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1979 | Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk RePEc:cla:levarc:7656 [Citation Analysis] | 2210 |
1989 | Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity RePEc:cla:levarc:7662 [Citation Analysis] | 529 |
1990 | Habit formation: a resolution of the equity premium puzzle RePEc:cla:levarc:1397 [Citation Analysis] | 451 |
1986 | Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth RePEc:cla:levarc:2232 [Citation Analysis] | 373 |
1990 | Endogenous Technological Change RePEc:cla:levarc:2135 [Citation Analysis] | 334 |
1978 | Temporal Resolution of Uncertainty and Dynamic Choice Theory RePEc:cla:levarc:625018000000000009 [Citation Analysis] | 266 |
1993 | Global Games and Equilibrium Selection RePEc:cla:levarc:122247000000001088 [Citation Analysis] | 219 |
1994 | The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information RePEc:cla:levarc:394 [Citation Analysis] | 218 |
1985 | The equity premium: a puzzle RePEc:cla:levarc:1401 [Citation Analysis] | 213 |
1993 | Debt Constrained Asset Markets RePEc:cla:levarc:1276 [Citation Analysis] | 205 |
1994 | The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information RePEc:cla:levarc:2058 [Citation Analysis] | 200 |
1993 | Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics RePEc:cla:levarc:511 [Citation Analysis] | 133 |
1997 | Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information RePEc:cla:levarc:1560 [Citation Analysis] | 124 |
1982 | Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model RePEc:cla:levarc:252 [Citation Analysis] | 123 |
1982 | Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model RePEc:cla:levarc:661465000000000387 [Citation Analysis] | 123 |
1961 | Risk, Ambiguity and the Savage Axioms RePEc:cla:levarc:7605 [Citation Analysis] | 121 |
1966 | A New Approach to Consumer Theory RePEc:cla:levarc:1385 [Citation Analysis] | 121 |
1985 | Indivisible Labor and the Business Cycle RePEc:cla:levarc:233 [Citation Analysis] | 118 |
1982 | Expected Utility Analysis without the Independence Axiom RePEc:cla:levarc:7650 [Citation Analysis] | 110 |
1989 | Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player RePEc:cla:levarc:508 [Citation Analysis] | 107 |
1992 | A theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom and cultural change as informational Cascades RePEc:cla:levarc:1193 [Citation Analysis] | 104 |
1995 | Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research RePEc:cla:levarc:509 [Citation Analysis] | 103 |
2001 | Global Games: Theory and Applications RePEc:cla:levarc:122247000000001080 [Citation Analysis] | 94 |
1982 | Reputation and Imperfect Information RePEc:cla:levarc:238 [Citation Analysis] | 89 |
1982 | Sequential Equilibria RePEc:cla:levarc:618897000000000813 [Citation Analysis] | 85 |
1993 | Self-Confirming Equilibrium RePEc:cla:levarc:2147 [Citation Analysis] | 83 |
1980 | On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets RePEc:cla:levarc:1908 [Citation Analysis] | 83 |
1996 | Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device RePEc:cla:levarc:563824000000000143 [Citation Analysis] | 82 |
1982 | An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining RePEc:cla:levarc:291 [Citation Analysis] | 81 |
1992 | Social Norms and Community Enforcement RePEc:cla:levarc:630 [Citation Analysis] | 79 |
1976 | Agreeing to Disagree RePEc:cla:levarc:512 [Citation Analysis] | 79 |
2002 | International Protection of Intellectual Property RePEc:cla:levarc:122247000000000442 [Citation Analysis] | 76 |
1963 | A Definition of Subjective Probability RePEc:cla:levarc:7591 [Citation Analysis] | 76 |
2002 | The Social Multiplier RePEc:cla:levarc:506439000000000130 [Citation Analysis] | 76 |
2006 | Who is âBehavioralâ? Cognitive Ability and Anomalous Preferences RePEc:cla:levarc:122247000000001334 [Citation Analysis] | 76 |
1997 | A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition RePEc:cla:levarc:1889 [Citation Analysis] | 74 |
1985 | Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining RePEc:cla:levarc:623 [Citation Analysis] | 72 |
1989 | The Equity Premium Puzzle and the Risk-Free Rate Puzzle RePEc:cla:levarc:1833 [Citation Analysis] | 72 |
1985 | Infinite-Horizon Models of Bargaining with One-Sided Incomplete Information RePEc:cla:levarc:1098 [Citation Analysis] | 69 |
1993 | The Evolution of Conventions RePEc:cla:levarc:485 [Citation Analysis] | 69 |
1982 | Strategic Information Transmission RePEc:cla:levarc:544 [Citation Analysis] | 69 |
1988 | Indivisible Labor, Lotteries and Equilibrium RePEc:cla:levarc:250 [Citation Analysis] | 67 |
1991 | Asset Trading Mechanisms and Expansionary Policy RePEc:cla:levarc:43 [Citation Analysis] | 65 |
1979 | Moral Hazard and Observability RePEc:cla:levarc:1205 [Citation Analysis] | 62 |
1989 | Reputation in Bargaining and Durable Goods Monopoly RePEc:cla:levarc:201 [Citation Analysis] | 62 |
1990 | Tacit coordination games, strategic uncertainty, and coordination failure RePEc:cla:levarc:1225 [Citation Analysis] | 59 |
1993 | Learning, Mutation and Long Run Equilibria in Games RePEc:cla:levarc:500 [Citation Analysis] | 59 |
1985 | Comparative Statics and Perfect Foresight in Infinite Horizon Economies RePEc:cla:levarc:1873 [Citation Analysis] | 59 |
