6
H index
5
i10 index
89
Citations
Universidad de Alcalá de Henares | 6 H index 5 i10 index 89 Citations RESEARCH PRODUCTION: 13 Articles 3 Papers RESEARCH ACTIVITY: 20 years (1995 - 2015). See details. MORE DETAILS IN: ABOUT THIS REPORT: Permalink: http://citec.repec.org/ppr234 |
Works with: Authors registered in RePEc who have co-authored more than one work in the last five years with Joaquín Pérez. | Is cited by: | Cites to: |
Journals with more than one article published | # docs |
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Social Choice and Welfare | 3 |
Group Decision and Negotiation | 3 |
Investigaciones Economicas | 2 |
Working Papers Series with more than one paper published | # docs |
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Doctorado en Economa- documentos de trabajo / Programa de doctorado en Economa. Universidad de Alcal. | 3 |
Year | Title of citing document |
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2023 | Split Cycle: A New Condorcet Consistent Voting Method Independent of Clones and Immune to Spoilers. (2020). Pacuit, Eric ; Holliday, Wesley H. In: Papers. RePEc:arx:papers:2004.02350. Full description at Econpapers || Download paper |
2023 | Participation Incentives in Approval-Based Committee Elections. (2023). Dong, Chris ; Bullinger, Martin ; Mehler, Clara ; Lederer, Patrick. In: Papers. RePEc:arx:papers:2312.08798. Full description at Econpapers || Download paper |
2024 | An impossibility theorem concerning positive involvement in voting. (2024). Holliday, Wesley H. In: Economics Letters. RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:236:y:2024:i:c:s0165176524000727. Full description at Econpapers || Download paper |
2023 | Split Cycle: a new Condorcet-consistent voting method independent of clones and immune to spoilers. (2023). Pacuit, Eric ; Holliday, Wesley H. In: Public Choice. RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:197:y:2023:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-023-01042-3. Full description at Econpapers || Download paper |
Year | Title | Type | Cited |
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2000 | A Strong No Show Paradox is a common flaw in Condorcet Voting Correspondences. In: Doctorado en Economía- documentos de trabajo. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 0 |
2002 | Another potential strong shortcoming of AHP In: Doctorado en Economía- documentos de trabajo. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 0 |
2002 | Individual dismissals in Europe and the United States: A model on the influence of the legal framework on firing costs In: Doctorado en Economía- documentos de trabajo. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | paper | 12 |
2003 | Individual Dismissals in Europe and the United States: A Model on the Influence of the Legal Framework on Firing Costs.(2003) In: European Journal of Law and Economics. [Full Text][Citation analysis] This paper has nother version. Agregated cites: 12 | article | |
1995 | Three practical criteria of comparison among ordinal preference aggregating rules In: European Journal of Operational Research. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 1 |
2011 | Extensions of the Young and Levenglick result about the inconsistency of Condorcet voting correspondences In: Mathematical Social Sciences. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 0 |
1995 | Incidence of no-show paradoxes in Condorcet choice functions In: Investigaciones Economicas. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 3 |
1995 | Non-linear dynamics and chaos in the Spanish stock market In: Investigaciones Economicas. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 9 |
1995 | Some Comments on Saatys AHP In: Management Science. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 11 |
2012 | No Show Paradox in Condorcet k-voting Procedures In: Group Decision and Negotiation. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 4 |
2013 | New Voting Correspondences Obtained from a Distance-Based Framework In: Group Decision and Negotiation. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 0 |
2015 | No Show Paradox and the Golden Number in Generalized Condorcet Voting Methods In: Group Decision and Negotiation. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 0 |
2001 | The Strong No Show Paradoxes are a common flaw in Condorcet voting correspondences In: Social Choice and Welfare. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 18 |
2009 | An extension of the Moulin No Show Paradox for voting correspondences In: Social Choice and Welfare. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 18 |
2014 | Implementation of Jefferson-d’Hondt rule in the formation of a parliamentary committee In: Social Choice and Welfare. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 3 |
2006 | Another potential shortcoming of AHP In: TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research. [Full Text][Citation analysis] | article | 10 |
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