Citation Profile: Games and Economic Behavior / Elsevier Science Economics Articles Archive

Most cited documents in this series:

Year Title Cited
1995 Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:10:y:1995:i:1:p:122-142 [Citation Analysis] 650
2006 A theory of reciprocity
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:54:y:2006:i:2:p:293-315 [Citation Analysis] 349
2004 A theory of sequential reciprocity
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:47:y:2004:i:2:p:268-298 [Citation Analysis] 335
1994 Preferences, Property Rights, and Anonymity in Bargaining Games
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:7:y:1994:i:3:p:346-380 [Citation Analysis] 309
1994 Fairness in Simple Bargaining Experiments
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:6:y:1994:i:3:p:347-369 [Citation Analysis] 284
1995 Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:8:y:1995:i:1:p:164-212 [Citation Analysis] 242
1996 Potential Games
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:14:y:1996:i:1:p:124-143 [Citation Analysis] 236
1990 Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or cournot equilibria
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:2:y:1990:i:1:p:29-46 [Citation Analysis] 186
1989 Psychological games and sequential rationality
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:1:y:1989:i:1:p:60-79 [Citation Analysis] 173
1996 Altruism in Anonymous Dictator Games
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:16:y:1996:i:2:p:181-191 [Citation Analysis] 167
1989 Renegotiation in repeated games
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:1:y:1989:i:4:p:327-360 [Citation Analysis] 166
1995 Learning to be imperfect: The ultimatum game
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:8:y:1995:i:1:p:56-90 [Citation Analysis] 159
1993 The Statistical Mechanics of Strategic Interaction
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:5:y:1993:i:3:p:387-424 [Citation Analysis] 159
2004 How to identify trust and reciprocity
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:46:y:2004:i:2:p:260-281 [Citation Analysis] 156
2007 A tractable model of reciprocity and fairness
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:59:y:2007:i:1:p:17-45 [Citation Analysis] 118
2000 Measuring Beliefs in an Experimental Lost Wallet Game
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:30:y:2000:i:2:p:163-182 [Citation Analysis] 116
1989 Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:1:y:1989:i:2:p:170-190 [Citation Analysis] 112
1999 A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structures
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:26:y:1999:i:2:p:286-336 [Citation Analysis] 108
2002 The Stability of Hedonic Coalition Structures
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:38:y:2002:i:2:p:201-230 [Citation Analysis] 106
1995 Anonymity versus Punishment in Ultimatum Bargaining
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:10:y:1995:i:1:p:95-121 [Citation Analysis] 103
1996 Sequential Formation of Coalitions in Games with Externalities and Fixed Payoff Division
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:14:y:1996:i:1:p:90-123 [Citation Analysis] 103
1995 Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:10:y:1995:i:1:p:6-38 [Citation Analysis] 102
1995 On Players Models of Other Players: Theory and Experimental Evidence
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:10:y:1995:i:1:p:218-254 [Citation Analysis] 101
1997 Stable Coalition Structures with Externalities
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:20:y:1997:i:2:p:201-237 [Citation Analysis] 97
1993 Learning Mixed Equilibria
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:5:y:1993:i:3:p:320-367 [Citation Analysis] 93

repec:eee:gamebe:v:44:y:2003:i:2:p:217-226 [Citation Analysis] 92
1991 Adaptive and sophisticated learning in normal form games
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:3:y:1991:i:1:p:82-100 [Citation Analysis] 87
1997 Individual Learning in Normal Form Games: Some Laboratory Results
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:19:y:1997:i:1:p:46-76 [Citation Analysis] 83
1996 Cournot Oligopoly and the Theory of Supermodular Games
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:15:y:1996:i:2:p:132-148 [Citation Analysis] 82
2001 The Relevance of Equal Splits in Ultimatum Games
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:37:y:2001:i:1:p:161-169 [Citation Analysis] 75
1995 Commitment and observability in games
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:8:y:1995:i:2:p:271-280 [Citation Analysis] 73
1993 Meaning and Credibility in Cheap-Talk Games
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:5:y:1993:i:4:p:514-531 [Citation Analysis] 72
1989 Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:1:y:1989:i:4:p:295-326 [Citation Analysis] 71
1994 Learning Behavior in an Experimental Matching Pennies Game
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:7:y:1994:i:1:p:62-91 [Citation Analysis] 68
2006 Network formation with heterogeneous players
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:54:y:2006:i:2:p:353-372 [Citation Analysis] 67
1993 An Evolutionary Analysis of Backward and Forward Induction
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:5:y:1993:i:3:p:425-454 [Citation Analysis] 65
1998 More Is Better, But Fair Is Fair: Tipping in Dictator and Ultimatum Games
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:23:y:1998:i:2:p:247-265 [Citation Analysis] 65
1994 A Laboratory Investigation of Multiperson Rationality and Presentation Effects
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:6:y:1994:i:3:p:445-468 [Citation Analysis] 65
1996 Fairness in Ultimatum Games with Asymmetric Information and Asymmetric Payoffs
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:13:y:1996:i:1:p:100-110 [Citation Analysis] 64
1999 The Indirect Evolutionary Approach to Explaining Fair Allocations
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:28:y:1999:i:1:p:13-24 [Citation Analysis] 63
1995 Social Norms and Random Matching Games
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:9:y:1995:i:1:p:79-109 [Citation Analysis] 62
2001 A Dynamic Model of Network Formation
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:34:y:2001:i:2:p:331-341 [Citation Analysis] 61
1989 Cooperation and bounded recall
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:1:y:1989:i:1:p:5-39 [Citation Analysis] 61
2006 Do non-strategic sanctions obey the law of demand? The demand for punishment in the voluntary contribution mechanism
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:54:y:2006:i:1:p:1-24 [Citation Analysis] 60
1997 On the Interpretation of Decision Problems with Imperfect Recall
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:20:y:1997:i:1:p:3-24 [Citation Analysis] 59
2003 Networks of collaboration in oligopoly
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:43:y:2003:i:1:p:57-85 [Citation Analysis] 58
1995 Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:8:y:1995:i:1:p:6-19 [Citation Analysis] 57
1990 Population monotonic allocation schemes for cooperative games with transferable utility
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:2:y:1990:i:4:p:378-394 [Citation Analysis] 56
1996 Asymmetric All-Pay Auctions with Incomplete Information: The Two-Player Case
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:14:y:1996:i:1:p:1-18 [Citation Analysis] 56
1997 Calibrated Learning and Correlated Equilibrium
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:21:y:1997:i:1-2:p:40-55 [Citation Analysis] 55

Citing documents used to compute impact factor 193:

