Citation profile for Francisco Silva

Francisco Silva : Citation Profile

Deakin University

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Citations

RESEARCH PRODUCTION:

Articles

Papers

RESEARCH ACTIVITY:

   8 years (2016 - 2024). See details.
   Cites by year: 0
   Journals where Francisco Silva has often published
   Relations with other researchers
   Recent citing documents: 4.    Total self citations: 6 (54.55 %)

MORE DETAILS IN:

EconPapers Author's homepage

ABOUT THIS REPORT:

   Permalink: http://citec.repec.org/psi931
   Updated: 2024-12-03    RAS profile: 2024-08-09
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Relations with other researchers

Works with:

Pereyra, Juan (3)

Authors registered in RePEc who have co-authored more than one work in the last five years with Francisco Silva.

Is cited by:

Cites to:

Tirole, Jean (7)

Fudenberg, Drew (6)

Milgrom, Paul (5)

Levine, David (5)

Ekmekci, Mehmet (5)

janssen, maarten (4)

spiegler, ran (4)

Crawford, Vincent (4)

Sobel, Joel (4)

Ben-Porath, Elchanan (4)

Schmidt, Klaus (3)

Main data

Where Francisco Silva has published?

Journals with more than one article published	# docs
Economic Inquiry	3
Theoretical Economics	3

Working Papers Series with more than one paper published	# docs
Documentos de Trabajo / Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Cat�lica de Chile.	6

Recent works citing Francisco Silva (2024 and 2023)

Year	Title of citing document
2023	Selecting a Winner with External Referees. (2023). Dziubinski, Marcin ; Dutta, Bhaskar ; Bloch, Francis. In: Working Papers. RePEc:ash:wpaper:99. Full description at Econpapers \|\| Download paper
2023	Selecting a winner with external referees. (2023). Dziubiski, Marcin ; Dutta, Bhaskar ; Bloch, Francis. In: Journal of Economic Theory. RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:211:y:2023:i:c:s0022053123000832. Full description at Econpapers \|\| Download paper

Works by Francisco Silva:

Year	Title	Type	Cited
2020	The Importance of Commitment Power in Games with Imperfect Evidence In: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. [Full Text][Citation analysis]	article	0
2017	INDUCING OVERCONFIDENCE In: Economic Inquiry. [Full Text][Citation analysis]	article	0
2020	A GAME THEORETIC ANALYSIS OF VOLUNTARY EUTHANASIA AND PHYSICIAN ASSISTED SUICIDE In: Economic Inquiry. [Full Text][Citation analysis]	article	0
2023	Should a benevolent government provide public goods if it cannot commit? In: Economic Inquiry. [Full Text][Citation analysis]	article	0
2023	Modeling Competition over Multiple Variables under Limited Consumer Awareness In: Journal of Industrial Economics. [Full Text][Citation analysis]	article	0
2022	The role of information in collective decisions In: Documentos CEDE. [Full Text][Citation analysis]	paper	0
2022	The value of uncertainty in determining an experts source of expertise In: Games and Economic Behavior. [Full Text][Citation analysis]	article	0
2016	Should the Government Provide Public Goods if it Cannot Commit? In: Documentos de Trabajo. [Full Text][Citation analysis]	paper	0
2020	Should the government provide public goods if it cannot commit?.(2020) In: Documentos de Trabajo. [Full Text][Citation analysis] This paper has nother version. Agregated cites: 0	paper
2016	Euthanasia: The Fear of Becoming a Burden In: Documentos de Trabajo. [Full Text][Citation analysis]	paper	0
2020	Optimal object assignment mechanisms with imperfect type veri?cation In: Documentos de Trabajo. [Full Text][Citation analysis]	paper	1
2020	The Equivalence Between Sequential and Simultaneous Firm Decisions In: Documentos de Trabajo. [Full Text][Citation analysis]	paper	0
2020	Self-evaluations In: Documentos de Trabajo. [Full Text][Citation analysis]	paper	0
2019	Renegotiation proof mechanism design with imperfect type verification In: Theoretical Economics. [Full Text][Citation analysis]	article	0
2023	Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification In: Theoretical Economics. [Full Text][Citation analysis]	article	3
2020	Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification.(2020) In: Documentos de Trabajo (working papers). [Full Text][Citation analysis] This paper has nother version. Agregated cites: 3	paper
2024	Information transmission in persuasion models with imperfect verification In: Theoretical Economics. [Full Text][Citation analysis]	article	0
2019	IF WE CONFESS OUR SINS In: International Economic Review. [Full Text][Citation analysis]	article	1