12
H index
15
i10 index
441
Citations
Osaka University | 12 H index 15 i10 index 441 Citations RESEARCH PRODUCTION: 25 Articles 33 Papers RESEARCH ACTIVITY:
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Works with: Authors registered in RePEc who have co-authored more than one work in the last five years with Shigehiro Serizawa. | Is cited by: | Cites to: |
Journals with more than one article published | # docs |
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Social Choice and Welfare | 7 |
Journal of Economic Theory | 6 |
Economic Theory | 5 |
Theoretical Economics | 2 |
Games and Economic Behavior | 2 |
Working Papers Series with more than one paper published | # docs |
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ISER Discussion Paper / Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University | 27 |
Discussion Papers / Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi | 2 |
Year | Title of citing document |
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2022 | Preference Restrictions for Simple and Strategy-Proof Rules: Local and Weakly Single-Peaked Domains. (2022). Bonifacio, AgustÃn ; Neme, Pablo ; Masso, Jordi. In: Working Papers. RePEc:aoz:wpaper:121. Full description at Econpapers || Download paper |
2023 | Strategyproofness-Exposing Mechanism Descriptions. (2022). Thomas, Clayton ; Heffetz, Ori ; Gonczarowski, Yannai A. In: Papers. RePEc:arx:papers:2209.13148. Full description at Econpapers || Download paper |
2023 | Strategy-proofness with single-peaked and single-dipped preferences. (2023). Vorsatz, Marc ; Gallo, Oihane ; Alcalde-Unzu, Jorge. In: Papers. RePEc:arx:papers:2303.05781. Full description at Econpapers || Download paper |
2023 | Decomposability and Strategy-proofness in Multidimensional Models. (2023). Zeng, Huaxia ; Chatterji, Shurojit. In: Papers. RePEc:arx:papers:2303.10889. Full description at Econpapers || Download paper |
2023 | Efficiency in Multiple-Type Housing Markets. (2023). Feng, DI. In: Papers. RePEc:arx:papers:2308.14989. Full description at Econpapers || Download paper |
2023 | Not obviously manipulable allotment rules. (2023). Bonifacio, Agustín ; Arribillaga, Pablo R. In: Papers. RePEc:arx:papers:2309.06546. Full description at Econpapers || Download paper |
2022 | Preference Restrictions for Simple and Strategy-Proof Rules: Local and Weakly Single-Peaked Domains. (2022). Neme, Pablo ; Masso, Jordi ; Bonifacio, Agustin G. In: Working Papers. RePEc:bge:wpaper:1324. Full description at Econpapers || Download paper |
2022 | A characterization of the Vickrey rule in slot allocation problems. (2022). Chun, Youngsub ; Serizawa, Shigehiro ; Zhou, YU. In: International Journal of Economic Theory. RePEc:bla:ijethy:v:18:y:2022:i:1:p:38-49. Full description at Econpapers || Download paper |
2022 | Multi-object Auction Design Beyond Quasi-linearity: Leading Examples. (2022). Serizawa, Shigehiro ; Zhou, YU. In: ISER Discussion Paper. RePEc:dpr:wpaper:1116r. Full description at Econpapers || Download paper |
2022 | A Characterization of the Minimum Price Walrasian Rule with Reserve Prices for an Arbitrary Number of Agents and Objects. (2022). Wakabayashi, Yuya ; Serizawa, Shigehiro ; Sakai, Ryosuke. In: ISER Discussion Paper. RePEc:dpr:wpaper:1161. Full description at Econpapers || Download paper |
2022 | Characterizing pairwise strategy-proof rules in object allocation problems with money. (2022). Shinozaki, Hiroki. In: ISER Discussion Paper. RePEc:dpr:wpaper:1187. Full description at Econpapers || Download paper |
2023 | Efficiency and strategy-proofness in multi-unit object allocation problems with non-quasi-linear preferences: A positive result. (2023). Shinozaki, Hiroki. In: Economics Letters. RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:223:y:2023:i:c:s0165176523000149. Full description at Econpapers || Download paper |
2023 | Equitable rent division on a soft budget. (2023). Velez, Rodrigo A. In: Games and Economic Behavior. RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:139:y:2023:i:c:p:1-14. Full description at Econpapers || Download paper |
2023 | Committee formation under constraints through randomized voting rules on separable domains. (2023). Sadhukhan, Soumyarup ; Roy, Souvik. In: Journal of Economic Theory. RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:209:y:2023:i:c:s0022053123000443. Full description at Econpapers || Download paper |
2022 | Group strategy-proof probabilistic voting with single-peaked preferences. (2022). Morimoto, Shuhei. In: Journal of Mathematical Economics. RePEc:eee:mateco:v:102:y:2022:i:c:s0304406822000842. Full description at Econpapers || Download paper |
2023 | Overbidding and underbidding in package allocation problems. (2023). Robles, Francisco ; Nez, Marina. In: UB Economics Working Papers. RePEc:ewp:wpaper:440web. Full description at Econpapers || Download paper |
2022 | Egalitarian-Equivalence and Strategy-Proofness in the Object Allocation Problem with Non-Quasi-Linear Preferences. (2022). Shinozaki, Hiroki. In: Games. RePEc:gam:jgames:v:13:y:2022:i:6:p:75-:d:973142. Full description at Econpapers || Download paper |
2022 | INCENTIVES AND EFFICIENCY IN MATCHING WITH TRANSFERS: TOWARDS NONQUASILINEAR PACKAGE AUCTIONS. (2022). Tierney, Ryan. In: Discussion Papers on Economics. RePEc:hhs:sdueko:2022_006. Full description at Econpapers || Download paper |
2022 | Non-dictatorial public distribution rules. (2022). Goswami, Mridu Prabal. In: Review of Economic Design. RePEc:spr:reecde:v:26:y:2022:i:2:d:10.1007_s10058-021-00262-7. Full description at Econpapers || Download paper |
2022 | Strategy-proof and fair reallocation with single-peaked preferences. (2022). Ohseto, Shinji ; Zhao, Zhen. In: Social Choice and Welfare. RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:58:y:2022:i:4:d:10.1007_s00355-021-01374-3. Full description at Econpapers || Download paper |