Year Title See
2011 Solution Concepts for Cooperative Games with Circular Communication Structure
RePEc:dgr:kubcen:2011100 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Average tree solutions and the distribution of Harsanyi dividends
RePEc:spr:jogath:v:40:y:2011:i:2:p:331-349 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Solution Concepts for Games with General Coalitional Structure (Replaces CentER DP 2011-025)
RePEc:dgr:kubcen:2011119 [Citation Analysis]
2011 The prenucleolus for games with communication structures
RePEc:hhs:sdueko:2011_010 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Inter and intra-group conflicts as a foundation for contest success functions
RePEc:pra:mprapa:31468 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Lead, Follow or Cooperate? Endogenous Timing & Cooperation in Symmetric Duopoly Games.
RePEc:urb:wpaper:11_12 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Capacity Constraint, Price Discrimination, and Oligopoly
RePEc:lsu:lsuwpp:2011-04 [Citation Analysis]
2011 The strategic timing of R&D agreements.
RePEc:urb:wpaper:11_04 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Bargaining with nonanonymous disagreement: Decomposable rules
RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:62:y:2011:i:3:p:151-161 [Citation Analysis]
2011 The Difference Indifference Makes in Strategy-Proof Allocation of Objects
RePEc:col:000089:008746 [Citation Analysis]
2011 On the number of blocks required to access the coalition structure core
RePEc:pra:mprapa:29755 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Accessible outcomes versus absorbing outcomes
RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:62:y:2011:i:1:p:65-70 [Citation Analysis]
2011 TanÃtÃ¡s Ã©rtelmezhetÃµ-e, mint egy kooperatÃv dinamikus jÃ¡tÃ©k?
RePEc:pkk:meb011:379-386 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Does consultation improve decision making?
RePEc:not:notcdx:2011-08 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Additive representation of separable preferences over infinite products
RePEc:pra:mprapa:28262 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Control and Efficiency in the Nonprofit Sector: Evidence from a Randomized Policy Experiment
RePEc:hhs:uulswp:2011_006 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Control and Efficiency in the Nonprofit Sector Evidence from a Randomized Policy Experiment
RePEc:hhs:uunewp:2011_008 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Intention-Based Reciprocity and the Hidden Costs of Control
RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20110115 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Team governance: Empowerment or hierarchical control
RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:78:y:2011:i:1-2:p:1-13 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Procurement auctions with avoidable fixed costs: an experimental approach
RePEc:pra:mprapa:32163 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Learning about a Class of Belief-Dependent Preferences without Information on Beliefs
RePEc:iza:izadps:dp5957 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Learning about a Class of Belief-Dependent Preferences without Information on Beliefs
RePEc:lvl:lacicr:1125 [Citation Analysis]
2011 The role of private information in dynamic matching and bargaining: Can it be good for efficiency?
RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:112:y:2011:i:1:p:128-131 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Gift-Exchange, Incentives, and Heterogeneous Workers
RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3547 [Citation Analysis]
2011 The Dark Side of Reciprocity
RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2011-052 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Worker Characteristics and Wage Differentials: Evidence from a Gift-Exchange Experiment
RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3637 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Team Incentives and Reference-Dependent Preferences
RePEc:kgu:wpaper:70 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Real Effort, Real Leisure and Real-time Supervision: Incentives and Peer Pressure in Virtual Organizations.
RePEc:chu:wpaper:11-05 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Inequality aversion and externalities
RePEc:zbw:tbsifw:if36v1 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Relative performance or team evaluation? Optimal contracts for other-regarding agents
RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:79:y:2011:i:3:p:183-193 [Citation Analysis]
2011 SEA Presidential address: Group connectivity and cooperation
RePEc:spr:series:v:2:y:2011:i:2:p:139-158 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Dictator games: a meta study
RePEc:kap:expeco:v:14:y:2011:i:4:p:583-610 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Cooperation through imitation and exclusion in networks
RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:35:y:2011:i:5:p:641-658 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Cooperative games with incomplete information: Some open problems
RePEc:imd:wpaper:wp2011-14 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Axioms for minimax regret choice correspondences
RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:146:y:2011:i:6:p:2226-2251 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Competition for procurement shares
RePEc:pra:mprapa:32078 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Competition for Procurement Shares
RePEc:ris:qmetal:2011_003 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Fast Convergence in Population Games
RePEc:oxf:wpaper:570 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Double-edged transparency in teams
RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:95:y:2011:i:7:p:531-542 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Size matters - when it comes to lies
RePEc:iaa:wpaper:20110517 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Disadvantageous lies in individual decisions
RePEc:twi:respas:0071 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Motivational Cherry Picking
RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2011-029 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Moral Emotions and Partnership
RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2011-028 [Citation Analysis]
2011 We Are Not Alone: The Impact of Externalities on Public Good Provision
RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2009_29 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Lies and Biased Evaluation: A Real-Effort Experiment
RePEc:iza:izadps:dp5884 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Let Me See You! A Video Experiment on the Social Dimension of Risk Preferences
RePEc:fau:aucocz:au2011_211 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Farmers adoption of integrated crop protection and organic farming: Do moral and social concerns matter?
RePEc:eee:ecolec:v:70:y:2011:i:8:p:1536-1545 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Are nurses more altruistic than real estate brokers?
RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:32:y:2011:i:5:p:818-831 [Citation Analysis]
2011 A general framework for rational learning in social networks
RePEc:the:publsh:1015 [Citation Analysis]
2011 DO AUCTION BIDS BETRAY EXPECTATIONS-BASED REFERENCE DEPENDENT PREFERENCES? A TEST, EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE, AND ESTIMATES OF LOSS AVERSION
RePEc:cde:cdewps:206 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Shunning Uncertainty: The Neglect of Learning Opportunities
RePEc:ecl:harjfk:rwp11-044 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Shunning Uncertainty: The Neglect of Learning Opportunities
RePEc:hrv:hksfac:5347068 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Feedback spillover and analogy-based expectations: A multi-game experiment
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:71:y:2011:i:2:p:351-365 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Sustaining cooperation in laboratory public goods experiments: a selective survey of the literature
RePEc:kap:expeco:v:14:y:2011:i:1:p:47-83 [Citation Analysis]
2011 How does income inequality affect cooperation and punishment in public good settings?
RePEc:mar:magkse:201138 [Citation Analysis]
2011 The limits of self-governance when cooperators get punished: Experimental evidence from urban and rural Russia
RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:55:y:2011:i:2:p:193-210 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Altruistic punishment and the threat of feuds
RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:78:y:2011:i:3:p:319-332 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Ultimata bargaining: generosity without social motives
RePEc:pra:mprapa:33613 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Is It How You Look or Speak That Matters? - An Experimental Study Exploring the Mechanisms of Ethnic Discrimination
RePEc:hhs:sunrpe:2011_0012 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Is It How You Look or Speak That Matters? - An Experimental Study Exploring the Mechanisms of Ethnic Discrimination
RePEc:hhs:sulcis:2011_003 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Stereotypes and madrassas: experimental evidence from Pakistan
RePEc:fip:fednsr:501 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Gender Differences in Bar gaining Outcomes: A Field Experiment on Discrimination
RePEc:gms:wpaper:1029 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Gender Differences in Bargaining Outcomes: A Field Experiment on Discrimination