1987 | Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria RePEc:cla:levarc:896 [Citation Analysis] | 58 |
1998 | Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiments RePEc:cla:levarc:2047 [Citation Analysis] | 55 |
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2011 | Absolute auctions and secret reserve prices: Why are they used? RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000316 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | Cognitive load in the multi-player prisoners dilemma game RePEc:pra:mprapa:30856 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | Artificial Agents as an Application to Policy Design: The Market Entry Game RePEc:ags:aaea11:103939 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | Artificial Agents as an Application to Policy Design: The Market Entry Game RePEc:ags:aaea11:103900 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | On Individual Cursedness - How personality shapes individuals sensitivity to incur a winners curse - RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2011-027 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | Information projection: model and applications RePEc:pra:mprapa:38612 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | On the Selection of Arbitrators RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8724 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | How to capture value from linking to science-driven basic research: boundary crossing inventors and partnerships. RePEc:ner:leuven:urn:hdl:123456789/326213 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | A simple model of favouritism in recruitment RePEc:eee:reecon:v:65:y:2011:i:2:p:78-88 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | The Neuroeconomics of Learning and Information Processing; Applying Markov Decision Process RePEc:pra:mprapa:28883 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | Price Discrimination Through Communication RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1536 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1772r | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000054 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | Robust Mechanism Design: An Introduction RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000187 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | Robust Mechanism Design: An Introduction RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1818 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1821 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | Robust Predictions in Games with Incomplete Information RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000275 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | Antitrust and Vertical Integration in âNew Economyâ Industries with Application to Broadband Access RePEc:kap:revind:v:38:y:2011:i:4:p:363-386 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | Competition policy and productivity growth: An empirical assessment RePEc:zbw:dicedp:22 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | Information Aggregation, Investment, and Managerial Incentives RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1816 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | Information Aggregation, Investment, and Managerial Incentives RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000197 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | Information Aggregation, Investment, and Managerial Incentives RePEc:nbr:nberwo:17330 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | Monopoly Pricing in the Presence of Social Learning RePEc:net:wpaper:1111 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | Competition and Commercial Media Bias RePEc:bol:bodewp:wp767 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | Issues in on-line advertising and competition policy: a two-sided market perspective RePEc:igi:igierp:427 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | The Economics of Internet Markets RePEc:nbr:nberwo:16852 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | Newspaper vs. Online Advertising â Is There a Niche for Newspapers in Modern Advertising Markets? RePEc:sdk:wpaper:113 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | The Economics of Internet Markets RePEc:sip:dpaper:10-018 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | Efficient Firm Dynamics in a Frictional Labor Market RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3336 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | Commitment, advertising and efficiency of two-sided investment in competitive search equilibrium RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:35:y:2011:i:7:p:1017-1031 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | Robust implementation in general mechanisms RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:71:y:2011:i:2:p:261-281 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | Partially-honest Nash implementation: Characterization results RePEc:hit:hituec:555 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | Implementation in minimax regret equilibrium RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:71:y:2011:i:2:p:527-533 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | The