7
H index
6
i10 index
122
Citations
Sang-Chul Suh : Citation Profile
University of Windsor | RESEARCH PRODUCTION: 15 Articles 6 Papers RESEARCH ACTIVITY:
MORE DETAILS IN: ABOUT THIS REPORT:
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22 years (1994 - 2016). Relations with other researchers
Works with: Authors registered in RePEc who have co-authored more than one work in the last five years with Sang-Chul Suh. | Is cited by:
| Cites to:
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Main data
Where Sang-Chul Suh has published?
| Journals with more than one article published | # docs |
|---|---|
| Social Choice and Welfare | 4 |
| Journal of Mathematical Economics | 3 |
| Review of Economic Design | 2 |
| Economics Letters | 2 |
Recent works citing Sang-Chul Suh (2025 and 2024)
| Year | Title of citing document |
|---|---|
| 2025 | The Equal Share Proportional Solution for the River Sharing Problem. (2025). Wang, Yuntong ; Suh, Sang-Chul. In: Working Papers. RePEc:wis:wpaper:2504. Full description at Econpapers || Download paper |
Works by Sang-Chul Suh:
| Year | Title | Type | Cited |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2003 | Flexibility mechanisms and credit discounting In: Environment and Development Economics. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 1 |
| 2004 | Multi-Agent Bilateral Bargaining with Endogenous Protocol In: Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings. [Citation analysis] | paper | 3 |
| 2004 | Multi-Agent Bilateral Bargaining with Endogenous Protocol.(2004) In: Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings. [Full Text][Citation analysis] This paper has nother version. Agregated cites: 3 | paper | |
| 2003 | Multi-Agent Bilateral Bargaining with Endogenous Protocol.(2003) In: Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers. [Full Text][Citation analysis] This paper has nother version. Agregated cites: 3 | paper | |
| 1996 | A mechanism implementing the stable rule in marriage problems In: Economics Letters. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 25 |
| 2007 | Non-Manipulability vs. Individual Rationality in a permit sharing problem In: Economics Letters. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 3 |
| 1997 | Double Implementation by a Simple Game Form in the Commons Problem In: Journal of Economic Theory. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 11 |
| 1996 | An algorithm for checking strong Nash implementability In: Journal of Mathematical Economics. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 2 |
| 1996 | Implementation with coalition formation: A complete characterization In: Journal of Mathematical Economics. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 11 |
| 2006 | Multi-agent bilateral bargaining and the Nash bargaining solution In: Journal of Mathematical Economics. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 24 |
| 2003 | Multi-Agent Bilateral Bargaining and the Nash Bargaining Solution.(2003) In: Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers. [Full Text][Citation analysis] This paper has nother version. Agregated cites: 24 | paper | |
| 2001 | An algorithm for verifying double implementability in Nash and strong Nash equilibria In: Mathematical Social Sciences. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 2 |
| 2006 | The Eeckhout Condition and the Subgame Perfect Implementation of Stable Matching In: 2006 Meeting Papers. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 0 |
| 2009 | A multi-agent bilateral bargaining model with endogenous protocol In: Economic Theory. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 11 |
| 1994 | A mechanism implementing the proportional solution In: Review of Economic Design. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 1 |
| 2002 | Non-manipulable solutions in a permit sharing problem: Equivalence between non-manipulability and monotonicity In: Review of Economic Design. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 0 |
| 1997 | Double implementation in Nash and strong Nash equilibria In: Social Choice and Welfare. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 12 |
| 2000 | Strategy-proofness and efficiency in a simple production economy In: Social Choice and Welfare. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 3 |
| 2003 | Games implementing the stable rule of marriage problems in strong Nash equilibria In: Social Choice and Welfare. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 4 |
| 2008 | Subgame perfect implementation of stable matchings in marriage problems In: Social Choice and Welfare. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 9 |
| 2016 | The Failure of Climate Change Negotiations: Irrational Countries Exclude the Poor and the Future Generations In: Working Papers. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 0 |
CitEc is a RePEc service, providing citation data for Economics since 2001. Last updated December, 22 2025. Contact: CitEc Team