RePEc:pit:wpaper:450 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Negotiation-proof correlated equilibrium
RePEc:ucy:cypeua:14-2011 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Political Motivations and Electoral Competition: Equilibrium Analysis and Experimental Evidence
RePEc:bir:birmec:11-15 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Political Motivations and Electoral Competition: Equilibrium Analysis and Experimental Evidence
RePEc:man:sespap:1119 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Electoral competition in 2-dimensional ideology space with unidimensional commitment
RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:36:y:2011:i:1:p:1-24 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Candidate quality in a Downsian Model with a Continuous Policy Space
RePEc:bge:wpaper:529 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Political Motivations and Electoral Competition: Equilibrium Analysis and Experimental Evidence
RePEc:qmw:qmwecw:wp682 [Citation Analysis]
2011 The lambda model and rule of thumb consumers: An estimation problem in existing studies
RePEc:eee:soceco:v:40:y:2011:i:4:p:381-384 [Citation Analysis]
2011 A generalized Tullock contest
RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:147:y:2011:i:3:p:413-420 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Signaling in deterministic and stochastic settings
RePEc:zbw:dicedp:35 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Endowment effects in contests
RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:111:y:2011:i:3:p:217-219 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Bowling alone but tweeting together: the evolution of human interaction in the social networking era
RePEc:pra:mprapa:34232 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Agreeing to disagree: a syntactic approach
RePEc:pra:mprapa:29066 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Generalisation of Samets (2010) agreement theorem
RePEc:pra:mprapa:29067 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Toward a Theory of Play: A Logical Perspective on Games and Interaction
RePEc:gam:jgames:v:2:y:2011:i:1:p:52-86:d:11354 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Correlation through Bounded Recall Strategies
RePEc:huj:dispap:dp579 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Nonspecific Networking
RePEc:gam:jgames:v:2:y:2011:i:1:p:87-113:d:11358 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Potential games in volatile environments
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:72:y:2011:i:1:p:271-287 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Legislative Bargaining with Reconsideration
RePEc:oup:qjecon:v:126:y:2011:i:2:p:947-985 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Understanding some recent existence results for discontinuous games
RePEc:spr:joecth:v:48:y:2011:i:1:p:31-45 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Secure implementation in ShapleyâScarf housing markets
RePEc:spr:joecth:v:48:y:2011:i:1:p:147-169 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Investments as Signals of Outside Options
RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8366 [Citation Analysis]
2011 The importance of moral reflection and self-reported data in a dictator game with production
RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:36:y:2011:i:1:p:105-120 [Citation Analysis]
2011 A note on the tight simplification of mechanisms
RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:110:y:2011:i:1:p:15-17 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Desert and Inequity Averson in Teams
RePEc:oxf:wpaper:563 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Stable and efficient coalitional networks
RePEc:cor:louvco:2011039 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Asymmetric discounting of gains and losses: A query theory account
RePEc:kap:jrisku:v:43:y:2011:i:2:p:107-126 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Does nurture matter: Theory and experimental investigation on the effect of working environment on risk and time preferences
RePEc:kap:jrisku:v:43:y:2011:i:3:p:245-270 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Non-parametric test of time consistency: Present bias and future bias
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:71:y:2011:i:2:p:456-478 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Information Markets, Elections and Contracts
RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3327 [Citation Analysis]
2011 A note on strategy-proofness from the doctor side in matching with contracts
RePEc:spr:reecde:v:15:y:2011:i:4:p:337-342 [Citation Analysis]
2011 The (sub-)optimality of the majority rule
RePEc:pra:mprapa:32716 [Citation Analysis]
2011 SMOOTH POLITICIANS AND PATERNALISTIC VOTERS: A THEORY OF LARGE ELECTIONS
RePEc:cla:levarc:786969000000000250 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Smooth Politicians and Paternalistic Voters: A Theory of Large Elections
RePEc:nbr:nberwo:17397 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Warm-Glow Giving and Freedom to be Selfish
RePEc:cfr:cefirw:w0171 [Citation Analysis]
2011 The Multi-item Bisection Auction
RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2011_031 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Competition and the signaling role of prices
RePEc:eee:indorg:v:29:y:2011:i:4:p:412-425 [Citation Analysis]
2011 The Cycles Approach
RePEc:acb:cbeeco:2011-547 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Cooperation through imitation and exclusion in networks
RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:35:y:2011:i:5:p:641-658 [Citation Analysis]
2011 The lifeboat problem
RePEc:zbw:wzbfff:spii2011106 [Citation Analysis]
2011 The Lifeboat Problem
RePEc:mpi:wpaper:the_lifeboat_problem [Citation Analysis]
2011 The dynamic instability of dispersed price equilibria
RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:146:y:2011:i:5:p:1796-1827 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Stable and efficient coalitional networks
RePEc:cor:louvco:2011039 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Influence functions, followers and command games
RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00583867 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Nonspecific Networking
RePEc:gam:jgames:v:2:y:2011:i:1:p:87-113:d:11358 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Social interactions and spillovers.
RePEc:ner:carlos:info:hdl:10016/12914 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Influence functions, followers and command games
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:72:y:2011:i:1:p:123-138 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Social interactions and spillovers
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:72:y:2011:i:2:p:339-360 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Beliefs about overconfidence
RePEc:kap:theord:v:70:y:2011:i:4:p:475-500 [Citation Analysis]
2011 One Step at a Time: Does Gradualism Build Coordination?
RePEc:nam:wpaper:1113 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Belief Elicitation: A Horse Race among Truth Serums
RePEc:dgr:kubcen:2011117 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Environmental Assessment Methodologies for Commercial Buildings: An Elicitation Study of U.S. Building Professionalsâ Beliefs on Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED)
RePEc:gam:jsusta:v:3:y:2011:i:12:p:2392-2412:d:15184 [Citation Analysis]
2011 So you want to run an experiment, now what? Some simple rules of thumb for optimal experimental design
RePEc:kap:expeco:v:14:y:2011:i:4:p:439-457 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Remain silent and ye shall suffer: seller exploitation ofÂ reticent buyers in an experimental reputation system
RePEc:kap:expeco:v:14:y:2011:i:2:p:273-285 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Social science and neuroscience: how can they inform each other?
RePEc:spr:inrvec:v:58:y:2011:i:3:p:243-256 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Trust and trustworthiness reputations in an investment game
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:72:y:2011:i:2:p:361-375 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Selfconfirming Equilibrium and Uncertainty
RePEc:igi:igierp:428 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Is there a U-shaped relation between competition and investment?
RePEc:eee:indorg:v:29:y:2011:i:1:p:65-73 [Citation Analysis]
2011 An individual manipulability of positional voting rules
RePEc:spr:series:v:2:y:2011:i:4:p:431-446 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Tops-only domains
RePEc:spr:joecth:v:46:y:2011:i:2:p:255-282 [Citation Analysis]
2011 An Experiment on Prisonerâs Dilemma with Confirmed Proposals
RePEc:tse:wpaper:25463 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Behavioral Spillovers in Coordination Games
RePEc:chu:wpaper:11-20 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Gift Exchange versus Monetary Exchange: Theory and Evidence
RePEc:pit:wpaper:449 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Learning, Teaching, and Turn Taking in the Repeated Assignment Game
RePEc:pur:prukra:1267 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Network architecture, salience and coordination
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:73:y:2011:i:1:p:76-90 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Strategic behavior in repeated voluntary contribution experiments
RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:95:y:2011:i:1:p:143-148 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Gift Exchange versus Monetary Exchange: Experimental Evidence
