3
H index
0
i10 index
25
Citations
Martin Pollrich : Citation Profile
Université Paris-Saclay (95% share) | RESEARCH PRODUCTION: 7 Articles 17 Papers RESEARCH ACTIVITY:
MORE DETAILS IN: ABOUT THIS REPORT:
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11 years (2013 - 2024). Relations with other researchers
Works with:
Authors registered in RePEc who have co-authored more than one work in the last five years with Martin Pollrich. | Is cited by:
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Main data
Where Martin Pollrich has published?
Recent works citing Martin Pollrich (2024 and 2023)
| Year | Title of citing document |
|---|---|
| 2023 | Auctioning with Strategically Reticent Bidders. (2021). Xu, Haifeng ; Badanidiyuru, Ashwinkumar ; Wu, Jibang. In: Papers. RePEc:arx:papers:2109.04888. Full description at Econpapers || Download paper |
| 2024 | Pricing Novel Goods. (2022). Hinnosaar, Toomas ; Giovannoni, Francesco. In: Papers. RePEc:arx:papers:2208.04985. Full description at Econpapers || Download paper |
| 2023 | Easing Renegotiation Rules in Public Procurement: Evidence from a Policy Reform. (2023). Titl, Vítězslav ; Šoltés, Michal ; de Jaegher, Kris. In: CERGE-EI Working Papers. RePEc:cer:papers:wp757. Full description at Econpapers || Download paper |
| 2023 | Regulatory mechanism design with extortionary collusion. (2023). Tsumagari, Masatoshi ; Mookherjee, Dilip. In: Journal of Economic Theory. RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:208:y:2023:i:c:s0022053123000108. Full description at Econpapers || Download paper |
| 2023 | Optimal transparency of monitoring capability. (2023). Tan, Teck Yong. In: Journal of Economic Theory. RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:209:y:2023:i:c:s0022053123000169. Full description at Econpapers || Download paper |
| 2023 | Trust and Trustworthiness in Procurement Contracts with Retainage. (2023). Shachat, Jason ; Katok, Elena ; Walker, Matthew J. In: Management Science. RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:69:y:2023:i:6:p:3492-3515. Full description at Econpapers || Download paper |
Works by Martin Pollrich:
| Year | Title | Type | Cited |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | The Irrelevance of Fee Structures for Certification In: American Economic Review: Insights. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 0 |
| .() In: . [Full Text][Citation analysis] This paper has nother version. Agregated cites: 0 | paper | ||
| 2015 | Unobservable investments, limited commitment, and the curse of firm relocation In: BDPEMS Working Papers. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 3 |
| 2013 | Informational opacity and honest certication In: BDPEMS Working Papers. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 3 |
| 2013 | Informational Opacity and Honest Certification.(2013) In: Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin. [Full Text][Citation analysis] This paper has nother version. Agregated cites: 3 | paper | |
| 2014 | Informational opacity and honest certification.(2014) In: Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems. [Full Text][Citation analysis] This paper has nother version. Agregated cites: 3 | paper | |
| 2015 | Mediated Audits In: BDPEMS Working Papers. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 5 |
| 2017 | Mediated audits.(2017) In: RAND Journal of Economics. [Full Text][Citation analysis] This paper has nother version. Agregated cites: 5 | article | |
| 2015 | Mediated Audits.(2015) In: Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems. [Full Text][Citation analysis] This paper has nother version. Agregated cites: 5 | paper | |
| 2015 | The Maximum Punishment Principle and Precision of Audits under Limited Commitment - Preliminary and Incomplete Version - In: BDPEMS Working Papers. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 0 |
| 2020 | Sweet Lemons: Mitigating Collusion in Organizations In: CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 2 |
| 2020 | Sweet lemons: Mitigating collusion in organizations.(2020) In: Journal of Economic Theory. [Full Text][Citation analysis] This paper has nother version. Agregated cites: 2 | article | |
| 2018 | Sweet Lemons: Mitigating Collusion in Organizations.(2018) In: Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series. [Full Text][Citation analysis] This paper has nother version. Agregated cites: 2 | paper | |
| 2020 | Optimal Auctions With Signaling Bidders In: CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 5 |
| 2020 | Optimal auctions with signaling bidders.(2020) In: ZEW Discussion Papers. [Full Text][Citation analysis] This paper has nother version. Agregated cites: 5 | paper | |
| 2013 | Gütesiegel: zu detaillierte Angaben können die Funktionsfähigkeit der Zertifikate schmälern In: DIW Wochenbericht. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 0 |
| 2016 | Imprecise information disclosure and truthful certification In: European Economic Review. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 4 |
| 2022 | Information design in sequential procurement In: Games and Economic Behavior. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 0 |
| 2022 | Incomplete Contracts in Multi-period Procurement In: Management Science. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 0 |
| 2014 | Optimal incentive contracts to avert firm relocation In: Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 0 |
| 2014 | An optimal incentive contract to avert firm relocation.(2014) In: VfS Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy. [Full Text][Citation analysis] This paper has nother version. Agregated cites: 0 | paper | |
| 2013 | An optimal incentive contract to avert firm relocation under unilateral environmental regulation In: VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 0 |
| 2019 | Sequential procurement with limited commitment In: ZEW Discussion Papers. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 2 |
| 2019 | Incomplete contracts in dynamic procurement In: ZEW Discussion Papers. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 1 |
CitEc is a RePEc service, providing citation data for Economics since 2001. Last updated November, 3 2024. Contact: CitEc Team