3
H index
1
i10 index
54
Citations
Jean Lainé : Citation Profile
Conservatoire National des Arts et Métiers (CNAM) (90% share) | RESEARCH PRODUCTION: 24 Articles 18 Papers 1 Chapters RESEARCH ACTIVITY:
MORE DETAILS IN: ABOUT THIS REPORT:
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31 years (1991 - 2022). Relations with other researchers
Works with:
Authors registered in RePEc who have co-authored more than one work in the last five years with Jean Lainé. | Is cited by:
| Cites to:
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Main data
Where Jean Lainé has published?
| Working Papers Series with more than one paper published | # docs |
|---|---|
| Post-Print / HAL | 14 |
| Working Papers / Murat Sertel Center for Advanced Economic Studies, Istanbul Bilgi University | 3 |
Recent works citing Jean Lainé (2023 and 2022)
| Year | Title of citing document |
|---|---|
| 2022 | Core and top trading cycles in a market with indivisible goods and externalities. (2022). Park, Jaeok ; Hong, Miho. In: Journal of Mathematical Economics. RePEc:eee:mateco:v:100:y:2022:i:c:s0304406821001725. Full description at Econpapers || Download paper |
| 2022 | On the integration of ShapleyâScarf markets. (2022). Ortega, Josue ; Manocha, Kriti ; Kumar, Rajnish. In: Journal of Mathematical Economics. RePEc:eee:mateco:v:100:y:2022:i:c:s0304406822000027. Full description at Econpapers || Download paper |
| 2022 | An analytical and experimental comparison of maximal lottery schemes. (2022). Stricker, Christian ; Brandt, Felix ; Brandl, Florian. In: Social Choice and Welfare. RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:58:y:2022:i:1:d:10.1007_s00355-021-01326-x. Full description at Econpapers || Download paper |
| 2022 | Characterization of tie-breaking plurality rules. (2022). Saitoh, Hiroki . In: Social Choice and Welfare. RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:59:y:2022:i:1:d:10.1007_s00355-021-01382-3. Full description at Econpapers || Download paper |
Works by Jean Lainé:
| Year | Title | Type | Cited |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2001 | Forums de consommation sur Internet. Un modèle évolutionniste In: Revue économique. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 1 |
| 2001 | Forums de consommation sur Internet. Un modèle évolutionniste.(2001) In: Revue Ãconomique. [Full Text][Citation analysis] This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 1 | article | |
| 2017 | Manipulation of single-winner large elections by vote pairing In: Economics Letters. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 0 |
| 2017 | Manipulation of single-winner large elections by vote pairing.(2017) In: Post-Print. [Citation analysis] This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 0 | paper | |
| 1991 | Finitely optimal allocation in countably large-square exchange economies In: Economics Letters. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 0 |
| 1992 | On the Nash equilibrium property of an auction matching game In: Economics Letters. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 0 |
| 2011 | The Core of Shapley-Scarf markets with couples In: Journal of Mathematical Economics. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 3 |
| 2020 | Competitive equilibria in ShapleyâScarf markets with couples In: Journal of Mathematical Economics. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 2 |
| 2020 | Competitive equilibria in Shapley-Scarf markets with couples.(2020) In: Post-Print. [Full Text][Citation analysis] This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 2 | paper | |
| 2000 | Representation in majority tournaments In: Mathematical Social Sciences. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 7 |
| 2006 | Single-switch preferences and the Ostrogorski paradox In: Mathematical Social Sciences. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 6 |
| 2006 | Single-switch preferences and the Ostrogorski paradox.(2006) In: Post-Print. [Citation analysis] This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 6 | paper | |
| 2015 | Hyper-stable collective rankings In: Mathematical Social Sciences. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 0 |
| 2015 | Hyper-stable collective rankings.(2015) In: Post-Print. [Citation analysis] This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 0 | paper | |
| 1993 | On Nash implementation of Walrasian equilibria in a market for pure indivisibles without money In: Ricerche Economiche. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 0 |
| 2016 | Hyper-stable social welfare functions In: Post-Print. [Citation analysis] | paper | 3 |
| 2014 | Hyper-Stable Social Welfare Functions.(2014) In: Working Papers. [Full Text][Citation analysis] This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 3 | paper | |
| 2016 | Hyper-stable social welfare functions.(2016) In: Social Choice and Welfare. [Full Text][Citation analysis] This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 3 | article | |
| 2017 | The strong referendum paradox In: Post-Print. [Citation analysis] | paper | 0 |
| 2017 | The strong referendum paradox.(2017) In: Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology. [Full Text][Citation analysis] This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 0 | article | |
| 2019 | Choosing a Committee Under Majority Voting In: Post-Print. [Citation analysis] | paper | 0 |
| 2020 | Metrizable preferences over preferences In: Post-Print. [Citation analysis] | paper | 0 |
| 2020 | Metrizable preferences over preferences.(2020) In: Social Choice and Welfare. [Full Text][Citation analysis] This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 0 | article | |
| 2015 | Vote Swapping in Representative Democracy In: Post-Print. [Citation analysis] | paper | 0 |
| 2021 | When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees? In: Post-Print. [Citation analysis] | paper | 0 |
| 2022 | When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees?.(2022) In: Review of Economic Design. [Full Text][Citation analysis] This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 0 | article | |
| 2021 | Referendum Paradox for Party-List Proportional Representation In: Post-Print. [Citation analysis] | paper | 1 |
| 2021 | Referendum Paradox for Party-List Proportional Representation.(2021) In: Group Decision and Negotiation. [Full Text][Citation analysis] This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 1 | article | |
| 2022 | Compromise in combinatorial vote In: Post-Print. [Citation analysis] | paper | 0 |
| 2022 | Compromise in combinatorial vote.(2022) In: Social Choice and Welfare. [Full Text][Citation analysis] This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 0 | article | |
| 2021 | Correction to: When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees? In: Post-Print. [Citation analysis] | paper | 0 |
| 2023 | Vote swapping in irresolute two-tier voting procedures In: Post-Print. [Citation analysis] | paper | 0 |
| 2008 | The Budget-Voting Paradox In: Theory and Decision. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 2 |
| 2012 | Pareto efficiency in multiple referendum In: Theory and Decision. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 0 |
| 2013 | Unanimity and the Anscombeâs Paradox In: Working Papers. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 1 |
| 2013 | Unanimity and the Anscombeâs paradox.(2013) In: TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research. [Full Text][Citation analysis] This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 1 | article | |
| 2013 | Seperable Voting Rules and the Strong Referandum Paradox In: Working Papers. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 0 |
| 2013 | Triple-Consistent Social Choice and the Majority Rule In: Working Papers. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 0 |
| 2014 | Triple-consistent social choice and the majority rule.(2014) In: TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research. [Full Text][Citation analysis] This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 0 | article | |
| 2012 | Searching for a Compromise in Multiple Referendum In: Group Decision and Negotiation. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 0 |
| 1996 | Composition-consistent tournament solutions and social choice functions In: Social Choice and Welfare. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 26 |
| 2009 | Condorcet choice and the Ostrogorski paradox In: Social Choice and Welfare. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 2 |
| 2010 | Does Choosing Committees from Approval Balloting Fulfill the Electorateâs Will? In: Studies in Choice and Welfare. [Citation analysis] | chapter | 0 |
CitEc is a RePEc service, providing citation data for Economics since 2001. Sponsored by INOMICS. Last updated July, 3 2023. Contact: CitEc Team