010), Recent citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers. Create citation feed for this series Missing citations? Add them with our user input service Incorrect content? Let us know
Raw data: |
|
IF |
AIF |
DOC |
CIT |
D2Y |
C2Y |
SC(%) |
CiY |
II |
AII |
1990 | | 0.09 | | 0 | 0 | | 0 | | | 0.04 |
1991 | | 0.08 | | 0 | 0 | | 0 | | | 0.04 |
1992 | | 0.09 | | 0 | 0 | | 0 | | | 0.05 |
1993 | | 0.11 | | 0 | 0 | | 0 | | | 0.05 |
1994 | | 0.13 | | 0 | 0 | | 0 | | | 0.05 |
1995 | | 0.14 | | 0 | 0 | | 0 | | | 0.09 |
1996 | | 0.17 | | 0 | 0 | | 0 | | | 0.09 |
1997 | | 0.18 | | 0 | 0 | | 0 | | | 0.09 |
1998 | | 0.21 | | 0 | 0 | | 0 | | | 0.14 |
1999 | | 0.27 | | 0 | 0 | | 0 | | | 0.16 |
2000 | | 0.37 | | 0 | 0 | | 0 | | | 0.15 |
2001 | | 0.35 | | 0 | 0 | | 0 | | | 0.18 |
2002 | | 0.39 | | 0 | 0 | | 0 | | | 0.19 |
2003 | | 0.42 | | 0 | 0 | | 0 | | | 0.21 |
2004 | | 0.45 | | 0 | 0 | | 0 | | | 0.21 |
2005 | | 0.45 | | 0 | 0 | | 0 | | | 0.26 |
2006 | | 0.48 | | 0 | 0 | | 0 | | | 0.22 |
2007 | | 0.41 | | 0 | 0 | | 0 | | | 0.19 |
2008 | | 0.41 | 7 | 9 | 0 | | 0 | 3 | 0.43 | 0.19 |
2009 | 0.29 | 0.37 | | 0 | 7 | 2 | 0 | | | 0.19 |
2010 | 0.14 | 0.28 | 3 | 2 | 7 | 1 | 100 | 1 | 0.33 | 0.16 |
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  Main indicatorsMost cited documents in this series: |
2008 | Mackerels in the Moonlight: A Duopoly Model of Political Agency RePEc:suf:wpaper:2008-4 [Citation Analysis] | 2 | 2008 | A Game-Theoretic Explanation for the Persistence of Political Corruption RePEc:suf:wpaper:2008-3 [Citation Analysis] | 2 | 2008 | Public Choice and the Economic Analysis of Anarchy: A Survey RePEc:suf:wpaper:2008-7 [Citation Analysis] | 2 | 2008 | Three-Candidate Competition when Candidates Have Valence: The Base Case RePEc:suf:wpaper:2008-2 [Citation Analysis] | 2 | 2008 | Corruption and the Institutional Environment for Growth RePEc:suf:wpaper:2008-6 [Citation Analysis] | 2 | 2010 | Three-Candidate Competition When Candidates Have Valence: Stochastic Voting RePEc:suf:wpaper:2010-2 [Citation Analysis] | 2 | 2010 | Three-Candidate Spatial Competition When Candidates Have Valence: Asymmetric Voter Density and Plurality Maximization RePEc:suf:wpaper:2010-1 [Citation Analysis] | 1 | 2008 | On the (In)Effectiveness of Some Commonly Proposed Anti-Corruption Reforms RePEc:suf:wpaper:2008-5 [Citation Analysis] | 1 | Citing documents used to compute impact factor 1: |
2010 | Three-Candidate Spatial Competition When Candidates Have Valence: Asymmetric Voter Density and Plurality Maximization RePEc:suf:wpaper:2010-1 | [Citation Analysis] | Cites in year: CiY Recent citations received in: 2010 |
2010 | Three-Candidate Spatial Competition When Candidates Have Valence: Asymmetric Voter Density and Plurality Maximization RePEc:suf:wpaper:2010-1 | [Citation Analysis] | Recent citations received in: 2008 |
2008 | A Game-Theoretic Explanation for the Persistence of Political Corruption RePEc:suf:wpaper:2008-3 | [Citation Analysis] | 2008 | Mackerels in the Moonlight: A Duopoly Model of Political Agency RePEc:suf:wpaper:2008-4 | [Citation Analysis] | 2008 | On the (In)Effectiveness of Some Commonly Proposed Anti-Corruption Reforms RePEc:suf:wpaper:2008-5 | [Citation Analysis] | Warning!! This is still an experimental service. The results of this service should be interpreted with care, especially in research assessment exercises. The processing of documents is automatic. There still are errors and omissions in the identification of references. We are working to improve the software to increase the accuracy of the results. Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.
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