CitEc
[home]     [Citation data for:  series | authors | papers]      [Maintainers]      [Submit references]      [warning | faq | about]
  Updated February, 5 2013 465.484 documents processed, 11.198.332 references and 4.512.497 citations

 

  
 

International Game Theory Review (IGTR) / World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.

Raw citation data, Main indicators, Most cited papers , cites used to compute the impact factor (2011), Recent citations and documents published in this series in EconPapers.

Create citation feed for this series

Missing citations? Add them with our user input service
Incorrect content? Let us know

Raw data:
IF AIF DOC CIT D2Y C2Y SC(%) CiY II AII
19900.080000.04
19910.080000.04
19920.080000.04
19930.090000.05
19940.10000.05
19950.190000.07
19960.230000.1
19970.290000.1
19980.290000.11
19990.340000.15
20000.430000.17
20010.450000.17
20020.460000.21
20030.480000.21
20040.550000.23
20050.573338000.24
20060.54462333010.020.22
20070.10.484746798030.060.19
20080.120.535199311010.030.22
20090.170.513511821400.21
20100.060.4631770400.17
20110.080.64315665030.10.26
 
 
IF: Impact Factor: C2Y / D2Y
AIF: Average Impact Factor for series in RePEc in year y
DOC: Number of documents published in year y
CIT: Number of citations to the series in year y
D2Y: Number of articles published in y-1 plus y-2
C2Y: Cites in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2
SC(%): Percentage of selft citations in y to articles published in y-1 plus y-2
CiY: Cites in year y to documents published in year y
II: Immediacy Index: CiY / Documents.
AII: Average Immediacy Index for series in RePEc in year y

 

