3
H index
3
i10 index
44
Citations
Kyoto University | 3 H index 3 i10 index 44 Citations RESEARCH PRODUCTION: 4 Articles 8 Papers RESEARCH ACTIVITY:
MORE DETAILS IN: ABOUT THIS REPORT:
|
Works with: Authors registered in RePEc who have co-authored more than one work in the last five years with Tomoya Kazumura. | Is cited by: | Cites to: |
Working Papers Series with more than one paper published | # docs |
---|---|
ISER Discussion Paper / Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka | 5 |
Discussion Papers / Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi | 2 |
Year ![]() | Title of citing document ![]() |
---|---|
2025 | Efficiency in Multiple-Type Housing Markets. (2023). Feng, DI. In: Papers. RePEc:arx:papers:2308.14989. Full description at Econpapers || Download paper |
2024 | Multidimensional screening after 37 years. (2024). Rochet, Jean. In: Journal of Mathematical Economics. RePEc:eee:mateco:v:113:y:2024:i:c:s0304406824000715. Full description at Econpapers || Download paper |
2024 | Monotonic transformation of preferences and Walrasian equilibrium in allocation problems. (2024). Robles, Francisco ; Nauaez, Marina. In: UB School of Economics Working Papers. RePEc:ewp:wpaper:478web. Full description at Econpapers || Download paper |
Year ![]() | Title ![]() | Type ![]() | Cited ![]() |
---|---|---|---|
2017 | Strategy-proof multi-object auction design: Ex-post revenue maximization with no wastage In: Discussion Papers. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 2 |
2017 | Mechanism design without quasilinearity In: Discussion Papers. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 13 |
2017 | Mechanism design without quasilinearity.(2017) In: ISER Discussion Paper. [Full Text][Citation analysis] This paper has nother version. Agregated cites: 13 | paper | |
2020 | Mechanism design without quasilinearity.(2020) In: Theoretical Economics. [Full Text][Citation analysis] This paper has nother version. Agregated cites: 13 | article | |
2015 | Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi demand preferences In: ISER Discussion Paper. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 13 |
2016 | Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi-demand preferences.(2016) In: Social Choice and Welfare. [Full Text][Citation analysis] This paper has nother version. Agregated cites: 13 | article | |
2016 | Non-manipulability of Walrasian mechanisms in economies with a large number of objects In: ISER Discussion Paper. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 0 |
2020 | Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: Ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences In: ISER Discussion Paper. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 12 |
2020 | Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: Ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences.(2020) In: Journal of Economic Theory. [Full Text][Citation analysis] This paper has nother version. Agregated cites: 12 | article | |
2022 | Multi-unit Object Allocation Problems with Money for (Non)Decreasing Incremental Valuations: Impossibility and Characterization Theorems In: ISER Discussion Paper. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 2 |
2019 | Non-manipulability of uniform price auctions with a large number of objects In: International Journal of Game Theory. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 0 |
2017 | Strategy-proof multi-object allocation: Ex-post revenue maximization with no wastage In: Working Papers. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 2 |
CitEc is a RePEc service, providing citation data for Economics since 2001. Last updated April, 14 2025. Contact: CitEc Team