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2007 | THE SHAPLEY VALUE FOR PARTITION FUNCTION FORM GAMES RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:09:y:2007:i:02:p:353-360 [Citation Analysis] | 8 |
2005 | AN AXIOM SYSTEM FOR A VALUE FOR GAMES IN PARTITION FUNCTION FORM RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:07:y:2005:i:01:p:63-72 [Citation Analysis] | 7 |
2008 | COMPUTING ALTERNATING OFFERS AND WATER PRICES IN BILATERAL RIVER BASIN MANAGEMENT RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:10:y:2008:i:03:p:257-278 [Citation Analysis] | 4 |
2007 | MEASURING THE POWER OF PARTIES WITHIN GOVERNMENT COALITIONS RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:09:y:2007:i:02:p:307-322 [Citation Analysis] | 4 |
2008 | DETERMINISTIC DIFFERENTIAL GAMES UNDER PROBABILITY KNOWLEDGE OF INITIAL CONDITION RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:10:y:2008:i:01:p:1-16 [Citation Analysis] | 4 |
2009 | A TWO-STEP SHAPLEY VALUE FOR COOPERATIVE GAMES WITH COALITION STRUCTURES RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:11:y:2009:i:02:p:207-214 [Citation Analysis] | 4 |
2007 | BANKRUPTCY RULES AND COALITIONAL MANIPULATION RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:09:y:2007:i:01:p:105-118 [Citation Analysis] | 4 |
2007 | TRANSFORMING GAMES FROM CHARACTERISTIC INTO NORMAL FORM RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:09:y:2007:i:01:p:87-104 [Citation Analysis] | 3 |
2008 | FRIENDLINESS AND RECIPROCITY IN EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:10:y:2008:i:01:p:53-72 [Citation Analysis] | 3 |
2006 | PROPORTIONALITY AND NON-MANIPULABILITY IN BANKRUPTCY PROBLEMS RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:08:y:2006:i:01:p:127-139 [Citation Analysis] | 3 |
2005 | HELPING AND SABOTAGING IN TOURNAMENTS RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:07:y:2005:i:02:p:211-228 [Citation Analysis] | 3 |
2007 | ANTI-COORDINATION GAMES AND DYNAMIC STABILITY RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:09:y:2007:i:04:p:667-688 [Citation Analysis] | 3 |
2006 | GLOBAL BIFURCATIONS IN DUOPOLY WHEN THE COURNOT POINT IS DESTABILIZED VIA A SUBCRITICAL NEIMARK BIFURCATION RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:08:y:2006:i:01:p:1-20 [Citation Analysis] | 3 |
2008 | ORDINAL GAMES RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:10:y:2008:i:02:p:177-194 [Citation Analysis] | 3 |
2010 | ENVIRONMENTAL INNOVATION, WAR OF ATTRITION AND INVESTMENT GRANTS RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:12:y:2010:i:01:p:37-59 [Citation Analysis] | 3 |
2005 | CORE CONCEPTS FOR DYNAMIC TU GAMES RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:07:y:2005:i:01:p:43-61 [Citation Analysis] | 2 |
2009 | UNIQUENESS IN RANDOM-PROPOSER MULTILATERAL BARGAINING RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:11:y:2009:i:04:p:407-417 [Citation Analysis] | 2 |
2006 | RATIONALIZATION IN SIGNALING GAMES: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:08:y:2006:i:01:p:67-93 [Citation Analysis] | 2 |
2007 | EFFECTIVENESS OF COOP ADVERTISING PROGRAMS IN COMPETITIVE DISTRIBUTION CHANNELS RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:09:y:2007:i:02:p:151-167 [Citation Analysis] | 2 |
2007 | NETWORK FORMATION UNDER HETEROGENEOUS COSTS: THE MULTIPLE GROUP MODEL RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:09:y:2007:i:04:p:599-635 [Citation Analysis] | 2 |
2008 | MULTISTAGE COMMUNICATION WITH AND WITHOUT VERIFIABLE TYPES RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:10:y:2008:i:02:p:145-164 [Citation Analysis] | 1 |
2006 | HERDING WITH COSTLY INFORMATION RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:08:y:2006:i:01:p:21-31 [Citation Analysis] | 1 |
2007 | THE IMPACT OF ADVERTISING IN A DUOPOLY GAME RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:09:y:2007:i:04:p:565-581 [Citation Analysis] | 1 |