RePEc:red:sed011:1153 [Citation Analysis]
2011 An Experiment on PrisonerÃ¢â¬â¢s Dilemma with Confirmed Proposals
RePEc:ler:wpaper:25432 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Critical decisions and constitutional rules
RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:37:y:2011:i:2:p:219-268 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Bilateral and Community Enforcement in a Networked Market with Simple Strategies
RePEc:bro:econwp:2011-2 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Price Competition on Network
RePEc:bdm:wpaper:2011-04 [Citation Analysis]
2011 On the Evolution of Preferences
RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2011-032 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Political Motivations and Electoral Competition: Equilibrium Analysis and Experimental Evidence
RePEc:bir:birmec:11-15 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Political Motivations and Electoral Competition: Equilibrium Analysis and Experimental Evidence
RePEc:man:sespap:1119 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Resource allocation and voter calculus inÂ aÂ multicandidate election
RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:148:y:2011:i:3:p:337-351 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Political Motivations and Electoral Competition: Equilibrium Analysis and Experimental Evidence
RePEc:qmw:qmwecw:wp682 [Citation Analysis]
2011 The Market for Conservation and Other Hostages
RePEc:nbr:nberwo:17409 [Citation Analysis]
2011 New Insights into Conditional Cooperation and Punishment from a Strategy Method Experiment
RePEc:iza:izadps:dp5689 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Use of data on planned contributions and stated beliefs in the measurement of social preferences
RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2011-039 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Attitudes to ambiguity in one-shot normal-form games: An experimental study
RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:71:y:2011:i:2:p:366-394 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Achieving Pareto Optimality Through Distributed Learning
RePEc:oxf:wpaper:557 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Endogenous capacities and price competition: The role of demand uncertainty
RePEc:eee:indorg:v:29:y:2011:i:4:p:399-411 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Endogenous capacities and price competition: the role of demand uncertainty.
RePEc:ner:carlos:info:hdl:10016/15757 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Bad News: An Experimental Study on the Informational Effects of Rewards
RePEc:cfr:cefirw:w0164 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Intention-Based Reciprocity and the Hidden Costs of Control
RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20110115 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Intention-Based Reciprocity and the Hidden Costs of Control
RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3553 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Subjective Evaluations with Performance Feedback
RePEc:qed:wpaper:1283 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Efficiency and Equilibria in Games of Optimal Derivative Design
RePEc:arx:papers:1107.0839 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: The case of risk-neutrality
RePEc:pra:mprapa:28823 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Double-edged transparency in teams
RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:95:y:2011:i:7:p:531-542 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Political influence in multi-choice institutions: cyclicity, anonymity, and transitivity
RePEc:kap:theord:v:70:y:2011:i:2:p:157-178 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Networks of manufacturers and retailers
RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:77:y:2011:i:3:p:351-367 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Farsightedly Stable FTA Structures
RePEc:koe:wpaper:1114 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Myopic or Farsighted? An Experiment on Network Formation
RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8263 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Behavioural patterns in social networks
RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2011-060 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Trading and rational security pricing bubbles
RePEc:cte:werepe:we1119 [Citation Analysis]
2011 An Efficient Multi-Item Dynamic Auction with Budget Constrained Bidders
RePEc:dgr:kubcen:2011096 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Sequential Contests with Synergy and Budget Constraints
RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8383 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Revenue Prediction in Budget-constrained Sequential Auctions with Complementarities
RePEc:dgr:eureri:1765025731 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Externalities in the games over electrical power transmission networks
RePEc:has:discpr:1125 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Capital allocation in financial institutions: the Euler method
RePEc:has:discpr:1126 [Citation Analysis]
2011 The computational complexity of rationalizing Pareto optimal choice behavior.
RePEc:ner:leuven:urn:hdl:123456789/310965 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Endogenous strength in conflicts
RePEc:cte:werepe:we1113 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Endogenous Liquidity Constraints in a Dynamic Contest
RePEc:iso:wpaper:0148 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Best-of-three all-pay auctions
RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:112:y:2011:i:1:p:67-70 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Non-partisan âget-out-the-voteâ efforts and policy outcomes
RePEc:eee:poleco:v:27:y:2011:i:4:p:728-739 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Contracts for Agents with Biased Beliefs: Some Theory and an Experiment
RePEc:bro:econwp:2011-10 [Citation Analysis]
2011 On efficient partnership dissolution under ex post individual rationality
RePEc:spr:joecth:v:48:y:2011:i:1:p:87-123 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Long-run Welfare under Externalities in Consumption, Leisure, and Production: A Case for Happy Degrowth vs. Unhappy Growth
RePEc:mod:recent:072 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Long-run Welfare under Externalities in Consumption, Leisure, and Production: A Case for Happy Degrowth vs. Unhappy Growth
RePEc:mod:depeco:0667 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Dress to Impress: Brands as Status Symbols
RePEc:acb:cbeeco:2011-567 [Citation Analysis]
2011 House allocation with fractional endowments
RePEc:spr:jogath:v:40:y:2011:i:3:p:481-513 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Do wage cuts damage work morale? Evidence from a natural field experiment
RePEc:zur:iewwpx:471 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Gift-Exchange, Incentives, and Heterogeneous Workers
RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20100008 [Citation Analysis]
2011 A Gift is not Always a Gift: Gift Exchange in a Voucher Experiment
RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3488 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Reciprocity in Labor Relations: Evidence from a Field Experiment with Long-Term Relationships
RePEc:lvl:lacicr:1127 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Building TrustâOne Gift at a Time
RePEc:gam:jgames:v:2:y:2011:i:4:p:412-433:d:14167 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Is There a Hidden Cost of Control in Naturally-Occurring Markets? Evidence from a Natural Field Experiment
RePEc:nbr:nberwo:17472 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Worker Characteristics and Wage Differentials: Evidence from a Gift-Exchange Experiment
RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3637 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Wage transparency and performance: A real-effort experiment
RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:111:y:2011:i:3:p:236-238 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Impatience and Uncertainty: Experimental Decisions Predict Adolescents Field Behavior
RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3635 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Energy-Using Durables: The Role of Time Discounting in Investment Decisions
RePEc:ied:wpsied:11-16 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Preference-Based Unawareness
RePEc:pra:mprapa:30221 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Generalized type spaces
RePEc:pra:mprapa:34107 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Correlation through Bounded Recall Strategies
RePEc:huj:dispap:dp579 [Citation Analysis]
2011 On the optimal management of teams under budget constraints
RePEc:pab:wpaper:11.11 [Citation Analysis]
2011 A general framework for rational learning in social networks
RePEc:the:publsh:1015 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Multiple equilibria in asymmetric first-price auctions
RePEc:pra:mprapa:34937 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Heterogeneous Tiebout communities with private production and anonymous crowding
RePEc:cte:werepe:we1028 [Citation Analysis]
2011 Power fluctuations and political economy
RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:146:y:2011:i:3:p:1009-1041 [Citation Analysis]
2011 A note on Ï-values
RePEc:spr:inrvec:v:58:y:2011:i:4:p:433-438 [Citation Analysis]