Main indicators

Most cited documents in this series:
YearTitleCited
2005AN AXIOM SYSTEM FOR A VALUE FOR GAMES IN PARTITION FUNCTION FORM
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:07:y:2005:i:01:p:63-72 [Citation Analysis]		13
2007THE SHAPLEY VALUE FOR PARTITION FUNCTION FORM GAMES
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:09:y:2007:i:02:p:353-360 [Citation Analysis]		13
2007MEASURING THE POWER OF PARTIES WITHIN GOVERNMENT COALITIONS
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:09:y:2007:i:02:p:307-322 [Citation Analysis]		6
2009A TWO-STEP SHAPLEY VALUE FOR COOPERATIVE GAMES WITH COALITION STRUCTURES
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:11:y:2009:i:02:p:207-214 [Citation Analysis]		6
2005CORE CONCEPTS FOR DYNAMIC TU GAMES
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:07:y:2005:i:01:p:43-61 [Citation Analysis]		6
2010ENVIRONMENTAL INNOVATION, WAR OF ATTRITION AND INVESTMENT GRANTS
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:12:y:2010:i:01:p:37-59 [Citation Analysis]		5
2005HELPING AND SABOTAGING IN TOURNAMENTS
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:07:y:2005:i:02:p:211-228 [Citation Analysis]		5
2008COMPUTING ALTERNATING OFFERS AND WATER PRICES IN BILATERAL RIVER BASIN MANAGEMENT
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:10:y:2008:i:03:p:257-278 [Citation Analysis]		4
2006GLOBAL BIFURCATIONS IN DUOPOLY WHEN THE COURNOT POINT IS DESTABILIZED VIA A SUBCRITICAL NEIMARK BIFURCATION
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:08:y:2006:i:01:p:1-20 [Citation Analysis]		4
2007BANKRUPTCY RULES AND COALITIONAL MANIPULATION
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:09:y:2007:i:01:p:105-118 [Citation Analysis]		4
2008DETERMINISTIC DIFFERENTIAL GAMES UNDER PROBABILITY KNOWLEDGE OF INITIAL CONDITION
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:10:y:2008:i:01:p:1-16 [Citation Analysis]		4
2006COALITION FORMATION IN GAMES WITHOUT SYNERGIES
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:08:y:2006:i:01:p:111-126 [Citation Analysis]		3
2008FRIENDLINESS AND RECIPROCITY IN EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:10:y:2008:i:01:p:53-72 [Citation Analysis]		3
2005SUSTAINABILITY OF COOPERATION OVERTIME IN LINEAR-QUADRATIC DIFFERENTIAL GAMES
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:07:y:2005:i:04:p:395-406 [Citation Analysis]		3
2007ANTI-COORDINATION GAMES AND DYNAMIC STABILITY
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:09:y:2007:i:04:p:667-688 [Citation Analysis]		3
2011ALLOCATION OF FIXED COSTS: CHARACTERIZATION OF THE (DUAL) WEIGHTED SHAPLEY VALUE
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:13:y:2011:i:02:p:141-157 [Citation Analysis]		3
2006PROPORTIONALITY AND NON-MANIPULABILITY IN BANKRUPTCY PROBLEMS
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:08:y:2006:i:01:p:127-139 [Citation Analysis]		3
2008ORDINAL GAMES
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:10:y:2008:i:02:p:177-194 [Citation Analysis]		3
2007THE E-MAIL GAME REVISITED — MODELING ROUGH INDUCTIVE REASONING
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:09:y:2007:i:02:p:323-339 [Citation Analysis]		3
2007TRANSFORMING GAMES FROM CHARACTERISTIC INTO NORMAL FORM
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:09:y:2007:i:01:p:87-104 [Citation Analysis]		3
2007THE IMPACT OF ADVERTISING IN A DUOPOLY GAME
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:09:y:2007:i:04:p:565-581 [Citation Analysis]		2
2006RATIONALIZATION IN SIGNALING GAMES: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:08:y:2006:i:01:p:67-93 [Citation Analysis]		2
2007EGALITARIAN DISTRIBUTIONS IN COALITIONAL MODELS
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:09:y:2007:i:01:p:47-57 [Citation Analysis]		2
2007THE CONSENSUS VALUE FOR GAMES IN PARTITION FUNCTION FORM
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:09:y:2007:i:03:p:437-452 [Citation Analysis]		2
2006HERDING WITH COSTLY INFORMATION
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:08:y:2006:i:01:p:21-31 [Citation Analysis]		2
2009UNIQUENESS IN RANDOM-PROPOSER MULTILATERAL BARGAINING
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:11:y:2009:i:04:p:407-417 [Citation Analysis]		2
2005LINK MONOTONIC ALLOCATION SCHEMES
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:07:y:2005:i:04:p:473-489 [Citation Analysis]		2
2006THE DISCRETIZATION OF CONTINUUM STRATEGY SPACES
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:08:y:2006:i:03:p:499-514 [Citation Analysis]		2
2007EFFECTIVENESS OF COOP ADVERTISING PROGRAMS IN COMPETITIVE DISTRIBUTION CHANNELS
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:09:y:2007:i:02:p:151-167 [Citation Analysis]		2
2005CONVEXITY IN STOCHASTIC COOPERATIVE SITUATIONS
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:07:y:2005:i:01:p:25-42 [Citation Analysis]		2
2007NETWORK FORMATION UNDER HETEROGENEOUS COSTS: THE MULTIPLE GROUP MODEL
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:09:y:2007:i:04:p:599-635 [Citation Analysis]		2
2005DYNAMIC ONLINE AND OFFLINE CHANNEL PRICING FOR HETEROGENEOUS CUSTOMERS IN VIRTUAL ACCEPTANCE
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:07:y:2005:i:02:p:137-150 [Citation Analysis]		2
2008MULTISTAGE COMMUNICATION WITH AND WITHOUT VERIFIABLE TYPES
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:10:y:2008:i:02:p:145-164 [Citation Analysis]		1
2006COALITION FORMATION GAMES: A SURVEY
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:08:y:2006:i:04:p:613-641 [Citation Analysis]		1
2009TRASH IT OR SELL IT? A STRATEGIC ANALYSIS OF THE MARKET INTRODUCTION OF PRODUCT INNOVATIONS
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:11:y:2009:i:03:p:321-345 [Citation Analysis]		1
2005A NOTE ON REPEATED GAMES WITH VANISHING ACTIONS
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:07:y:2005:i:01:p:107-115 [Citation Analysis]		1
2005POTENTIAL MAXIMIZATION AND COALITION GOVERNMENT FORMATION
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:07:y:2005:i:04:p:407-429 [Citation Analysis]		1
2010A MATRIX APPROACH TO THE ASSOCIATED CONSISTENCY WITH AN APPLICATION TO THE SHAPLEY VALUE
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:12:y:2010:i:02:p:175-187 [Citation Analysis]		1
2005DEADLINE EFFECTS IN SEQUENTIAL BARGAINING — AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:07:y:2005:i:02:p:117-135 [Citation Analysis]		1
2006BIDDER WELFARE IN AN AUCTION WITH A BUYOUT OPTION
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:08:y:2006:i:04:p:595-612 [Citation Analysis]		1
2007ON BARGAINING SETS IN SYMMETRIC GAMES
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:09:y:2007:i:02:p:199-213 [Citation Analysis]		1
2011ON THE COMPLETE INFORMATION FIRST-PRICE AUCTION AND ITS INTUITIVE SOLUTION
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:13:y:2011:i:03:p:353-361 [Citation Analysis]		1
2007WAGE NEGOTIATION UNDER GOOD FAITH BARGAINING
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:09:y:2007:i:03:p:551-564 [Citation Analysis]		1
2008CONFLICT AND COOPERATION IN SYMMETRIC POTENTIAL GAMES
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:10:y:2008:i:03:p:245-256 [Citation Analysis]		1
2005SOLUTION UNIQUENESS IN A CLASS OF CURRENCY CRISIS GAMES
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:07:y:2005:i:04:p:531-543 [Citation Analysis]		1
2006AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF FINANCIAL SUPPORT AFTER DIVORCE
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:08:y:2006:i:04:p:561-579 [Citation Analysis]		1
2009SPATIAL OLIGOPOLIES WITH COOPERATIVE DISTRIBUTION
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:11:y:2009:i:01:p:33-40 [Citation Analysis]		1
2007A REFINEMENT CONCEPT FOR EQUILIBRIA IN MULTICRITERIA GAMES VIA STABLE SCALARIZATIONS
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:09:y:2007:i:02:p:169-181 [Citation Analysis]		1
2011NASH NETWORKS WITH IMPERFECT RELIABILITY AND HETEROGEOUS PLAYERS
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:13:y:2011:i:02:p:181-194 [Citation Analysis]		1
2005EVOLUTION WITH ENDOGENOUS MUTATIONS
RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:07:y:2005:i:02:p:229-240 [Citation Analysis]		1

