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1999 | The Quality of Government. RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:15:y:1999:i:1:p:222-79 [Citation Analysis] | 817 |
1991 | Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design. RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:7:y:1991:i:0:p:24-52 [Citation Analysis] | 215 |
1986 | Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations. RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:2:y:1986:i:2:p:181-214 [Citation Analysis] | 181 |
1987 | Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control. RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:3:y:1987:i:2:p:243-77 [Citation Analysis] | 128 |
1992 | The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform. RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:8:y:1992:i:3:p:523-46 [Citation Analysis] | 115 |
1995 | Empirical Research in Transaction Cost Economics: A Review and Assessment. RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:11:y:1995:i:2:p:335-61 [Citation Analysis] | 95 |
1985 | Corporate Governance and the Board of Directors: Performance Effects of Changes in Board Composition. RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:1:y:1985:i:1:p:101-24 [Citation Analysis] | 93 |
2002 | Courts and Relational Contracts RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:18:y:2002:i:1:p:221-277 [Citation Analysis] | 93 |
1997 | Appropriability Hazards and Governance in Strategic Alliances: A Transaction Cost Approach. RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:13:y:1997:i:2:p:387-409 [Citation Analysis] | 88 |
1994 | The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation. RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:10:y:1994:i:2:p:201-46 [Citation Analysis] | 85 |
1988 | The Theory of the Firm Revisited. RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:4:y:1988:i:1:p:141-61 [Citation Analysis] | 75 |
1996 | The Costs and Benefits of Privatization: An Incomplete Contracts Approach. RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:12:y:1996:i:1:p:1-24 [Citation Analysis] | 72 |
1994 | The Effects of Mergers in Differentiated Products Industries: Logit Demand and Merger Policy. RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:10:y:1994:i:2:p:407-26 [Citation Analysis] | 70 |
1986 | Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards. RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:2:y:1986:i:2:p:279-303 [Citation Analysis] | 68 |
1999 | The Firm as a Subeconomy. RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:15:y:1999:i:1:p:74-102 [Citation Analysis] | 67 |
1991 | Privatization and Incentives. RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:7:y:1991:i:0:p:84-105 [Citation Analysis] | 65 |
2000 | The Institutional Environment for Multinational Investment. RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:16:y:2000:i:2:p:334-64 [Citation Analysis] | 64 |
1991 | The Costs of Organization. RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:7:y:1991:i:1:p:1-25 [Citation Analysis] | 59 |
1989 | Using Equity Participation to Support Exchange: Evidence from the Biotechnology Industry. RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:5:y:1989:i:1:p:109-26 [Citation Analysis] | 58 |
2006 | Does Corporate Governance Predict Firms Market Values? Evidence from Korea RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:22:y:2006:i:2:p:366-413 [Citation Analysis] | 58 |
2003 | Sabotage in Promotion Tournaments RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:19:y:2003:i:1:p:119-140 [Citation Analysis] | 58 |
1995 | Path Dependence, Lock-in, and History. RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:11:y:1995:i:1:p:205-26 [Citation Analysis] | 57 |
1990 | Legal Restrictions on Private Contracts Can Enhance Efficiency. RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:6:y:1990:i:2:p:381-409 [Citation Analysis] | 52 |
1999 | Informal Authority in Organizations. RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:15:y:1999:i:1:p:56-73 [Citation Analysis] | 52 |
1988 | Asset Specificity and the Structure of Vertical Relationships: Empirical Evidence. RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:4:y:1988:i:1:p:95-117 [Citation Analysis] | 51 |
1994 | Top Executives, Turnover, and Firm Performance in Germany. RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:10:y:1994:i:1:p:142-59 [Citation Analysis] | 51 |
1986 | The Tax Compliance Game: Toward an Interactive Theory of Law Enforcement. RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:2:y:1986:i:1:p:1-32 [Citation Analysis] | 48 |
2002 | An Experimental Bribery Game RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:18:y:2002:i:2:p:428-454 [Citation Analysis] | 48 |
1996 | The Determinants and Impact of Property Rights: Land Titles on the Brazilian Frontier. RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:12:y:1996:i:1:p:25-61 [Citation Analysis] | 47 |
1992 | Cooperation in Hierarchical Organizations: An Incentive Perspective. RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:8:y:1992:i:2:p:321-45 [Citation Analysis] | 47 |
1988 | The Multinational Corporations Degree of Control over Foreign Subsidiaries: An Empirical Test of a Transaction Cost Explanation. RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:4:y:1988:i:2:p:305-36 [Citation Analysis] | 46 |
1991 | Transfer Pricing and Organizational Form. RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:7:y:1991:i:2:p:201-28 [Citation Analysis] | 45 |
1999 | Dispute Prevention without Courts in Vietnam. RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:15:y:1999:i:3:p:637-58 [Citation Analysis] | 43 |