2005 | SUSTAINABILITY OF COOPERATION OVERTIME IN LINEAR-QUADRATIC DIFFERENTIAL GAMES RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:07:y:2005:i:04:p:395-406 [Citation Analysis] | 1 |
2006 | AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF FINANCIAL SUPPORT AFTER DIVORCE RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:08:y:2006:i:04:p:561-579 [Citation Analysis] | 1 |
2005 | CONVEXITY IN STOCHASTIC COOPERATIVE SITUATIONS RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:07:y:2005:i:01:p:25-42 [Citation Analysis] | 1 |
2009 | A LOCATION GAME ON DISJOINT CIRCLES RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:11:y:2009:i:04:p:391-406 [Citation Analysis] | 1 |
2007 | EGALITARIAN DISTRIBUTIONS IN COALITIONAL MODELS RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:09:y:2007:i:01:p:47-57 [Citation Analysis] | 1 |
2007 | A NOTE ON LUENBERGERS ZERO-MAXIMUM PRINCIPLE FOR CORE ALLOCATIONS RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:09:y:2007:i:03:p:453-460 [Citation Analysis] | 1 |
2008 | CONFLICT AND COOPERATION IN SYMMETRIC POTENTIAL GAMES RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:10:y:2008:i:03:p:245-256 [Citation Analysis] | 1 |
2006 | THE DISCRETIZATION OF CONTINUUM STRATEGY SPACES RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:08:y:2006:i:03:p:499-514 [Citation Analysis] | 1 |
2007 | ON BARGAINING SETS IN SYMMETRIC GAMES RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:09:y:2007:i:02:p:199-213 [Citation Analysis] | 1 |
2005 | A NOTE ON REPEATED GAMES WITH VANISHING ACTIONS RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:07:y:2005:i:01:p:107-115 [Citation Analysis] | 1 |
2006 | COALITION FORMATION IN GAMES WITHOUT SYNERGIES RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:08:y:2006:i:01:p:111-126 [Citation Analysis] | 1 |
2007 | THE CONSENSUS VALUE FOR GAMES IN PARTITION FUNCTION FORM RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:09:y:2007:i:03:p:437-452 [Citation Analysis] | 1 |
2005 | DEADLINE EFFECTS IN SEQUENTIAL BARGAINING â AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:07:y:2005:i:02:p:117-135 [Citation Analysis] | 1 |
2008 | COMPETING FOR ENDOGENOUS INFORMATION IN AN IRREVERSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCE PROBLEM: A GAME-THEORETIC ANALYSIS RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:10:y:2008:i:03:p:229-243 [Citation Analysis] | 1 |
2006 | GUARANTEED INERTIA FUNCTIONS IN DYNAMICAL GAMES RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:08:y:2006:i:02:p:185-218 [Citation Analysis] | 1 |
2007 | A REFINEMENT CONCEPT FOR EQUILIBRIA IN MULTICRITERIA GAMES VIA STABLE SCALARIZATIONS RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:09:y:2007:i:02:p:169-181 [Citation Analysis] | 1 |
2009 | SPATIAL OLIGOPOLIES WITH COOPERATIVE DISTRIBUTION RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:11:y:2009:i:01:p:33-40 [Citation Analysis] | 1 |
2006 | A ONE-SHOT PRISONERS DILEMMA WITH PROCEDURAL UTILITY RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:08:y:2006:i:04:p:655-668 [Citation Analysis] | 1 |
2005 | LINK MONOTONIC ALLOCATION SCHEMES RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:07:y:2005:i:04:p:473-489 [Citation Analysis] | 1 |
2008 | COALITION FORMATION IN STRADDLING STOCK FISHERIES: A PARTITION FUNCTION APPROACH RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:10:y:2008:i:03:p:303-317 [Citation Analysis] | 1 |
2006 | BIDDER WELFARE IN AN AUCTION WITH A BUYOUT OPTION RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:08:y:2006:i:04:p:595-612 [Citation Analysis] | 1 |
2007 | COMPETITIVE TAX EVASION AND TRANSFER PRICES RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:09:y:2007:i:02:p:347-351 [Citation Analysis] | 1 |
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Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.