Citing documents used to compute impact factor 5:
YearTitleSee
2011Transferable utility games with uncertainty
RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:146:y:2011:i:5:p:2126-2139		[Citation Analysis]
2011Location game on disjoint line segments
RePEc:spr:jogath:v:40:y:2011:i:2:p:231-262		[Citation Analysis]
2011An Owen-Type Value for Games with Two-Level Communication Structures
RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20110089		[Citation Analysis]
2011Value of games with two-layered hypergraphs
RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:62:y:2011:i:2:p:114-119		[Citation Analysis]
2011Managing decentralized inventory and transshipment
RePEc:spr:topjnl:v:19:y:2011:i:2:p:480-506		[Citation Analysis]

Cites in year: CiY

Recent citations received in: 2011

YearTitleSee
2011Allocation of fixed costs: characterization of the (dual) weighted Shapley value.
RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2011-03		[Citation Analysis]
2011The EU legislation game: the case of asylum law.
RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2011-16		[Citation Analysis]
2011Fiscal disciplining effect of central bank opacity: Stackelberg versus Nash equilibrium.
RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2011-17		[Citation Analysis]

Recent citations received in: 2010

YearTitleSee

Recent citations received in: 2009

YearTitleSee

Recent citations received in: 2008

YearTitleSee
2008Structural Estimation and Solution of International Trade Models with Heterogeneous Firms
RePEc:eth:wpswif:08-89		[Citation Analysis]

Warning!! This is still an experimental service. The results of this service should be interpreted with care, especially in research assessment exercises. The processing of documents is automatic. There still are errors and omissions in the identification of references. We are working to improve the software to increase the accuracy of the results.

Source data used to compute the impact factor of RePEc series.
Hosted by Valencian Economic Research Institute ©2013 Jose Manuel Barrueco | mail: barrueco@uv.es