Most cited documents in this series:

Year	Title	Cited
2006	Competition over agents with boundedly rational expectations RePEc:the:publsh:144 [Citation Analysis]	31
2006	Hierarchies of belief and interim rationalizability RePEc:the:publsh:163 [Citation Analysis]	25
2007	Interim correlated rationalizability RePEc:the:publsh:140 [Citation Analysis]	23
2007	Can intergenerational equity be operationalized? RePEc:the:publsh:309 [Citation Analysis]	17
2006	A theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets RePEc:the:publsh:139 [Citation Analysis]	16
2007	Secure implementation RePEc:the:publsh:229 [Citation Analysis]	16
2007	Noisy talk RePEc:the:publsh:263 [Citation Analysis]	16
2006	Topologies on types RePEc:the:publsh:141 [Citation Analysis]	15
2006	Optimal auctions with ambiguity RePEc:the:publsh:203 [Citation Analysis]	14
2006	Group formation and voter participation RePEc:the:publsh:266 [Citation Analysis]	14
2006	Regret testing: learning to play Nash equilibrium without knowing you have an opponent RePEc:the:publsh:199 [Citation Analysis]	12
2007	Updating preferences with multiple priors RePEc:the:publsh:215 [Citation Analysis]	12
2006	A model of choice from lists RePEc:the:publsh:164 [Citation Analysis]	11
2006	Financial equilibrium with career concerns RePEc:the:publsh:165 [Citation Analysis]	10
2007	Coarse contingencies and ambiguity RePEc:the:publsh:223 [Citation Analysis]	10
2006	Information, evolution and utility RePEc:the:publsh:166 [Citation Analysis]	10
2008	Monotone methods for equilibrium selection under perfect foresight dynamics RePEc:the:publsh:194 [Citation Analysis]	9
2006	A study in the pragmatics of persuasion: a game theoretical approach RePEc:the:publsh:211 [Citation Analysis]	9
2008	Consumer optimism and price discrimination RePEc:the:publsh:326 [Citation Analysis]	8
2008	Contagion through learning RePEc:the:publsh:416 [Citation Analysis]	8
2006	Competitive markets with externalities RePEc:the:publsh:168 [Citation Analysis]	8
2009	Strategy-proofness and single-crossing RePEc:the:publsh:399 [Citation Analysis]	8
2006	Sufficient conditions for stable equilibria RePEc:the:publsh:159 [Citation Analysis]	8
2008	Many inspections are manipulable RePEc:the:publsh:398 [Citation Analysis]	8
2008	Multi-sender cheap talk with restricted state spaces RePEc:the:publsh:334 [Citation Analysis]	8
2008	Caller Number Five and related timing games RePEc:the:publsh:375 [Citation Analysis]	7
2009	Robust virtual implementation RePEc:the:publsh:453 [Citation Analysis]	6
2010	Common agency and public good provision under asymmetric information RePEc:the:publsh:507 [Citation Analysis]	6
2007	Complementarities in information acquisition with short-term trades RePEc:the:publsh:294 [Citation Analysis]	6
2012	Implementation with evidence RePEc:the:publsh:723 [Citation Analysis]	6
2007	A non-differentiable approach to revenue equivalence RePEc:the:publsh:277 [Citation Analysis]	6
2006	Coordination failure in repeated games with almost-public monitoring RePEc:the:publsh:167 [Citation Analysis]	6
2008	Price dispersion and loss leaders RePEc:the:publsh:362 [Citation Analysis]	5
2011	Dynamic choice under ambiguity RePEc:the:publsh:571 [Citation Analysis]	5
2011	Intertemporal substitution and recursive smooth ambiguity preferences RePEc:the:publsh:843 [Citation Analysis]	5
2007	Party platforms in electoral competition with heterogeneous constituencies RePEc:the:publsh:176 [Citation Analysis]	4
2009	Asymptotic ordinal inefficiency of random serial dictatorship RePEc:the:publsh:442 [Citation Analysis]	4
2008	Nonlinear pricing, market coverage, and competition RePEc:the:publsh:336 [Citation Analysis]	4
2008	Subjective expected utility in games RePEc:the:publsh:302 [Citation Analysis]	4
2006	Endogenous incomplete markets, enforcement constraints, and intermediation RePEc:the:publsh:204 [Citation Analysis]	4
2006	Ex post implementation in environments with private goods RePEc:the:publsh:182 [Citation Analysis]	4
2010	Rationalizable voting RePEc:the:publsh:425 [Citation Analysis]	4
2012	Designing stable mechanisms for economic environments RePEc:the:publsh:898 [Citation Analysis]	3
2011	Search, choice, and revealed preference RePEc:the:publsh:592 [Citation Analysis]	3
2011	Contributing or free-riding? Voluntary participation in a public good economy RePEc:the:publsh:567 [Citation Analysis]	3
2010	Supermodular mechanism design RePEc:the:publsh:604 [Citation Analysis]	3
2011	Robustness to incomplete information in repeated games RePEc:the:publsh:795 [Citation Analysis]	3
2009	Choice deferral and ambiguity aversion RePEc:the:publsh:498 [Citation Analysis]	3
2012	A partial folk theorem for games with private learning RePEc:the:publsh:913 [Citation Analysis]	3
2011	Survival of dominated strategies under evolutionary dynamics RePEc:the:publsh:771 [Citation Analysis]	3

Citing documents used to compute impact factor 15:

Year	Title	See
2011	Vote Revelation: Empirical Characterization of Scoring Rules RePEc:cie:wpaper:1102	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Foundations of spatial preferences RePEc:eee:mateco:v:47:y:2011:i:2:p:200-205	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Robustness of equilibria in anonymous local games RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:146:y:2011:i:1:p:300-325	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Asset Pricing under Rational Learning about Rare Disasters RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:8514	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Should the Flatterers be Avoided? RePEc:red:sed011:1273	[Citation Analysis]
2011	High profit equilibria in directed search models RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:71:y:2011:i:1:p:224-234	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Common Agency with Informed Principals: Menus and Signals RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1541	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Aggregate Representations of Aggregate Games RePEc:pra:mprapa:32871	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Public Good Provision with Convex Costs RePEc:pra:mprapa:36984	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Ambiguity and Robust Statistics RePEc:igi:igierp:382	[Citation Analysis]
2011	On the multi-utility representation of preference relations RePEc:eee:mateco:v:47:y:2011:i:4:p:554-563	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Matching Through Position Auctions RePEc:nod:wpaper:001	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Efficiency under a combination of ordinal and cardinal information on preferences RePEc:eee:mateco:v:47:y:2011:i:2:p:180-185	[Citation Analysis]
2011	Robust implementation in general mechanisms RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:71:y:2011:i:2:p:261-281	[Citation Analysis]
2011	A robustness result for rationalizable implementation RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:72:y:2011:i:1:p:301-305	[Citation Analysis]

Cites in year: CiY