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2007 | A Contribution to the Theory of Optimal Utilitarian Income Taxation RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2007_2 [Citation Analysis] | 20 |
2008 | Multiple-Reason Decision Making Based on Automatic Processing RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2008_12 [Citation Analysis] | 14 |
2011 | Dictator Games: A Meta Study RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2010_07 [Citation Analysis] | 13 |
2006 | How Much Collusion. A Meta-Analysis On Oligopoly Experiments RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2006_27 [Citation Analysis] | 13 |
2006 | The Threat of Capital Drain: A Rationale for Public Banks? RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2006_11 [Citation Analysis] | 10 |
2008 | Modeling Option and Strategy Choices with Connectionist Networks: Towards an Integrative Model of Automatic and Deliberate Decision Making RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2008_2 [Citation Analysis] | 10 |
2005 | A Contribution to the Theory of Optimal Utilitarian Income Taxation RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2005_23 [Citation Analysis] | 9 |
| repec:mpg:wpaper:2009_31 [Citation Analysis] | 7 |
2005 | Ostracism and the Provision of a Public Good, Experimental Evidence RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2005_24 [Citation Analysis] | 7 |
2010 | Binary Payment Schemes: Moral Hazard and Loss Aversion RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2010_38 [Citation Analysis] | 6 |
2008 | Systemic Risk in the Financial Sector: An Analysis of the Subprime-Mortgage Financial Crisis RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2008_43 [Citation Analysis] | 6 |
2011 | We Are Not Alone: The Impact of Externalities on Public Good Provision RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2009_29 [Citation Analysis] | 6 |
2004 | Banks without Parachutes Competitive Effects of Government Bail-out Policies RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2004_12 [Citation Analysis] | 6 |
2010 | Capital Regulation after the Crisis: Business as Usual? RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2010_31 [Citation Analysis] | 6 |
| RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2004_02 [Citation Analysis] | 5 |
2008 | A Maximum Principle for Control Problems with Monotonicity Constraints RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2008_4 [Citation Analysis] | 5 |
2011 | Can we manage first impressions in cooperation problems? An experimental study on âBroken (and Fixed) Windowsâ RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2011_05 [Citation Analysis] | 4 |
2009 | How Distinct are Intuition and Deliberation? An Eye-Tracking Analysis of Instruction-Induced Decision Modes RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2009_10 [Citation Analysis] | 4 |
| RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2005_06 [Citation Analysis] | 4 |
| RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2009_20 [Citation Analysis] | 4 |
| RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2005_05 [Citation Analysis] | 4 |
2010 | On the Prevalence of Framing Effects Across Subject-Pools in a Two- Person Cooperation Game RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2010_28 [Citation Analysis] | 3 |
2008 | Can We Trust Intuitive Jurors? An Experimental Analysis RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2008_36 [Citation Analysis] | 3 |
2009 | Survey Evidence on Conditional Norm Enforcement RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2009_03 [Citation Analysis] | 3 |
2004 | Optimal Income Taxation, Public-Goods Provision and Public-Sector Pricing: A Contribution to the Foundations of Public Economics RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2004_14 [Citation Analysis] | 3 |
2010 | Incentive Problems with Unidimensional Hidden Characteristics: A Unified Approach RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2006_26 [Citation Analysis] | 3 |
2008 | Size, Spillovers and Soft Budget Constraints RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2008_17 [Citation Analysis] | 3 |
2005 | Optimal Income Taxation and Public Good Provision in a Two-Class Economy RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2005_25 [Citation Analysis] | 3 |
2010 | Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in the Discussion of Capital Regulation: Why Bank Equity is Not Expensive RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2010_42 [Citation Analysis] | 3 |
2006 | Private Damage Claims and the Passing-On Defense in Horizontal Price-Fixing Cases: An Economists Perspective RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2006_22 [Citation Analysis] | 3 |
2007 | Institutions for Intuitive Man RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2007_12 [Citation Analysis] | 2 |
2009 | On Probation. An Experimental Analysis RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2009_38 [Citation Analysis] | 2 |
2008 | Apportionment, Fiscal Equalization and Decentralized Tax Enforcement RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2008_21 [Citation Analysis] | 2 |
2012 | Symmetric vs. Asymmetric Punishment Regimes for Bribery RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2012_01 [Citation Analysis] | 2 |
2009 | On the legitimacy of coercion for the financing of public goods RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2009_15 [Citation Analysis] | 2 |
2007 | Switzerland and Euroland: European Monetary Union, Monetary Stability and Financial Stability RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2007_9 [Citation Analysis] | 2 |