2023 | Ordinal allocation. (2023). Richter, Michael ; Chambers, Christopher. In: Social Choice and Welfare. RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:60:y:2023:i:1:d:10.1007_s00355-020-01280-0. Full description at Econpapers || Download paper |
2023 | Strategy-proof mechanism design with non-quasi-linear preferences: ex-post revenue maximization for an arbitrary number of objects. (2023). Serizawa, Shigehiro ; Sakai, Ryosuke. In: Social Choice and Welfare. RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:60:y:2023:i:1:d:10.1007_s00355-021-01333-y. Full description at Econpapers || Download paper |
Year | Title | Type | Cited |
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2017 | Strategy-proof multi-object auction design: Ex-post revenue maximization with no wastage In: Discussion Papers. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 1 |
2017 | Mechanism design without quasilinearity In: Discussion Papers. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 7 |
2017 | Mechanism design without quasilinearity.(2017) In: ISER Discussion Paper. [Full Text][Citation analysis] This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 7 | paper | |
2020 | Mechanism design without quasilinearity.(2020) In: Theoretical Economics. [Full Text][Citation analysis] This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 7 | article | |
1996 | Maximal Domain for Strategy-Proof Rules with one Public Good. In: UFAE and IAE Working Papers. [Citation analysis] | paper | 28 |
2000 | Maximal Domain for Strategy-Proof Rules with One Public Good.(2000) In: Journal of Economic Theory. [Full Text][Citation analysis] This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 28 | article | |
1996 | Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges. In: UFAE and IAE Working Papers. [Citation analysis] | paper | 23 |
1998 | Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges.(1998) In: Games and Economic Behavior. [Full Text][Citation analysis] This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 23 | article | |
1996 | An IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM IN PURE PUBLIC GOODS ECONOMIES WITH FEASIBILITY CONSTRAINTS: VOTING BY COMMITTEES IN NON-RECTANGULAR FEASIBLE SETS In: The Japanese Economic Review. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 4 |
2005 | Maximal Domain for Strategy-Proof Rules in Allotment Economies In: ISER Discussion Paper. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 7 |
2006 | Maximal Domain for Strategy-proof Rules in Allotment Economies.(2006) In: Social Choice and Welfare. [Full Text][Citation analysis] This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 7 | article | |
2005 | Pairwise Strategy-Proofness and Self-Enforcing Manipulation In: ISER Discussion Paper. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 25 |
2006 | Pairwise Strategy-Proofness and Self-Enforcing Manipulation.(2006) In: Social Choice and Welfare. [Full Text][Citation analysis] This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 25 | article | |
2005 | Characterizing the Vickrey Combinatorial Auction by Induction In: ISER Discussion Paper. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 19 |
2007 | Characterizing the Vickrey combinatorial auction by induction.(2007) In: Economic Theory. [Full Text][Citation analysis] This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 19 | article | |
2005 | Vickrey Allocation Rule with Income Effect In: ISER Discussion Paper. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 37 |
2008 | Vickrey allocation rule with income effect.(2008) In: Economic Theory. [Full Text][Citation analysis] This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 37 | article | |
2006 | Strategy-Proof and Anonymous Allocation Rules of Indivisible Goods: A New Characterization of Vickrey Allocation Rule In: ISER Discussion Paper. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 1 |
2006 | An Impossibility Theorem in Matching Problems In: ISER Discussion Paper. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 1 |
2009 | Coalitionally Strategy-Proof Rules in Allotment Economies of Homogeneous Indivisible Goods In: ISER Discussion Paper. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 5 |
2010 | Auctions for Public Construction with Corner-cutting In: ISER Discussion Paper. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 0 |
2010 | An Experimental Study of Procurement Auctions with Endogenous Minimum Prices In: ISER Discussion Paper. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 0 |
2009 | Auctions with Endogenous Price Ceiling:Theoretical and Experimental Results In: ISER Discussion Paper. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 0 |
2009 | A Characterization of the Uniform Rule with Several Commodities and Agents In: ISER Discussion Paper. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 12 |
2013 | A characterization of the uniform rule with several commodities and agents.(2013) In: Social Choice and Welfare. [Full Text][Citation analysis] This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 12 | article | |
2013 | A maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice model In: ISER Discussion Paper. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 9 |
2014 | A maximal domain for strategy-proof and no-vetoer rules in the multi-object choice model.(2014) In: International Journal of Game Theory. [Full Text][Citation analysis] This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 9 | article | |
