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| 1997 | Optimal Prediction Under Asymmetric Loss
RePEc:wop:pennca:97-20 [Citation Analysis] | 64 |
| 1998 | Who Wants a Good Reputation?
RePEc:wop:pennca:98-12 [Citation Analysis] | 35 |
| 1997 | Democratic Choice of an Education System: Implications for Growth and Income Distribution
RePEc:wop:pennca:97-05 [Citation Analysis] | 22 |
| 1999 | Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring
RePEc:wop:pennca:99-09 [Citation Analysis] | 17 |
| 1995 | Incorporating Concern for Relative Wealth into Economic Models
RePEc:wop:pennca:95-14 [Citation Analysis] | 17 |
| 1995 | An Economic Model of Representative Democracy
RePEc:wop:pennca:95-02 [Citation Analysis] | 15 |
| 1998 | Do People Play Nash Equilibrium? Lessons From Evolutionary Game Theory
RePEc:wop:pennca:98-01 [Citation Analysis] | 14 |
| 1997 | Approximate Common Knowledge and Co-ordination: Recent Lessons from Game Theory
RePEc:wop:pennca:97-8 [Citation Analysis] | 14 |
| 1997 | How Strongly is Child Schooling Associated with Household Income?
RePEc:wop:pennca:97-22 [Citation Analysis] | 14 |
| 1997 | Child Health and Schooling Achievement: Association, Causality and Household Allocations
RePEc:wop:pennca:97-23 [Citation Analysis] | 13 |
| 1998 | Earnings and Wealth Inequality and Income Taxation: Quantifying the Trade-Offs of Switching to a Proportional Income Tax in the U.S.
RePEc:wop:pennca:98-14 [Citation Analysis] | 12 |
| 1995 | The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information*
RePEc:wop:pennca:95-18 [Citation Analysis] | 10 |
| 1999 | Racial Bias in Motor Vehicle Searches: Theory and Evidence
RePEc:wop:pennca:99-06 [Citation Analysis] | 9 |
| 1997 | Indeterminacy, Home Production, and the Business Cycle: a Calibrated Analysis
RePEc:wop:pennca:97-4 [Citation Analysis] | 9 |
| 1998 | The Provision of Public Goods Under Alternative Electoral Incentives
RePEc:wop:pennca:98-08 [Citation Analysis] | 9 |
| 1998 | Efficient Non-Contractible Investments
RePEc:wop:pennca:98-13 [Citation Analysis] | 9 |
| 1995 | An Anti-Folk Theorem for a Class of Asynchronously Repeated Games
RePEc:wop:pennca:95-15 [Citation Analysis] | 9 |
| 1998 | Endogenous Inequality in Integrated Labor Markets with Two-sided Search
RePEc:wop:pennca:98-06 [Citation Analysis] | 9 |
| 1997 | Correlated Equilibria and Local Interactions
RePEc:wop:pennca:97-6 [Citation Analysis] | 8 |
| 1997 | Endogenous Interactions
RePEc:wop:pennca:endo-one [Citation Analysis] | 8 |
| 1997 | Policy Persistence
RePEc:wop:pennca:97-2 [Citation Analysis] | 8 |
| 1998 | Your Reputation Is Who Youre Not, Not Who Youd Like To Be
RePEc:wop:pennca:98-11 [Citation Analysis] | 7 |
| 1995 | Co-operation and Timing
RePEc:wop:pennca:95-05 [Citation Analysis] | 6 |
| 1998 | Your Reputation Is Who Youre Not, Not Who Youd Like To Be
RePEc:wop:pennca:rep-is-sep [Citation Analysis] | 6 |
| 1997 | Evaluating Density Forecasts
RePEc:wop:pennca:97-18 [Citation Analysis] | 6 |
| 2000 | Does Competition Solve the Hold-up Problem'DONE'
RePEc:wop:pennca:00-04 [Citation Analysis] | 6 |
| 1998 | Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective
RePEc:wop:pennca:imp-mon [Citation Analysis] | 5 |
| 1998 | Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective
RePEc:wop:pennca:98-07 [Citation Analysis] | 5 |
| 1998 | Learning Correlated Equilibria in Potential Games
RePEc:wop:pennca:98-05 [Citation Analysis] | 4 |
| 1995 | Justifying Rational Expectations
RePEc:wop:pennca:95-04 [Citation Analysis] | 4 |
| 1997 | Technological Innovations: Slumps and Booms
RePEc:wop:pennca:97-17 [Citation Analysis] | 4 |
| 2000 | Endogenous Lobbying
RePEc:wop:pennca:00-03 [Citation Analysis] | 3 |
| 1997 | Child Nutrition, Child Health, and School Enrollment: A Longitudinal Analysis
RePEc:wop:pennca:97-21 [Citation Analysis] | 3 |
| 1995 | A Rudimentary Model of Search with Divisible Money and Prices
RePEc:wop:pennca:95-17 [Citation Analysis] | 3 |
| 1997 | A Dynamic Equilibrium Model of Search, Bargaining, and Money
RePEc:wop:pennca:97-9 [Citation Analysis] | 3 |
| 1999 | Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility
RePEc:wop:pennca:99-14 [Citation Analysis] | 3 |
| 1997 | On Money as a Medium of Exchange When Goods Vary by Supply and Demand
RePEc:wop:pennca:97-1 [Citation Analysis] | 3 |
| 2000 | Investment and Concern for Relative Position
RePEc:wop:pennca:invest [Citation Analysis] | 3 |
| 1997 | A Model of Commodity Money, With Application to Greshams Law and the Debasement Puzzle
RePEc:wop:pennca:97-7 [Citation Analysis] | 3 |
| 2000 | Reducing Overlapping Generations Economies to Finite Economies
RePEc:wop:pennca:00-08 [Citation Analysis] | 2 |
| 1999 | A Theory of Negotiation and Formation of Coalition
RePEc:wop:pennca:99-12 [Citation Analysis] | 2 |
| 2000 | The Drawbacks of Electoral Competition
RePEc:wop:pennca:00-02 [Citation Analysis] | 2 |
| 1995 | Generic Existence of Sunspot Equilibria: The Case of real Assets
RePEc:wop:pennca:95-12 [Citation Analysis] | 2 |
| 1996 | Class Systems and the Enforcement of Social Norms
RePEc:wop:pennca:96-04 [Citation Analysis] | 2 |
| 2000 | Investment and Concern for Relative Position
RePEc:wop:pennca:00-06 [Citation Analysis] | 2 |
| 1999 | Quantity Discounts for Taste-Varying Consumers
RePEc:wop:pennca:99-11 [Citation Analysis] | 2 |
| 1997 | Interaction Games: A Unified Analysis of Incomplete Information, Local Interaction and Random Matching
RePEc:wop:pennca:97-02 [Citation Analysis] | 2 |
| 2000 | Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Large Economies
RePEc:wop:pennca:eff-inv-large [Citation Analysis] | 2 |
| 2000 | Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Large Economies
RePEc:wop:pennca:00-05 [Citation Analysis] | 2 |
| 1999 | Consensus and the Accuracy of Signals: Optimal Committee Design with Endogenous Information
RePEc:wop:pennca:99-08 [Citation Analysis] | 2 |