2005 | The Undesirability of Randomized Income Taxation under Decreasing Risk Aversion RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2005_27 [Citation Analysis] | 2 |
2008 | Information Processing in Decisions under Risk: Evidence for Compensatory Strategies based on Automatic Processes RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2008_42 [Citation Analysis] | 2 |
2008 | Vertical Integration, Raising Rivals Costs and Upstream Collusion RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2008_30 [Citation Analysis] | 2 |
2010 | Poverty and crime in 19th century Germany: A reassessment RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2010_35 [Citation Analysis] | 2 |
2008 | Price Setting in a Decentralized Market and the Competitive Outcome RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2008_6 [Citation Analysis] | 2 |
2007 | Cooperation in Symmetric and Asymmetric Prisoners Dilemma Games RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2006_25 [Citation Analysis] | 2 |
2009 | Leading with(out) Sacrifice? A Public-Goods Experiment with a Super-Additive Player RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2009_08 [Citation Analysis] | 2 |
| RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2004_04 [Citation Analysis] | 2 |
2008 | The Politician and his Banker RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2008_1 [Citation Analysis] | 2 |
2010 | Public Ownership of Banks and Economic Growth The Role of Heterogeneity RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2010_41 [Citation Analysis] | 2 |
2009 | Deterrence Through Word of Mouth RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2009_04 [Citation Analysis] | 1 |
2008 | A Note on Deatons Theorem on the Undesirability of Nonuniform Excise Taxation RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2008_45 [Citation Analysis] | 1 |
2006 | The Impact of Institutions on the Decision How to Decide RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2006_19 [Citation Analysis] | 1 |
| RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2005_03 [Citation Analysis] | 1 |
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2011 | Mechanism Design and Voting for Public-Good Provision RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2011_31 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | Can we manage first impressions in cooperation problems? An experimental study on âBroken (and Fixed) Windowsâ RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2011_05 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | Framing and free riding: emotional responses and punishment in social dilemma games RePEc:kap:expeco:v:14:y:2011:i:2:p:254-272 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | Cooperation: the power of a single word? Some experimental evidence on wording and gender effects in a Game of Chicken RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-00741973 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | The Strategic Use of Ambiguity RePEc:bie:wpaper:452 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | Chapter 5: Taxation and Regulation of the Financial Sector RePEc:ces:eeagre:v::y:2011:i::p:147-169 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | Countercyclical capital regulation: should bank regulators use rules or discretion? RePEc:fip:fedker:y:2011:i:qii:n:v.96no.2:x:1 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | Credit Risk in General Equilibrium RePEc:onb:oenbwp:172 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | Stealing to Survive: Crime and Income Shocks in 19th Century France RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-00623804 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | Stealing to Survive: Crime and Income Shocks in 19th Century France RePEc:cpm:docweb:1111 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | Limited liability and the riskincentive relationship RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:102:y:2011:i:2:p:97-110 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | Team Incentives and Reference-Dependent Preferences RePEc:kgu:wpaper:70 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | Goals and Psychological Accounting RePEc:iza:izadps:dp5802 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | Development banks : role and mechanisms to increase their efficiency RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:5729 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | Bank ownership and performance in the Middle East and North Africa region RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:5620 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | Minskyâs Financial Instability Hypothesis and the Leverage Cycle RePEc:fmg:fmgsps:sp202 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | Punishment â and Beyond RePEc:wyz:journl:id:212 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | Social norms and the indirect evolution of conditional cooperation RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:102:y:2011:i:3:p:237-262 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | The perception of small crime RePEc:eee:poleco:v:27:y:2011:i:4:p:749-763 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | Favor Trading in Public Good Provision RePEc:wil:wileco:2010-21 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | Herbert Simonââ¬â¢s spell on judgment and decision making RePEc:jdm:journl:v:6:y:2011:i:8:p:722-732 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | Applying the decision moving window to risky choice: Comparison of eye-tracking and mousetracing methods RePEc:jdm:journl:v:6:y:2011:i:8:p:740-749 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | Incomplete contracts and excludable public goods RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:95:y:2011:i:7:p:553-569 | [Citation Analysis] |