Cites in year: CiY

Recent citations received in: 2011

Year	Title	See
2011	Identical Preferences Lower Bound for Allocation of Heterogeneous Tasks and NIMBY Problems RePEc:adl:wpaper:2011-27	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Finite-Population Mass-Action and Evolutionary Stability RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3378	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Behavioral Spillovers in Coordination Games RePEc:chu:wpaper:11-20	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Investments as Signals of Outside Options RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8366	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Vulnerable Markets RePEc:deg:conpap:c016_040	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Lying About What you Know or About What you Do? (replaces CentER DP 2010-033) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:2011139	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Lying About What you Know or About What you do? (replaces TILEC DP 2010-016) RePEc:dgr:kubtil:2011055	[Citation Analysis]
2011	An Experimental Study of Credible Deviations and ACDC RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20110153	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in bargaining one-dimensional policies under (super) majority rules RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:73:y:2011:i:1:p:65-75	[Citation Analysis]
2011	The dynamic instability of dispersed price equilibria RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:146:y:2011:i:5:p:1796-1827	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Axioms for minimax regret choice correspondences RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:146:y:2011:i:6:p:2226-2251	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Context and interpretation in laboratory experiments: The case of reciprocity RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:32:y:2011:i:5:p:846-856	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Perfect and limit admissible perfect equilibria in discontinuous games RePEc:eee:mateco:v:47:y:2011:i:4:p:531-540	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Core-stable rings in second price auctions with common values RePEc:eee:mateco:v:47:y:2011:i:6:p:760-767	[Citation Analysis]
2011	The Existence of Perfect Equilibrium in Discontinuous Games RePEc:gam:jgames:v:2:y:2011:i:3:p:235-256:d:13182	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Unraveling Public Good Games RePEc:gam:jgames:v:2:y:2011:i:4:p:434-451:d:14898	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Lies and Biased Evaluation : A Real-Effort Experiment RePEc:gat:wpaper:1124	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Core stable bidding rings in independent private value auctions with externalities RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00608008	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Full Disclosure in Decentralized Organizations RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00652279	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Lies and Biased Evaluation: A Real-Effort Experiment RePEc:iza:izadps:dp5884	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Motivational Cherry Picking RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2011-029	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Use of data on planned contributions and stated beliefs in the measurement of social preferences RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2011-039	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Testing the Framework of Other-Regarding Preferences RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2011-041	[Citation Analysis]
2011	A Class of Evolutionary Models for Participation Games with Negative Feedback RePEc:kap:compec:v:37:y:2011:i:3:p:267-300	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Economics in the Kingdom of Loathing: Analysis of Virtual Market Data RePEc:knz:dpteco:1130	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Testing the Analytical Framework of Other-Regarding Preferences RePEc:mos:moswps:2011-26	[Citation Analysis]
2011	We Are Not Alone: The Impact of Externalities on Public Good Provision RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2009_29	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Oligopoly as a Socially Embedded Dilemma. An Experiment RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2011_01	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Common reasoning in games: a Lewisian analysis of common knowledge of rationality RePEc:not:notcdx:2011-01	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Peer Effects and Social Preferences in Voluntary Cooperation RePEc:not:notcdx:2011-09	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Price Discrimination Through Communication RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1536	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Binomial menu auctions in government formation RePEc:pra:mprapa:28576	[Citation Analysis]
2011	On Integration Policies and Schooling RePEc:pra:mprapa:29145	[Citation Analysis]
2011	A Model of Party Discipline in a Congress RePEc:pra:mprapa:29890	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Coordination structures RePEc:pra:mprapa:30463	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Core stable bidding rings in independent private value auctions with externalities RePEc:pra:mprapa:32164	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Ultimata bargaining: generosity without social motives RePEc:pra:mprapa:33613	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Refinements of Nash equilibrium in potential games RePEc:rut:rutres:201125	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Approximation Results for Discontinuous Games with an Application to Equilibrium Refinement RePEc:rut:rutres:201128	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Are the treasures of game theory ambiguous? RePEc:spr:joecth:v:48:y:2011:i:2:p:313-339	[Citation Analysis]
2011	A unified approach to strategy-proofness for single-peaked preferences RePEc:spr:series:v:2:y:2011:i:4:p:529-550	[Citation Analysis]
2011	An experimental inquiry into the nature of relational goods RePEc:uca:ucapdv:160	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Temporal stability and psychological foundations of cooperation preferences RePEc:usg:econwp:2011:01	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Economic incentives and social preferences: substitutes or complements? RePEc:usi:wpaper:617	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Signaling in deterministic and stochastic settings RePEc:zbw:dicedp:35	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Implications of inequality aversion for international climate policy RePEc:zbw:zewdip:11050	[Citation Analysis]
2011	On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation in a general class of social choice problems RePEc:zur:econwp:021	[Citation Analysis]
2011	A geometric approach to mechanism design RePEc:zur:econwp:056	[Citation Analysis]

