Most cited documents in this series:

Year	Title	Cited
1973	A Simple Model of Imperfect Competition, where 4 are Few and 6 are Many RePEc:bie:wpaper:008 [Citation Analysis]	22
2002	Moral property rights in bargaining RePEc:bie:wpaper:330 [Citation Analysis]	20
2002	Power measurement as sensitivity analysis : a unified approach RePEc:bie:wpaper:345 [Citation Analysis]	17
1974	Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games RePEc:bie:wpaper:023 [Citation Analysis]	14
2002	Convex fuzzy games and participation monotonic allocation schemes RePEc:bie:wpaper:332 [Citation Analysis]	7
1974	The Chain Store Paradox RePEc:bie:wpaper:018 [Citation Analysis]	7
2007	Do social preferences matter in competitive markets? RePEc:bie:wpaper:392 [Citation Analysis]	6
2009	Voronoi languages: Equilibria in cheap-talk games with high-dimensional types and few signals RePEc:bie:wpaper:420 [Citation Analysis]	5
2007	Network formation with closeness incentives RePEc:bie:wpaper:395 [Citation Analysis]	5
1998	The Positive Prekernel of a Cooperative Game RePEc:bie:wpaper:292 [Citation Analysis]	4
1998	Implementation of the Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution in Dominant Strategies RePEc:bie:wpaper:301 [Citation Analysis]	4
2001	The Pazner-Schmeidler Social Ordering: A Defense RePEc:bie:wpaper:328 [Citation Analysis]	4
1999	Unique Nash implementation for a class of bargaining solutions RePEc:bie:wpaper:308 [Citation Analysis]	4
2001	Can and should the Nash program be looked at as a part of mechanism theory? RePEc:bie:wpaper:322 [Citation Analysis]	3
2001	Game theory RePEc:bie:wpaper:321 [Citation Analysis]	3
2010	Product and Quality Innovations: An Optimal Control Approach RePEc:bie:wpaper:439 [Citation Analysis]	3
1999	A universal meta bargaining realization of the Nash solution RePEc:bie:wpaper:310 [Citation Analysis]	3
2003	A General Strategy Proof Fair Allocation Mechanism RePEc:bie:wpaper:346 [Citation Analysis]	3
2009	An axiomatization of the Sequential Raiffa solution RePEc:bie:wpaper:425 [Citation Analysis]	3
2005	Regrouping of endowments in exchange markets with indivisible goods RePEc:bie:wpaper:367 [Citation Analysis]	3
1998	Adjusted Winner: An Algorithm for Implementing Bargaining Solutions in Multi-Issue Negotiations RePEc:bie:wpaper:295 [Citation Analysis]	2
1997	Environmental Taxation and the Double Dividend: A Drawback for a Revenue-Neutral Tax Reform RePEc:bie:wpaper:274 [Citation Analysis]	2
2007	On Maskin monotonicity of solution based social choice rules RePEc:bie:wpaper:393 [Citation Analysis]	2
1995	Airport Problems and Consistent Solution Rules RePEc:bie:wpaper:246 [Citation Analysis]	2
2010	Financial markets with volatility uncertainty RePEc:bie:wpaper:441 [Citation Analysis]	2
2010	Optimal Stopping Under Ambiguity in Continuous Time RePEc:bie:wpaper:429 [Citation Analysis]	2
2012	The refined best-response correspondence in normal form games RePEc:bie:wpaper:466 [Citation Analysis]	2
2002	Social Choice and Just Institutions: New Perspectives RePEc:bie:wpaper:333 [Citation Analysis]	2
2011	The Dynamics of Continuous Cultural Traits in Social Networks RePEc:bie:wpaper:457 [Citation Analysis]	2
2008	Under-connected and over-connected networks RePEc:bie:wpaper:400 [Citation Analysis]	2
2011	Competitive Outcomes and the Inner Core of NTU Market Games RePEc:bie:wpaper:449 [Citation Analysis]	2
1998	Supporting Cooperative Multi-Issue Negotiations RePEc:bie:wpaper:299 [Citation Analysis]	2
2001	A note on an axiomatization of the core of market games RePEc:bie:wpaper:323 [Citation Analysis]	2
2009	Indivisible commodities and an equivalence theorem on the strong core RePEc:bie:wpaper:417 [Citation Analysis]	2
2005	Government versus opposition: Who should be who in the 16th German Bundestag? RePEc:bie:wpaper:375 [Citation Analysis]	2
2002	Hypercubes and compromise values for cooperative fuzzy games RePEc:bie:wpaper:331 [Citation Analysis]	2
1996	A Further Extension of the KKMS Theorem RePEc:bie:wpaper:251 [Citation Analysis]	2
2006	Convex games versus clan games RePEc:bie:wpaper:381 [Citation Analysis]	1
2009	Irreversible investment in oligopoly RePEc:bie:wpaper:415 [Citation Analysis]	1
	repec:bie:wpaper:340 [Citation Analysis]	1
2010	Representation of TU games by coalition production economies RePEc:bie:wpaper:430 [Citation Analysis]	1
2005	On core membership testing for hedonic coalition formation games RePEc:bie:wpaper:374 [Citation Analysis]	1
2011	The Strategic Use of Ambiguity RePEc:bie:wpaper:452 [Citation Analysis]	1
1998	Should High-Tax Countries Pursue Revenue-Neutral Ecological Tax Reforms? RePEc:bie:wpaper:304 [Citation Analysis]	1
2004	A superadditive solution RePEc:bie:wpaper:361 [Citation Analysis]	1
2006	Polluting technologies and sustainable economic development RePEc:bie:wpaper:379 [Citation Analysis]	1
2009	The Best Choice Problem under ambiguity RePEc:bie:wpaper:413 [Citation Analysis]	1
2002	How to cope with division problems under interval uncertainty of claims? RePEc:bie:wpaper:339 [Citation Analysis]	1
1997	The Selection of Mixed Strategies in 2x2 Bimatrix Games RePEc:bie:wpaper:268 [Citation Analysis]	1
2005	A taxonomy of myopic stability concepts for hedonic games RePEc:bie:wpaper:373 [Citation Analysis]	1

Citing documents used to compute impact factor 7:

Year	Title	See
2011	Endogenous specialization of heterogeneous innovative activities of firms under technological spillovers RePEc:pra:mprapa:35424	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Competitive Outcomes and the Core of TU Market Games RePEc:bie:wpaper:454	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Game-theoretic pragmatics under conflicting and common interests RePEc:use:tkiwps:1125	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Axioms for Euclidean preferences with a valence dimension RePEc:eee:mateco:v:47:y:2011:i:4:p:545-553	[Citation Analysis]
2011	An exact non-cooperative support for the sequential Raiffa solution RePEc:eee:mateco:v:47:y:2011:i:1:p:77-83	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Experimental comparison of compulsory and non compulsory arbitration mechanisms RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00584328	[Citation Analysis]
2011	On irreversible investment RePEc:spr:finsto:v:15:y:2011:i:4:p:607-633	[Citation Analysis]

Cites in year: CiY