5
H index
3
i10 index
73
Citations
| 5 H index 3 i10 index 73 Citations RESEARCH PRODUCTION: 11 Articles 14 Papers RESEARCH ACTIVITY: 23 years (1994 - 2017). See details. MORE DETAILS IN: ABOUT THIS REPORT: Permalink: http://citec.repec.org/pmi193 |
Works with: Authors registered in RePEc who have co-authored more than one work in the last five years with H. Reiju Mihara. | Is cited by: | Cites to: |
Journals with more than one article published | # docs |
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Social Choice and Welfare | 4 |
Journal of Mathematical Economics | 3 |
Working Papers Series with more than one paper published | # docs |
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MPRA Paper / University Library of Munich, Germany | 6 |
Public Economics / University Library of Munich, Germany | 6 |
Year | Title of citing document |
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2023 | Axioms for Defeat in Democratic Elections. (2020). Pacuit, Eric ; Holliday, Wesley H. In: Papers. RePEc:arx:papers:2008.08451. Full description at Econpapers || Download paper |
2024 | An Axiomatic Characterization of Split Cycle. (2022). Pacuit, Eric ; Holliday, Wesley H ; Ding, Yifeng. In: Papers. RePEc:arx:papers:2210.12503. Full description at Econpapers || Download paper |
2024 | The reciprocity set. (2024). Pongou, Roland ; Tondji, Jean-Baptiste. In: Journal of Mathematical Economics. RePEc:eee:mateco:v:112:y:2024:i:c:s0304406824000429. Full description at Econpapers || Download paper |
2023 | The precedence function: a numerical evaluation method for multicriteria ranking problems. (2023). Villar, Antonio. In: Economic Theory Bulletin. RePEc:spr:etbull:v:11:y:2023:i:2:d:10.1007_s40505-023-00249-3. Full description at Econpapers || Download paper |
Year | Title | Type | Cited |
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2012 | THE SECOND-PRICE AUCTION SOLVES KING SOLOMONS DILEMMA In: The Japanese Economic Review. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 4 |
2008 | The second-price auction solves King Solomons dilemma.(2008) In: MPRA Paper. [Full Text][Citation analysis] This paper has nother version. Agregated cites: 4 | paper | |
2011 | Preference aggregation theory without acyclicity: The core without majority dissatisfaction In: Games and Economic Behavior. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 2 |
2008 | Preference aggregation theory without acyclicity: The core without majority dissatisfaction.(2008) In: MPRA Paper. [Full Text][Citation analysis] This paper has nother version. Agregated cites: 2 | paper | |
1999 | Arrows theorem, countably many agents, and more visible invisible dictators1 In: Journal of Mathematical Economics. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 5 |
2008 | Computability of simple games: A characterization and application to the core In: Journal of Mathematical Economics. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 3 |
2006 | Computability of simple games: A characterization and application to the core.(2006) In: MPRA Paper. [Full Text][Citation analysis] This paper has nother version. Agregated cites: 3 | paper | |
2011 | Computability of simple games: A complete investigation of the sixty-four possibilities In: Journal of Mathematical Economics. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 1 |
2006 | Computability of simple games: A complete investigation of the sixty-four possibilities.(2006) In: MPRA Paper. [Full Text][Citation analysis] This paper has nother version. Agregated cites: 1 | paper | |
2004 | Nonanonymity and sensitivity of computable simple games In: Mathematical Social Sciences. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 1 |
2004 | Nonanonymity and sensitivity of computable simple games.(2004) In: Game Theory and Information. [Full Text][Citation analysis] This paper has nother version. Agregated cites: 1 | paper | |
1994 | Arrows Theorem and Turing Computability. In: Minnesota - Center for Economic Research. [Citation analysis] | paper | 12 |
1997 | Arrows Theorem and Turing computability.(1997) In: Economic Theory. [Full Text][Citation analysis] This paper has nother version. Agregated cites: 12 | article | |
1994 | Arrows Theorem and Turing Computability.(1994) In: Public Economics. [Full Text][Citation analysis] This paper has nother version. Agregated cites: 12 | paper | |
2007 | The Nakamura numbers for computable simple games In: MPRA Paper. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 2 |
2008 | The Nakamura numbers for computable simple games.(2008) In: Social Choice and Welfare. [Full Text][Citation analysis] This paper has nother version. Agregated cites: 2 | article | |
2017 | Characterizing the Borda ranking rule for a fixed population In: MPRA Paper. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 7 |
1997 | Anonymity and neutrality in Arrows Theorem with restricted coalition algebras In: Social Choice and Welfare. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 13 |
1994 | Anonymity and Neutrality in Arrows Theorem with Restricted Coalition Algebras.(1994) In: Public Economics. [Full Text][Citation analysis] This paper has nother version. Agregated cites: 13 | paper | |
2000 | Coalitionally strategyproof functions depend only on the most-preferred alternatives In: Social Choice and Welfare. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 10 |
1996 | Coalitionally strategyproof functions depend only on the most-preferred alternatives.(1996) In: Public Economics. [Full Text][Citation analysis] This paper has nother version. Agregated cites: 10 | paper | |
2001 | Existence of a coalitionally strategyproof social choice function: A constructive proof In: Social Choice and Welfare. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 5 |
1996 | Existence of a Coalitionally Strategyproof Social Choice Function: A Constructive Proof.(1996) In: Public Economics. [Full Text][Citation analysis] This paper has nother version. Agregated cites: 5 | paper | |
1997 | Arrows Theorem, countably many agents, and more visible invisible dictators In: Public Economics. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 7 |
2004 | Arrows theorem, Weglorz models and the axiom of choice In: Public Economics. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 1 |
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