Recent citations received in: 2010

Year	Title	See
2010	Strategic Spending in Voting Competitions with Social Networks RePEc:bdm:wpaper:2010-16	[Citation Analysis]
2010	Directed Generosity and Network Formation: Network Dimension Matters RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3287	[Citation Analysis]
2010	Perfect-Substitutes, Best-Shot, and Weakest-Link Contests between Groups RePEc:chu:wpaper:10-25	[Citation Analysis]
2010	Dynamic Auctions: A Survey RePEc:cla:levarc:661465000000000035	[Citation Analysis]
2010	Competitive Equilibrium in Markets for Votes RePEc:cla:levarc:661465000000000143	[Citation Analysis]
2010	Competitive Equilibrium in Markets for Votes RePEc:clu:wpaper:0910-21	[Citation Analysis]
2010	Optimal Incentive Contracts under Moral Hazard When the Agent is Free to Leave RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:7914	[Citation Analysis]
2010	Competitive equilibrium in Markets for Votes RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:7992	[Citation Analysis]
2010	Dynamic Auctions: A Survey RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1757	[Citation Analysis]
2010	Dynamic Auctions: A Survey RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:1757r	[Citation Analysis]
2010	Which Words Bond? An Experiment on Signaling in a Public Good Game (replaced by CentER DP 2011-139) RePEc:dgr:kubcen:201033	[Citation Analysis]
2010	You get what you pay for: Incentives and Selection in the Education System RePEc:dgr:umamet:2010011	[Citation Analysis]
2010	Performance Pay and Multi-dimensional Sorting - Productivity, Preferences and Gender RePEc:dgr:umamet:2010012	[Citation Analysis]
2010	Directed Generosity and Network Formation: Network Dimension Matters RePEc:dgr:umamet:2010065	[Citation Analysis]
2010	Peer Evaluation: Incentives and Co-Worker Relations RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20100055	[Citation Analysis]
2010	Profit Sharing and Reciprocity: Theory and Survey Evidence RePEc:diw:diwsop:diw_sp292	[Citation Analysis]
2010	All-Pay Auctions with Handicaps RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0781	[Citation Analysis]
2010	Bertrand competition with cost uncertainty RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:107:y:2010:i:3:p:356-359	[Citation Analysis]
2010	All-stage strong correlated equilibrium RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:69:y:2010:i:1:p:184-188	[Citation Analysis]
2010	Fairness and desert in tournaments RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:69:y:2010:i:2:p:346-364	[Citation Analysis]
2010	Sequential reciprocity in two-player, two-stage games: An experimental analysis RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:70:y:2010:i:2:p:289-303	[Citation Analysis]
2010	A unified analysis of rational voting with private values and group-specific costs RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:70:y:2010:i:2:p:457-471	[Citation Analysis]
2010	Does competition affect giving? RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:74:y:2010:i:1-2:p:82-103	[Citation Analysis]
2010	The rate of convergence to perfect competition of matching and bargaining mechanisms RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:145:y:2010:i:3:p:1164-1187	[Citation Analysis]
2010	Kernel-based type spaces RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:145:y:2010:i:6:p:2483-2495	[Citation Analysis]
2010	Fairness perceptions and prosocial emotions in the power to take RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:31:y:2010:i:6:p:908-922	[Citation Analysis]
2010	The intensity of incentives in firms and markets: Moral hazard with envious agents RePEc:eee:labeco:v:17:y:2010:i:3:p:598-607	[Citation Analysis]
2010	Rationalizability in continuous games RePEc:eee:mateco:v:46:y:2010:i:5:p:912-924	[Citation Analysis]
2010	The uniform rule with several commodities: A generalization of Sprumonts characterization RePEc:eee:mateco:v:46:y:2010:i:6:p:952-964	[Citation Analysis]
2010	Public-good games and the Balinese RePEc:eme:ijsepp:v:37:y:2010:i:9:p:660-675	[Citation Analysis]
2010	Coordination Games and Local Interactions: A Survey of the Game Theoretic Literature RePEc:gam:jgames:v:1:y:2010:i:4:p:551-585:d:10210	[Citation Analysis]
2010	Contrôle de linformation et crowdsourcing RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00545788	[Citation Analysis]
2010	Reciprocity and Incentive Pay in the Workplace RePEc:iza:izadps:dp4782	[Citation Analysis]
2010	Competition and innovation: an experimental investigation RePEc:kap:expeco:v:13:y:2010:i:4:p:439-460	[Citation Analysis]
2010	Scheduling with package auctions RePEc:kap:expeco:v:13:y:2010:i:4:p:476-499	[Citation Analysis]
2010	Bounding Preference Parameters under Different Assumptions about Beliefs: a Partial Identification Approach RePEc:lvl:lacicr:1017	[Citation Analysis]
2010	Competitive Equilibrium in Markets for Votes RePEc:nbr:nberwo:16315	[Citation Analysis]
2010	Estimating Time Preferences from Convex Budgets RePEc:nbr:nberwo:16347	[Citation Analysis]
2010	Toward a unified theory of economic geography an urban economics. RePEc:ner:louvai:info:hdl:2078.1/30406	[Citation Analysis]
2010	Networks of free trade agreements among heterogeneous countries. RePEc:ner:louvai:info:hdl:2078.1/32314	[Citation Analysis]
2010	Market integration and strike activity. RePEc:ner:louvai:info:hdl:2078.1/32315	[Citation Analysis]
2010	Auctions with Dynamic Populations: Efficiency and Revenue Maximization RePEc:pra:mprapa:11456	[Citation Analysis]
2010	Endogenous Timing in General Rent-Seeking and Conflict Models RePEc:pra:mprapa:24084	[Citation Analysis]
2010	On the evolution of prize perceptions in contests RePEc:pra:mprapa:24640	[Citation Analysis]
2010	On the number of blocks required to access the core RePEc:pra:mprapa:26578	[Citation Analysis]
2010	Market games and clubs RePEc:pra:mprapa:33968	[Citation Analysis]
2010	Computing equilibria: a computational complexity perspective RePEc:spr:joecth:v:42:y:2010:i:1:p:193-236	[Citation Analysis]
2010	General equilibrium and the emergence of (non)market clearing trading institutions RePEc:spr:joecth:v:44:y:2010:i:3:p:339-360	[Citation Analysis]
2010	Implementation of solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked RePEc:spr:reecde:v:14:y:2010:i:1:p:1-15	[Citation Analysis]
2010	A Folk Theorem for Competing Mechanisms RePEc:ubc:pmicro:michael_peters-2010-17	[Citation Analysis]
2010	On the Revelation Principle and Reciprocal Mechanisms in Competing Mechanism Games RePEc:ubc:pmicro:michael_peters-2010-18	[Citation Analysis]
2010	Directed generosity and network formation: Network dimension matters RePEc:uea:wcbess:10-15	[Citation Analysis]
2010	Long-run equilibria, dominated strategies, and local interactions RePEc:vie:viennp:1005	[Citation Analysis]
2010	Information and Beliefs in a Repeated Normal-form Game RePEc:wzb:wzebiv:fsiv2010-02	[Citation Analysis]