2012 | Strategy-proofness and Efficiency with Nonquasi-linear Preferences: A Characterization of Minimum Price Walrasian Rule In: ISER Discussion Paper. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 40 |
2015 | Strategy-proofness and efficiency with non-quasi-linear preferences: a characterization of minimum price Walrasian rule.(2015) In: Theoretical Economics. [Full Text][Citation analysis] This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 40 | article | |
2015 | Notions of anonymity for object assignment: impossibility theorems In: ISER Discussion Paper. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 0 |
2015 | Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi demand preferences In: ISER Discussion Paper. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 10 |
2016 | Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi-demand preferences.(2016) In: Social Choice and Welfare. [Full Text][Citation analysis] This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 10 | article | |
2016 | Strategy-Proofness and Efficiency for Non-quasi-linear Common-Tiered-Object Preferences: Characterization of Minimum Price Rule In: ISER Discussion Paper. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 2 |
2020 | Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: Ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences In: ISER Discussion Paper. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 6 |
2020 | Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: Ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences.(2020) In: Journal of Economic Theory. [Full Text][Citation analysis] This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 6 | article | |
2019 | Minimum price equilibrium in the assignment market In: ISER Discussion Paper. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 1 |
2019 | A Strategy-Proof Mechanism Should Be Announced to Be Strategy-Proof: An Experiment for the Vickrey Auction In: ISER Discussion Paper. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 0 |
2020 | Serial Vickrey Mechanism In: ISER Discussion Paper. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 1 |
2020 | Strategy-proof mechanism design with non-quasilinear preferences: Ex-post revenue maximization for an arbitrary number of objects In: ISER Discussion Paper. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 3 |
2021 | The net effect of advice on strategy-proof mechanisms: An experiment for the Vickrey auction In: ISER Discussion Paper. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 2 |
2020 | On Strategy-proofness and the Salience of Single-peakedness in a Private Goods Economy In: ISER Discussion Paper. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 0 |
2021 | Multi-object Auction Design Beyond Quasi-linearity: Leading Examples In: ISER Discussion Paper. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 0 |
2021 | A characterization of the Vickery rule in slot allocation problems In: ISER Discussion Paper. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 0 |
2021 | A Characterization of Minimum Price Walrasian Rule in Object Allocation Problem for an Arbitrary Number of Objects In: ISER Discussion Paper. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 1 |
1999 | Strategy-Proof and Symmetric Social Choice Functions for Public Good Economies In: Econometrica. [Citation analysis] | article | 26 |
2018 | Strategy-proofness and efficiency for non-quasi-linear and common-tiered-object preferences: Characterization of minimum price rule In: Games and Economic Behavior. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 6 |
2002 | Inefficiency of Strategy-Proof Rules for Pure Exchange Economies In: Journal of Economic Theory. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 39 |
2003 | Efficient strategy-proof exchange and minimum consumption guarantees In: Journal of Economic Theory. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 35 |
2002 | Efficient Strategy-Proof Exchange and Minimum Consumption Guarantees.(2002) In: Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers. [Full Text][Citation analysis] This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 35 | paper | |
1995 | Power of Voters and Domain of Preferences Where Voting by Committees Is Strategy-Proof In: Journal of Economic Theory. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 16 |
1998 | A Maximal Domain for the Existence of Strategy-Proof Rules In: Journal of Economic Theory. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 27 |
1996 | Strategy-Proof and Individually Rational Social Choice Functions for Public Good Economies. In: Economic Theory. [Citation analysis] | article | 12 |
1996 | Strategy-proof and individually rational social choice functions for public good economies (*).(1996) In: Economic Theory. [Citation analysis] This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 12 | article | |
1997 | Strategy-proof and individually rational social choice functions for public good economies.(1997) In: Economic Theory. [Citation analysis] This paper has another version. Agregated cites: 12 | article | |
2009 | Coalitionally strategy-proof rules in allotment economies with homogeneous indivisible goods In: Social Choice and Welfare. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 5 |
2010 | An impossibility theorem for matching problems In: Social Choice and Welfare. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 7 |
2012 | Characterizing Vickrey allocation rule by anonymity In: Social Choice and Welfare. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 22 |
2017 | Strategy-proof multi-object allocation: Ex-post revenue maximization with no wastage In: Working Papers. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 1 |
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