2003 | The Institutional Foundations of Public Policy: A Transactions Approach with Application to Argentina RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:19:y:2003:i:2:p:281-306 [Citation Analysis] | 42 |
1993 | Judicial Modification of Contracts between Sophisticated Parties: A More Complete View of Incomplete Contracts and Their Breach. RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:9:y:1993:i:2:p:230-55 [Citation Analysis] | 40 |
1999 | Public and Private Bureaucracies: A Transaction Cost Economics Perspective. RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:15:y:1999:i:1:p:306-42 [Citation Analysis] | 38 |
1990 | Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story. RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:6:y:1990:i:0:p:213-53 [Citation Analysis] | 37 |
1988 | Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm. RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:4:y:1988:i:1:p:119-39 [Citation Analysis] | 37 |
1995 | The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development. RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:11:y:1995:i:1:p:1-31 [Citation Analysis] | 36 |
1995 | Start-ups, Spin-offs, and Internal Projects. RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:11:y:1995:i:2:p:362-78 [Citation Analysis] | 36 |
2006 | Marriage Markets and Divorce Laws RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:22:y:2006:i:1:p:30-69 [Citation Analysis] | 35 |
2000 | On the Economics of Trials: Adversarial Process, Evidence, and Equilibrium Bias. RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:16:y:2000:i:2:p:365-94 [Citation Analysis] | 35 |
1999 | Optimal Soft or Tough Bankruptcy Procedures. RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:15:y:1999:i:3:p:659-84 [Citation Analysis] | 34 |
2000 | Contract Renegotiation and Options in Agency Problems. RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:16:y:2000:i:2:p:395-423 [Citation Analysis] | 34 |
1996 | Constitutional Limitations on Borrowing: An Analysis of State Bonded Indebtedness. RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:12:y:1996:i:1:p:62-97 [Citation Analysis] | 34 |
2000 | A Theory of Legal Presumptions. RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:16:y:2000:i:1:p:1-49 [Citation Analysis] | 33 |
1985 | Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle. RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:1:y:1985:i:2:p:225-83 [Citation Analysis] | 32 |
1992 | Dual Distribution and Royalty Fees in Franchising. RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:8:y:1992:i:3:p:471-501 [Citation Analysis] | 32 |
1993 | Contested Mergers and Equilibrium Antitrust Policy. RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:9:y:1993:i:1:p:1-29 [Citation Analysis] | 32 |
1988 | A Legal Basis for the Firm. RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:4:y:1988:i:1:p:181-98 [Citation Analysis] | 32 |
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2011 | Contracts as Threats: on a Rationale For Rewarding A while Hoping For B RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8195 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | Litigation and Settlement under Judicial Agency RePEc:koc:wpaper:1121 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | Refusal to Deal, Intellectual Property Rights, and Antitrust RePEc:pra:mprapa:31974 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | Remanufacturing RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:62:y:2011:i:3:p:337-351 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | Competition and Post-Transplant Outcomes in Cadaveric Liver Transplantation under the MELD Scoring System RePEc:hit:cisdps:522 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | Competition and Post-Transplant Outcomes in Cadaveric Liver
Transplantation under the MELD Scoring System RePEc:cca:wpaper:213 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | On the Political Economics of Tax Reforms RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3538 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | Would you civil union me? RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00628642 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | Intertemporal movie distribution: Versioning when customers can buy both versions RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8279 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | Monitoring and Enforcement of Climate Policy RePEc:nbr:nberch:12140 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | Entry deterrence through cooperative R&D over-investment RePEc:zbw:dicedp:38 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | (Un)bundling infrastructure procurement: Evidence from water supply and sewage projects RePEc:eee:juipol:v:19:y:2011:i:2:p:104-114 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | Testing capital and trade openness complementarity in presence of financial frictions RePEc:hal:journl:dumas-00643733 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | Incentives and Adaptation: Evidence from Highway Procurement in Minnesota RePEc:nbr:nberwo:17647 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | Incomplete Contracts and Industrial Organization: A Survey RePEc:bos:wpaper:wp2011-036 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | Auctions vs Negotiations in Public Procurement: Which Works Better? RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8538 | [Citation Analysis] |
2011 | Job Design and Incentives RePEc:edj:ceauch:279 | [Citation Analysis] |