Recent citations received in: 2009

Year	Title	See
2009	Departure Times in Y-Shaped Traffic Networks with Multiple Bottlenecks RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:99:y:2009:i:5:p:2149-76	[Citation Analysis]
2009	Contracts, cost sharing and consistency RePEc:ams:ndfwpp:09-04	[Citation Analysis]
2009	Game Mining: How to Make Money from those about to Play a Game RePEc:amu:wpaper:2009-10	[Citation Analysis]
2009	Farsighted Stability for Roommate Markets RePEc:bge:wpaper:385	[Citation Analysis]
2009	Elicited Beliefs and Social Information in Modified Dictator Games: What Do Dictators Believe Other Dictators Do? RePEc:bge:wpaper:405	[Citation Analysis]
2009	Von NeumannâMorgenstern stable-set solutions in the assignment market RePEc:bge:wpaper:412	[Citation Analysis]
2009	Voronoi languages: Equilibria in cheap-talk games with high-dimensional types and few signals RePEc:bie:wpaper:420	[Citation Analysis]
2009	The Relation Between Competition and Investment Ã¢â¬â Towards a Synthesis RePEc:cdl:econwp:qt8tt4457m	[Citation Analysis]
2009	Decision Making in Uncertain and Changing Environments RePEc:cla:levarc:814577000000000259	[Citation Analysis]
2009	Altruism, Turnout and Strategic Voting Behavior RePEc:cla:levarc:814577000000000309	[Citation Analysis]
2009	Communication, Renegotiation, and the Scope for Collusion RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:7563	[Citation Analysis]
2009	Endogenous Default Penalties in Nominal Incomplete Markets RePEc:cuf:journl:y:2009:v:10:i:2:p:391-418	[Citation Analysis]
2009	Revisiting Strategic versus Non-strategic Cooperation RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200922	[Citation Analysis]
2009	Never change a winning team: The effect of substitutions on success in football tournaments RePEc:dgr:umamet:2009027	[Citation Analysis]
2009	Cheap Talk with an Informed Receiver RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0746	[Citation Analysis]
2009	Confidence in preferences RePEc:ebg:heccah:0919	[Citation Analysis]
2009	Revisiting Friendship Networks RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-09-00401	[Citation Analysis]
2009	Testing the TASP: An Experimental Investigation of Learning in Games with Unstable Equilibria RePEc:edn:esedps:188	[Citation Analysis]
2009	Revenue comparison in common-value auctions: Two examples RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:105:y:2009:i:2:p:177-180	[Citation Analysis]
2009	Information acquisition in auctions: Sealed bids vs. open bids RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:65:y:2009:i:2:p:372-405	[Citation Analysis]
2009	ReGale: Some memorable results RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:66:y:2009:i:2:p:632-642	[Citation Analysis]
2009	Status, affluence, and inequality: Rank-based comparisons in games of status RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:67:y:2009:i:2:p:552-568	[Citation Analysis]
2009	Optimum tariffs and retaliation: How country numbers matter RePEc:eee:inecon:v:78:y:2009:i:2:p:276-286	[Citation Analysis]
2009	Dumbing down rational players: Learning and teaching in an experimental game RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:70:y:2009:i:1-2:p:54-71	[Citation Analysis]
2009	On eliciting beliefs in strategic games RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:71:y:2009:i:2:p:98-109	[Citation Analysis]
2009	Bilateral commitment RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:144:y:2009:i:4:p:1817-1831	[Citation Analysis]
2009	Decreasing relative impatience RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:30:y:2009:i:6:p:831-839	[Citation Analysis]
2009	Large economies and two-player games RePEc:eee:mateco:v:45:y:2009:i:9-10:p:603-608	[Citation Analysis]
2009	Committees and reciprocity RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:57:y:2009:i:1:p:26-47	[Citation Analysis]
2009	Whatever you say, your reputation precedes you: Observation and cheap talk in the trust game RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:93:y:2009:i:9-10:p:1036-1044	[Citation Analysis]
2009	Strategic Information Transmission in Networks RePEc:esx:essedp:668	[Citation Analysis]
2009	Cooperation through Imitation and Exclusion in Networks RePEc:fem:femwpa:2009.37	[Citation Analysis]
2009	Fatigue in dynamic tournaments RePEc:fsu:wpaper:wp2009_06_03	[Citation Analysis]
2009	Dumbing down rational players: Learning and teaching in an experimental game RePEc:hal:cesptp:hal-00607223	[Citation Analysis]
2009	Ascending auctions: some impossibility results and their resolutions with final price discounts RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-00575076	[Citation Analysis]
2009	Ascending auctions: some impossibility results and their resolutions with final price discounts RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00575076	[Citation Analysis]
2009	Optimal Categorization RePEc:hhs:hastef:0721	[Citation Analysis]
2009	Coordination in Evolving Networks with Endogenous Decay RePEc:inn:wpaper:2009-19	[Citation Analysis]
2009	Revisiting Strategic versus Non-Strategic Cooperation RePEc:iza:izadps:dp4107	[Citation Analysis]
2009	On the Relevance and Composition of Gifts within the Firm: Evidence from Field Experiments RePEc:iza:izadps:dp4339	[Citation Analysis]
2009	Preferences and Beliefs in a Sequential Social Dilemma: A Within-Subjects Analysis RePEc:iza:izadps:dp4624	[Citation Analysis]
2009	Choosers as extension axioms RePEc:kap:theord:v:67:y:2009:i:4:p:375-384	[Citation Analysis]
2009	Decision Making in Uncertain and Changing Environments RePEc:kse:dpaper:19	[Citation Analysis]
2009	Limit Behavior of No-regret Dynamics RePEc:kse:dpaper:21	[Citation Analysis]
2009	Revisiting Friendship Networks RePEc:lsu:lsuwpp:2009-12	[Citation Analysis]
2009	On the Relevance and Composition of Gifts within the Firm: Evidence from Field Experiments RePEc:lvl:lacicr:0932	[Citation Analysis]
2009	Evaluating the Degree of Manipulability of Certain Aggregation Procedures under Multiple Choices RePEc:nea:journl:y:2009:i:1-2:p:37-61	[Citation Analysis]
2009	Farsightedly stable networks. RePEc:ner:louvai:info:hdl:2078.1/28993	[Citation Analysis]
2009	Measuring Winners and Losers from the new I-35W Mississippi River Bridge RePEc:nex:wpaper:i-35w-trb2010-measuringwinnerslosers	[Citation Analysis]
2009	Stationary consistent equilibrium coalition structures constitute the recursive core RePEc:pkk:wpaper:0905	[Citation Analysis]
2009	The impossibility of effective enforcement mechanisms in collateralized credit markets RePEc:pra:mprapa:13781	[Citation Analysis]
2009	The Role of Financial Intermediaries in Securities Issues: A Theoretical Analysis RePEc:pra:mprapa:16112	[Citation Analysis]
2009	Auctioning with Aspirations: Keep Them Low (Enough) RePEc:pra:mprapa:16242	[Citation Analysis]
2009	Self-Enforcing Climate Change Treaties: A Generalized Differential Game Approach with Applications RePEc:pra:mprapa:17889	[Citation Analysis]
2009	Political Influence in Multi-Choice Institutions: Cyclicity, Anonymity and Transitivity RePEc:pra:mprapa:18240	[Citation Analysis]
2009	Consumer theory with bounded rational preferences RePEc:pra:mprapa:18673	[Citation Analysis]
2009	Endogenous Relative Concerns: The Impact of Workers Characteristics on Status and Pro ts in the Firm RePEc:pra:mprapa:18759	[Citation Analysis]
2009	In Vino Veritas: The Economics of Drinking RePEc:rwi:repape:0158	[Citation Analysis]
2009	Robust rational turnout RePEc:spr:joecth:v:41:y:2009:i:2:p:317-343	[Citation Analysis]
2009	Strategic absentmindedness in finitely repeated games RePEc:spr:topjnl:v:17:y:2009:i:1:p:85-95	[Citation Analysis]
2009	On Inequity Aversion - A Reply to Binmore and Shaked RePEc:trf:wpaper:256	[Citation Analysis]
2009	Renegotiation-Proof Relational Contracts with Side Payments RePEc:trf:wpaper:259	[Citation Analysis]
2009	Sabotage in dynamic tournaments RePEc:trf:wpaper:266	[Citation Analysis]
2009	Household behavior and individual autonomy. RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2009-17	[Citation Analysis]
2009	Elicited beliefs and social information in modified dictator games: What do dictators believe other dictators do? RePEc:upf:upfgen:1137	[Citation Analysis]
2009	Decision making in uncertain and changing environments RePEc:upf:upfgen:1160	[Citation Analysis]
2009	Optimum Tariffs and Retaliation: How Country Numbers Matter RePEc:van:wpaper:0904	[Citation Analysis]
2009	Price Dispersion, Search Externalities, and the Digital Divide RePEc:vie:viennp:0916	[Citation Analysis]