Empire Is Dead, Long Live the Empire! Long-Run Persistence of Trust and Corruption in the Bureaucracy RePEc:iza:izadps:dp5584 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | The Empire is Dead, Long Live the Empire! Long-Run Persistence of Trust and Corruption in the Bureaucracy RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3392 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | The Empire Is Dead, Long Live the Empire! Long-Run Persistence of Trust and Corruption in the Bureaucracy RePEc:cge:warwcg:40 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | The Empire Is Dead, Long Live the Empire! Long-Run Persistence of Trust and Corruption in the Bureaucracy RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8288 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | Legal Institutions, Innovation and Growth RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3489 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | Legal Institutions, Innovation and Growth RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8433 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: Towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms. RePEc:ner:carlos:info:hdl:10016/12895 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | Trade and Insecure Resources: Implications for Welfare and Comparative Advantage RePEc:irv:wpaper:111201 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | Why Do Voters Dismantle Checks and Balances? RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000287 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | Why Do Voters Dismantle Checks and Balances? RePEc:nbr:nberwo:17293 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | Inequality and Poverty under Latin Americas New Left Regimes RePEc:tul:wpaper:1117 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | Inequality and poverty under Latin Americaâs new left regimes RePEc:inq:inqwps:ecineq2011-208 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | Why Do Voters Dismantle Checks and Balances? RePEc:nst:samfok:11711 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | Energy populism and household welfare RePEc:pra:mprapa:35725 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | Are international environmental agreements stable ex-post? RePEc:pra:mprapa:34303 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | Mechanism Design and Voting for Public-Good Provision RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2011_31 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | Robust implementation in general mechanisms RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:71:y:2011:i:2:p:261-281 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | A robustness result for rationalizable implementation RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:72:y:2011:i:1:p:301-305 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | The robustness of robust implementation RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:146:y:2011:i:5:p:2093-2104 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | The more we know on the fundamental, the less we agree on the price RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8455 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | On the Existence of Markov Perfect Equilibria in Perfect Information Games RePEc:tkk:dpaper:dp68 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | Strategic real options under asymmetric information RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:35:y:2011:i:6:p:922-934 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | Aggregate information cascades RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:73:y:2011:i:1:p:167-185 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | Adaptive social learning RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-00572528 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | Ambiguity and Robust Statistics RePEc:igi:igierp:382 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | Objective Rationality and Uncertainty Averse Preferences RePEc:igi:igierp:413 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | Variational Bewley Preferences RePEc:ibm:ibmecp:wpe_258 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | Ambiguity in Asset Pricing and Portfolio Choice: A Review of the Literature RePEc:igi:igierp:417 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | Economic Models as Analogies RePEc:pen:papers:12-001 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | The wrong shape of insurance? What cross-sectional distributions tell us about models of consumption-smoothing RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8701 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | Menu-Dependent Self-Control RePEc:bos:wpaper:wp2011-041 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | The Cost of Cost Studies RePEc:cbt:econwp:11/29 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | Attitudes toward uncertainty and randomization: an experimental study RePEc:spr:joecth:v:48:y:2011:i:2:p:289-312 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | Risk, ambiguity, and state-preference theory RePEc:spr:joecth:v:48:y:2011:i:2:p:437-467 | [Citation Analysis] |