Recent citations received in: 2008

Year	Title	See
2008	Nash Equilibrium and Mechanism Design RePEc:ads:wpaper:0086	[Citation Analysis]
2008	Multiple Priors as Similarity Weighted Frequencies RePEc:awi:wpaper:0470	[Citation Analysis]
2008	Optimal Auction Design and Irrelevance of Private Information RePEc:bon:bonedp:bgse21_2008	[Citation Analysis]
2008	Bubblesandcrashes:GradientdynamicsinÃ¯Â¬nancial markets RePEc:cdl:ucscec:qt3905j8kq	[Citation Analysis]
2008	Three Very Simple Games and What It Takes to Solve Them RePEc:cer:papers:wp347	[Citation Analysis]
2008	Imitation and the Evolution of Walrasian Behavior: Theoretically Fragile but Behaviorally Robust RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2224	[Citation Analysis]
2008	The Paradoxes of Revenge in Conflicts RePEc:ces:ceswps:_2261	[Citation Analysis]
2008	Inequality, Happiness and Relative Concerns: What Actually is their Relationship? RePEc:cla:levrem:122247000000001896	[Citation Analysis]
2008	Cooling-Off in Negotiations - Does It Work? RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6807	[Citation Analysis]
2008	The Average Tree Solution for Cooperative Games with Communication Structure RePEc:dgr:kubcen:200873	[Citation Analysis]
2008	Non-cooperative Support for the Asymmetric Nash Bargaining solution RePEc:dgr:umamet:2008018	[Citation Analysis]
2008	Behavorial Effects in Individual Decisions of Network Formation RePEc:dgr:umamet:2008019	[Citation Analysis]
2008	The Average Tree Solution for Cooperative Games with Communication Structure RePEc:dgr:umamet:2008026	[Citation Analysis]
2008	Simultaneous Pooled Auctions with Multiple Bids and Preference Lists RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20080034	[Citation Analysis]
2008	Positive Expectations Feedback Experiments and Number Guessing Games as Models of Financial Markets RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20080076	[Citation Analysis]
2008	The Average Tree Solution for Cooperative Games with Communication Structure RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20080083	[Citation Analysis]
2008	On two basic properties of equilibria of voting with exit RePEc:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2008:i:21:p:1-9	[Citation Analysis]
2008	Pricing with markups in industries with increasing marginal costs RePEc:edj:ceauch:256	[Citation Analysis]
2008	Interactive unawareness revisited RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:62:y:2008:i:1:p:232-262	[Citation Analysis]
2008	New complexity results about Nash equilibria RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:63:y:2008:i:2:p:621-641	[Citation Analysis]
2008	The projection dynamic and the geometry of population games RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:64:y:2008:i:2:p:565-590	[Citation Analysis]
2008	Favoritism in asymmetric procurement auctions RePEc:eee:indorg:v:26:y:2008:i:6:p:1407-1424	[Citation Analysis]
2008	Performance-pay, sorting and social motivation RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:68:y:2008:i:2:p:412-421	[Citation Analysis]
2008	Generalized projection dynamics in evolutionary game theory RePEc:esi:evopap:2008-11	[Citation Analysis]
2008	The Right of Withdrawal in the Treaty of Lisbon: A game theoretic reflection on different decision processes in the EU RePEc:got:cegedp:77	[Citation Analysis]
2008	Tracing Fairness Intentions: Chinese Whisper RePEc:got:vwldps:135	[Citation Analysis]
2008	The Paradoxes of Revenge in Conflicts RePEc:gue:guelph:2008-5	[Citation Analysis]
2008	Contracts and Promises - An Approach to Pre-play Agreements RePEc:hhs:hastef:0707	[Citation Analysis]
2008	Analogy-based Expectations and the Partially Cursed Equilibrium RePEc:hhs:hastef:0708	[Citation Analysis]
2008	Zum ErklÃ¤rungsgehalt der verhaltensorientierten Spieltheorie RePEc:jen:jenjbe:2008-04	[Citation Analysis]
2008	Inequality, happiness and relative concerns: What actually is their relationship? RePEc:kap:jecinq:v:6:y:2008:i:4:p:351-372	[Citation Analysis]
2008	Feedback; Punishment and Cooperation in Public Good Experiments RePEc:mlb:wpaper:1036	[Citation Analysis]
2008	Ex Ante Efficiency in School Choice Mechanisms: An Experimental Investigation RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14618	[Citation Analysis]
2008	Average tree solution and subcore for acyclic graph games. RePEc:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-3129818	[Citation Analysis]
2008	Job-market signalling and screening: An experimental study. RePEc:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-347328	[Citation Analysis]
2008	The Rate of Convergence to Perfect Competition of Matching and Bargaining Mechanisms RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1467	[Citation Analysis]
2008	Macroeconomics: A Survey of Laboratory Research RePEc:pit:wpaper:334	[Citation Analysis]
2008	Average tree solutions for graph games RePEc:pra:mprapa:10189	[Citation Analysis]
2008	Ignorance Is Bliss: Matching in Auctions with an Uninformed Seller RePEc:pra:mprapa:24374	[Citation Analysis]
2008	The Paradoxes of Revenge in Conflicts RePEc:pra:mprapa:7687	[Citation Analysis]
2008	The Discursive Dilemma and Probabilistic Judgement Aggregation RePEc:pra:mprapa:8412	[Citation Analysis]
2008	The Impact of Council Voting Rules on EU Decision-Making RePEc:rif:dpaper:1162	[Citation Analysis]
2008	The Power of Words: Why Communication fosters Cooperation and Efficiency RePEc:uam:wpaper:200901	[Citation Analysis]
2008	An Experimental Study of the Holdout Problem in a Multilateral Bargaining Game RePEc:usn:usnawp:21	[Citation Analysis]
2008	The Power of Reasoning: Experimental Evidence RePEc:uta:papers:2008_20	[Citation Analysis]
2008	The Optimal Choice of Pre-launch Reviewer : How Best to Transmit Information using Tests and Conditional Pricing RePEc:wrk:warwec:877	[Citation Analysis]

Warning!! This is still an experimental service. The results of this service should be interpreted with care, especially in research assessment exercises. The processing of documents is automatic. There still are errors and omissions in the identification of references. We are working to improve the software to increase the accuracy of the results.

Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.